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1.08710GEORGE ELIOT: CLIO AS NOVELIST
An investigation into the uses of history 
in three of George Eliot's novels: Romola, 
Middlemarch, and Daniel Deronda
The novels of George Eliot are lucrative source materials for 
investigating literature's relation to history. Her works offer a 
spectrum of possibilities in the approach to the past. Felix Holt, the 
Radical, for example, describes the awakening of political conscious­
ness in early Victorian rural England; The Mill on the Floss depicts 
the power of traditional class ties in shaping social mores; Daniel 
Deronda renders the Zeitgeist in budding Zionism; Romola is a tidy 
set piece on the closing years of fifteenth-century Florence, and 
Middlemarch projects a Heraclitean reality with close-ups on the 
capillary action of process, dissolution, and change. When Henry 
James read Middlemarch, he paid it a high compliment by observing: 
"If we write novels so, how shall we write History" ("Three Reviews," 
The Future of the Novel, p. 89)? Though meant to be rhetorical, 
James's question is a goad. The following three chapters will take 
up the challenge implicit in his words by exploring the uses of history 
in George Eliot's imaginative re-creation of the past in Romola, 
Middlemarch, and Daniel Deronda.
What does the novelist share with the historian in the creative 
interpretation of bygone days? Methodological problems such as the 
handling of time, the techniques of selection, the interaction of 
individual and social will, continuity in the art of narrative, needless 
to say, concern both. The novelist and the historian have an avid
curiosity about sources, origins, and beginnings,’ that is, they are 
genetically oriented. Both seek, like Tristram Shandy, to tell their 
story ab ovo. On the whole, both view institutions as evolving projec­
tions of changing social needs and regard man and society as inextri­
cably interwoven. And both affirm that however much a man may go 
. . transacting his particular affairs with the narrow pertinacity 
of a respectable ant, " to use George Eliot's words, "he subserves 
an economy larger than any purpose of his own" (Impressions of 
Theophrastus Such, Ch. 7).
More important, however, are the very assumptions which 
the historian and the novelist entertain towards the nature of the 
historical process itself. Is history an antique gallery of outworn 
attractive merchandise still worthy of attention? Is history a sense­
less horror story, a nightmare, to paraphrase James Joyce’s Stephen 
Dedalus, from which we are trying to escape? Or is history a 
critical reservoir in the flow of human experience, a reservoir whose 
contents exhibit a patterned direction of mankind's future course?
The writer's attitude towards history not only influences the structural 
dimensions of his work but also acts as the supreme fiat controlling 
the unity of his composition, be it fact or fiction.
Eliot is impressed by the subtle yet vital links between men 
as functioning cells within the body politic. Her novels are permeated 
with the awareness that though she ravels and unravels the skeins of 
particular lives, these lives form part of a larger social whole. In 
the third chapter of Felix Holt, the Radical, she comments: "This 
history is chiefly concerned with the private lot of a few men and
)
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women, but there is no private life which has not been determined by
a wider public life. ..." Middlemarch abounds with references to
the "web" of relations binding characters to their social environment.
In Romola, the network of interaction between part and whole is also
referred to as "a tangled web, " though Eliot in this novel prefers to
use images drawn from botany to illustrate the correspondence
between the individual and the collective:
Since that Easter a great change had come over the prospects 
of Florence; and as in the tree that bears a myriad of blossoms, 
each single bud with its fruit is dependent on the primary 
circulation of the sap, so the fortunes of Tito and Romola 
were dependent on certain grand political and social conditions 
which made an epoch in the history of Italy.
(Book Two, Ch. I)
History has repeatedly professed its allegiance to truth, and 
so has the novel. While other forms of fiction have been content to 
entertain, the novel has doggedly insisted on assuming a more 
ambitious role: that of a meticulous diagnostician of human manners 
and morals. No genre has more loudly flaunted its truth-to-life and 
its devotions to the sober canons of probability and verisimilitude. 
And no genre lias presumed with more effrontery to declare its 
kinship with realism or with greater impertinence asserted it knew 
precisely what "realism" was.
One of the least dogmatic testimonials of this way of thinking 
appears in George Eliot's Adam Bede, when the author in an oft- 
quoted aside declares her purpose to be the faithful rendering of 
men and things as they have mirrored themselves in her mind. Eliot 
admits that her mirror may be defective and her reflection faint or 
confused, but she feels bound to tell the truth about the past "as if I
I
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were in the witness-box, " she writes, "narrating my experience on 
oath" (Ch. XVII). Considering the dramatic intensity inherent in the 
courtroom analogy, there seems to be little doubt, that Eliot means to 
tell the whole truth and nothing but. Yet it is obvious to Eliot and to 
most of her readers that this goal in no way excludes the fictional 
reconstruction of the past, and that truth and fiction far from being 
contraries are in fact quite compatible.
This point of view has long been anathema to the professional 
historian. Rooted in a literary past, history has viewed its own 
genealogy with mixed feelings. Aware of its shared pedigree with 
fiction, its ancient kinship with the epics, the prose sagas, folk tales, 
and legends, history has, nevertheless, done its utmost to exorcise 
the fictional strains from its family tree. In the opening pages of 
Middlemarch, the genial dilettante, Mr. Brooke, asks the historian, 
Mr. Casaubon: "But talking of books, there is Southey's 'Peninsular 
War.' lam reading that of a morning. You know Southey?" Replying 
"no" to the query, Mr. Casaubon adds: "I have little leisure for such 
literature just now. " Casaubon's response reflects a prevalent 
attitude among "serious" historians towards literature. At best, 
history has treated fiction as a frivolous adornment which graces the 
ancestral manse, at worst, a family skeleton about which the less 
said the better. Literary historians, such as Carlyle, Macaulay, or 
Froude, for example, have long been regarded by self-respecting 
historians as slovenly scholars, who shaped the evidence hastily 
according to their heated fancies. Or, as Mr. Casaubon would say:
It had been easy for me to gain a temporary effect by a mirage of
baseless opinion; but it is ever the trial of the scrupulous explorer
-4-
to be saluted with the impatient scorn of chatterers who attempt 
only the smallest achievements, being indeed equipped for no 
other.
(Ch. 20)
In the nineteenth century, these sentiments were echoed in 
the pages of Droysen, Niebuhr, Fustel de Coulanges, and John Seeley, 
all of whom cautioned against giving history the vivid artificial 
coloring and the dramatic interest of fiction. In our own day, a 
vociferous spokesman for this position is Harry Elmer Barnes, 
who states emphatically:
Least of all should literary artistry be confused with historical 
prowess. The clever essayist, as such, is no more a historian 
than a painter who produces a chromatic masterpiece designed 
to reproduce the likeness of St. Peter or Charles I. Van Dyke 
was as much entitled to rank as a historian as Carlyle. Hogarth 
was as truly a historian as Macaulay.
(A History of Historical Writing, p. 386)
Curious to say, literature has remained singularly impervious 
to the efforts of historians to show it the door. Instead it has 
stubbornly reaffirmed its old family ties by offering what it felt was 
a legitimate heir to history's demesne in the form of a brand new 
mutant genre: the novel. It is no accident that the novel blossomed 
in the eighteenth century, when widespread interest in the professional 
study of history arose. It is no accident that novelists over and 
over again refer to their works as histories and refer to themselves 
as historians. Henry James underscores this kinship in an essay 
censoring Anthony Trollope's suicidal satisfaction in reminding the 
reader that fiction is, after all, only make-believe. "It is impossible 
to imagine what a novelist takes himself to be unless he regards 
himself as an historian and this narrative as a history, " James 
writes. "It is only as an historian that he has the smallest locus
-5-
standi ("Anthony Trollope," The Future of the Novel, p. 248).
To history's claim that it is based upon documentary evidence,
the novelist replies that documents can lie, or that good fiction is 
more authentic than "paste and scissors" truth. For Swift's Gulliver, 
modern historians were "prostitute writers, " who ascribed "the
greatest exploits in war to cowards, the wisest counsel to fools, 
sincerity to flatterers. . . piety to atheists, chastity to sodomites, 
truth to informers" (Gulliver's Travels, Part III, Ch. 8). History's 
claim that it is dispassionate and objective is parried by the novel­
ist’s retort that selection is the first blow to the theory of the whole 
truth. In Jane Austen's Northanger Abbey, Cadierine finds it odd 
that history . . should be so dull, for a great deal of it must be 
invention. " Her companion, Miss Tilney, replies with unconscious 
irony:
I am fond of history and am well contented to take the false with 
the true. In the principal facts they have sources of intelligence 
in former histories and records, which may be as much depended 
on, I conclude, as anything that does not actually pass under one's 
observation. . .
(Ch. 14)
In his Notes on Life and Letters, Joseph Conrad also attacks the
credentials of historians as qualified appraisers of the past:
Fiction is history, human history, or it is nothing. But it is also 
more than that; it stands on firmer ground, being based on the 
reality of forms and the observation of social phenomena, 
whereas history is based on documents, and the reading of 
print and handwriting -- on second-hand impressions. Thus, 
fiction is nearer truth. But let that pass. A historian may be 
an artist too, and a novelist is a historian, the preserver, the 
keeper, the expounder, of human experience.
(p. 17)
With the growth of cultural history in recent years, there has 
been a tentative rapprochement in the estranged relations betweena
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the novelist and the historian. Itself a victim of the historical proc­
ess, history has watched its cherished assumptions crumble, attack­
ed not only by the new physics and psychology but also by members 
within its own ranks. For example, Carl Becker’s essay, "What are 
Historical Facts?" explodes materialistic shibboleths about empirical 
data: ". . . the simple historical fact turns out to be not a hard, 
cold something with clear outline and measurable pressure, like a 
brick. It is so far as we can know it, only a symbol. . . " 
(Detachment and the Writing of History, p. 45). R. G. Collingwood's 
The Idea of History is a compelling account in favor of the creative 
imagination in historical research, though he insists that the 
historian's aim radically alters the nature of the artistic product.
"As works of imagination, the historian’s work and the novelist's do 
not differ. Where they do differ is that the historian’s picture is 
meant to be true" (p. 246), a distinction which would impress a 
George Eliot and a Joseph Conrad but little.
While die gulf between die two disciplines has narrowed, it 
would be rash to conclude that the phrase "historical novel" is re­
dundant, because the novel with few exceptions describes the recent 
or distant past. And it would be equally rash to conclude that the 
phrase "literary history" is redundant, since the historian's vision 
is a highly-colored personal one, being conditioned by his own race, 
temps, milieu, as well as a plethora of unconscious causes within 
the Freudian paradigm.
George Eliot's novels illuminate the gray limbo shared by the 
creative artist and the creative historian. Her novels offer a
-7-
diversity of literary techniques which embody die multiple roles of 
history in fiction. The ensuing chapters will explore how she projects
I
a three-pronged view of the past: of history as preservation in 
Romola, of history as process in Middlemarch, and in Daniel 
Deronda, a view of history as prophecy.
-8-
CHAPTER ONE
HISTORY AS PRESERVATION: ROMOLA
The study of Romola's artistic structure discloses a method­
ology bent on presenting an ahistorical view of a segment of time, 
namely, late fifteenth-century Renaissance Florence. This chapter 
will examine those literary techniques which contribute to Eliot's 
non-developmental historical outlook in this novel.
Paradoxical as it may seem, an interest in the past in no way 
guarantees the possession of a sense of history, that is, a conscious­
ness of change. Men and women have looked backwards in time in 
myriad modes, not all of which could be called historical. While the 
novels of George Eliot are imbued with a deep regard for former days,
her works vary markedly in their projection of historical change. A
/
glance at the range of time spanning Eliot's description of the past 
reveals a curious correlation between the remoteness of her fictional 
settings and her historical point of view. The further back the novel's 
milieu appears in the time scale, the more hostile is the author's 
attitude towards change, and the more inflexible are her structural 
shapings of the sinews of movement and flux. Conversely, the 
closer the temporal stage, the more receptive the author is to the 
march of events, and the more eager she is to render palpable the 
propellers of social transformation. To illustrate, Romola, set in 
Renaissance Florence, is of all Eliot’s novels the most remote in 
time. And of all Eliot's novels, Romola is generally singled out as
I
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bonafide historical fiction, yet, strange to say, this work is barely 
tinged with a sense of historical change. Instead, Romola is a paean 
to permanence. On the other hand, Daniel Deronda, cast in the 
Victorian "age of crinoline, " is the most contemporary of Eliot's 
settings, yet this novel is drenched with wonder at the inexorable 
power of the historical process as it affects the present.
Between these extremes in the temporal range of Eliot's 
fiction lie two clusters of novels. The opening decades of the nine­
teenth century provide the backdrop for the first group, which includes 
Scenes of Clerical Life, Adam Bede, and Silas Marner. Like Walter 
Scott's Waverley, these works might very well bear the subtitle,
*Tis Sixty Years Since, and could by a rather crude chronological 
gauge be classified as historical fiction, since they re-create an age 
just prior to the author's birth. The action in the second cluster, 
which embraces The Mill on the Floss, Felix Holt, the Radical, and 
Middlemarch, centers about the Reform era of late Georgian England, 
a time paralleling Eliot's early girlhood years. To some degree, 
each of these six novels is concerned with the transmutations wrought 
by the industrialization and the democratization of England. Middle- 
march, in particular, peers with its fine microscopic eye into the 
gradual modifications of cellular structure in a small provincial city 
responding to the pressures of social change. If George Eliot's 
intellectual biography is a "graph" of the emerging philosophical 
ideas of her century, as Basil Willey convincingly argues in his 
Nineteenth Century Studies (Ch. VIII, pp. 208-9), then it is fair to 
assume that her imaginative flights into former times took full
i
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measure of the prevailing winds and crosswinds of her day.
The development of her historical outlook follows the gradual 
pattern of conversion typical of her century. This pattern rose from 
a picture of the past as a storehouse of antiquarian treasures and then 
grew into a conception of history as a prolific womb of evolutionary 
flux. The most exaggerated forms of this pattern regarded history 
as a universal dynamo, a Prime Mover energizing and regulating the 
future. Needless to say, these three stages are convenient abstrac­
tions which have rarely existed in their pure forms. Nor are these 
stages necessarily consecutive, but rather they represent steps in 
the growing intensity of feeling which history kindled in the enthusi­
asms of men over a century ago. In George Eliot's novels, the first 
stage of this pattern is best pinioned in Romola, the second in. 
Middlemarch, and the third is most sympathetically portrayed in her 
last novel, Daniel Deronda. The remaining pages of this chapter will 
concentrate on the first stage, which is embodied in Romola.
Using the title of a poem by Swinburne, Jerome Hamilton 
Buckley, in a recent book, dubs the Victorian age,.The Triumph of 
Time, a fitting epithet for the nineteenth-century obsession with the 
anatomy of change. Mr. Buckley states that Victorians had an 
unprecedented awareness of themselves in time and either cele­
brated or reviled history as the harbinger of progress or the kernel 
of decay. "The conviction is already not far from being universal, " 
John Stuart Mill wrote in 1831, "that the times are pregnant with 
change; and that the nineteenth century will be known to posterity as 
the era of one of the greatest revolutions of which history has
■
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preserved the remembrance, in the human mind, and in the whole 
constitution of human society . . . " (Richard L. Schoenwald, ed., 
"The Spirit of the Times," Nineteenth-Century Thought: The Dis­
covery of Change, p. 17). In such an atmosphere, the mood of 
Ecclesiastes would seem alien and anachronistic. That generations 
come and generations go and there's nothing new under die sun 
would strike the Victorian mind as gross and fatuous generalizations, 
which flatly ignore the stunning profusion of revolutionary innova­
tions emerging every day. "Events are now so momentous, and the 
elements of society in so chemically critical a state," George Eliot 
exclaimed in a letter written in 1840, "diat a drop seems enough to 
change its whole form" (Haight, ed., The George Eliot Letters, Vol. 
I, p. 72).
The contrast between then and now is a persistent leitmotif 
in Eliot's fiction. In Adam Bede, for example, she compares die 
strenuous pace of modem life, a pace in which ". . . even idleness 
is eager now . . .widi an old kind of leisure "free from that 
- periodicity of sensations which we call post-time," a leisure which 
is "gone -- gone where the spinning wheels are gone, and the pack 
horses, and the slow waggons, and the pedlars, who brought bar­
gains to the door on sunny afternoons" (Ch. LII). Similarly, in 
the opening pages of Felix Holt, the Radical, she contrasts the 
vanished era of five.-and-thirty years ago, when ". . . the glory 
had not yet departed from the old coach roads . . .," with die 
questionable benefits accrued by so-called "improved" methods of 
travel: "Posterity may be shot, like a bullet through a tube, by
-12-
atmospheric pressure from Winchester to Newcastle. . . , but the 
slow old-fashioned way of getting from one end of our country to 
the other is the better thing to have in the memory. " Like most 
Victorians, Eliot mourned or lauded, feared or braved, thwarted 
or greeted the unrelenting march of events, but rarely if ever 
questioned whether or not there was a march at all.
One significant exception is the novel, Romola. Rather than 
stress the differences between the present and the past, Eliot shifts 
her customary outlook on change to picture what she describes in 
the first paragraph of Romola as . . the broad sameness of the 
human lot, which never alters in trie main headings of its history,
-- hunger and labour, seed-time and harvest, love and death. " Her 
characteristic nineteenth-century habit of accentuating the hetero­
geneity of history, the uniqueness of the historical event, and the 
progressive though gradual growth of society is, in Romola, meta­
morphosed into a Classical Greek appreciation of the uniform and 
abiding essence, the immutable world of permanence. To transmit 
this conception of the universe, Eliot employs a compositional 
strategy with the following literary devices: 1) the emphasis of 
repetition, similarity, and identity in the cyclical rhythms of 
Renaissance community life; 2) the use of rhetorical aids which 
underscore the notion of eternal return; 3) the ample provision of 
figurative language connoting the idea of rootedness; 4) extensive 
parallelism of plot and subplots, of themes and leitmotifs to 
accentuate likenesses between past and present; 5) the delineation of 
character as a fixed rather than an evolving entity; 6) the rendition
i
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of time as a reaper, a servant of nature rather than a dynamic 
impresario of infinite future potential. Each of these techniques 
will be examined in turn.
Romola*s introductory Proem is a tribute to the spirit of 
identity, to an ideal Platonic substratum of changeless forms, to a 
changelessness made viable through the concrete visual evidence of 
landscapes and skylines and through the concrete visceral evidence 
of the experiences of men. For example, Eliot speaks of Florence, 
the urban backdrop of the novel, as a city, "which has hardly 
changed its outline since the days of Columbus, seeming to stand as 
an almost unviolated symbol, amidst the flux of human things, to 
remind us that we still resemble the men of the past more than we 
differ from them. " To illustrate the notion of eternal recurrence 
stylistically, Eliot uses massive parallel constructions, which 
contain identical syntax and repeat identical words. Too long to 
quote fully, the following abstracts of the opening sentences of 
Romola will serve to illustrate this point. In the first sentence,". . . 
the angel of the dawn . . . saw nearly the same outline of firm 
land, . . . saw the same great mountain shadows, . . . saw olive 
mounts, . ... saw the domes. ..." In the second sentence,
". . . the faint light fell ... on the rosy warmth, ... on the 
haggard waking, ... on the hasty uprising, ... on the late sleep 
of the night student. ..." In addition, the repetition of syntax is 
matched by the repet it Lon of one predominant qualifier: the word 
"same. " With unrelenting insistence, this adjective hammers at 
the reader's mind and reinforces with monotonous regularity the
-14-
underlying idea of uniformity, which is fundamental to the novel's 
philosophical point of view. In the first paragraph, the adjective 
is repeated no less than seven times: "the same outline, " "the 
same great mountain shadows, " "the same valleys, " "the same 
spots, " "the same great needs, " "the same great loves, " and "the 
broad sameness of the human lot. "
The extensive use of alliteration further compounds the 
impression of recurrence in phrases such as "sedge-like masts on 
the many-curved sea-coast, " "break through the barrier of man's 
brief life, " and "spires of cities rising by the river-sides, " to 
mention but a few. Also contributing to the air of changelessness 
on the opening page of the novel is the prose rhythm, which is 
punctuated with the monotonous movement of the pendulum, see­
sawing back-and-forth, to-and-fro, in such couplings as "firm land 
and unstable sea, " "olive mounts and pine forests, " "young corn or 
rain-freshened grass, " "domes and spires, " "sorrow and sickness, " 
"light and glory, " "ebb and flow, " "loves and terrors, " as well as 
the sextet already quoted, "hunger and labour, seed-time and har­
vest, love and death. " In Romola, reality is conceived of as a vast 
immobile Eleatic lake, undisturbed by currents or tides, or by the 
infusion of tributaries, or even by the soft stirring of fish. This 
conception is ahistorical, because it downgrades the passing ex­
perience of the particular, the ephemeral, the fleeting, into a 
third-rate realm of "mere" phenomena, which are at best illusory 
shadows of what is real-.
/
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A traditional classical picture, this view has drawn potent 
spokesmen down through the ages, spokesmen who drowned out 
dissenting voices which protested that the universe was more like a 
river than a lake and that there was nothing permanent except 
change. Gradually gaining ascendancy, this second conception of 
reality ousted its competitor in the nineteenth century and spawned 
a luxuriant progeny, which culminated in the radical relativism of 
Eliot's contemporary, Walter Pater. In the "Conclusion" to The 
Renaissance, Pater celebrated a pointillism in time, a splendorous 
world of "unstable, flickering, inconsistent" impressions constantly 
passing, dissolving, vanishing, and continually weaving, unweaving, 
and re-forming themselves, a world "in perpetual flight, " a world 
in which "all melts under out feet. ..." In the nineteenth century, 
Becoming eclipsed Being; Heraclitus eclipsed Plato; flux was king.
The I-Ieraclitean outlook, however propitious to the historical tem­
per in the recognition of change, in the appreciation of the unique 
moment, and in the enthusiasm for the singular phenomenon, cre­
ated as many problems as it solved. The classical world view of 
Romola's Proem, which acknowledged only permanence, would 
sooner or later have to account for the presence of change. Sim­
ilarly, a world view such as Pater's, which acknowledged only 
evanescence, would sooner or later have to account for the presence 
of continuity. The first was all substratum with no movement; the 
second all movement and no coherence. The old problem of the One 
and the Many became the new problem of the Many and the One. The 
critical issue of the interrelationship between the two remained much
-16-
the same. Only the emphasis had shifted and had become a question 
as Humpty Dumpty would say, of which was to be master -- that's
:
all.
If time had triumphed in the nineteenth century, if time was 
master, then the narrator of the past, either as novelist or histor­
ian, had to trace the intrinsic connections which governed process 
and the threads which ran through change. The author of Romola, 
however, had to pursue a reverse course. Having committed her­
self in the Proem to the vision of an enduring universe of amaran­
thine forms, of immutable geographical panoramas, of unaltered 
cities and unfading human patterns of life, Eliot is confronted with 
the staggering testimony of the cataclysmic historical changes which 
occurred in the six-year span the novel describes. With the excep­
tion of a short epilogue which extends the period by eleven years, 
Romola covers the interval from 1492 to 1498 in the annals of
Florence. Far from being arbitrarily chosen, this hexad of years 
commemorates three monumental events in Florentine history: the 
death of Lorenzo de’ Medici in 1492, the entrance of Charles VIII, 
king of France, into Florence in 1494, and the execution of 
Girolamo Savonarola in 1498. Eliot does not ignore these convul­
sions, as the mood of her Proem would suggest. On the contrary, 
she divides her novel into three books, each of which centers on 
one of these three prominent episodes in the life of the city. Eliot 
is faced with the paradox which, on the one hand, flatly denies that 
changes have occurred, -a belief which she braces by describing 
the stability of the landscape, by portraying Florence as an
-17-
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"unviolated symbol" of stasis amidst the flux, and by assuming that 
human affairs are fundamentally the same. On the other hand, she 
concentrates with blatant inconsistency on the revolutionary aspect 
of late fifteenth-century Florence in a nugget of time which marked 
an epoch not only in the history of Italy but of western civilization 
as well. Had Eliot confined her feelings about the immutability of 
things to the world of nature, she might well have avoided this 
paradox. For example, another Victorian novelist, Thomas Hardy, 
who seeks to render the atmosphere of timelessness in his novels, 
avoids Eliot's pitfall by confining his notion of permanence to dis­
tinctive fragments of nature, not to the affairs of men and society.
In the first chapter of The Return of the Native, Hardy depicts 
Egdon Heath as follows:
To recline on a stump of thorn in the central valley of Egdon, 
between afternoon and night, as now, where the eye could reach 
nothing of the world outside the summits and shoulders of 
heathland which filled the whole circumference of its glance, 
and to know that everything around and underneath had been 
from prehistoric times as unaltered as the stars overhead, gave 
ballast to the mind adrift on change, and harassed by the irre­
pressible New. The great inviolate place had an ancient per­
manence which the sea cannot claim. Who can say of a particu­
lar sea that it is old? Distilled by the sun, kneaded by the 
moon, it is renewed in a year, in a day, or in an hour. The sea 
changed, the fields changed, the rivers, the villages, and the 
people changed, yet Egdon remained.
It is one thing for a novelist to assert, as Hardy does, that 
certain aspects of the scenery endure, but quite another to convey 
the impression, as Eliot does in the Proem, that everything endures 
despite paroxysms of social change. How does Eliot cope with this 
paradox? Her initial reaction is simply to contradict- herself. To 
illustrate, the immutable panorama of the opening scene of the novel
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is viewed first by a soaring "angel of the dawn" and later by a 
deceased but still curious Florentine citizen, who returns from the 
realm of the shades to find out what is new in his old city. Looking 
down from the hill of San Miniato in 1492, the shade sees the same 
abiding spectacle witnessed by the angel of the dawn and affirms 
the same philosophy of permanence set forth by the author. Anxious 
to have a closer look at his beloved marmi and to listen to the 
familiar gossip of his townspeople, the shade begins to descend the 
hill, whereupon the narrator suddenly bursts forth with the follow­
ing admonition: "Go not down, good spirit! for the changes are 
great, and the speech of Florentines would sound as a riddle in your 
ears. " This abrupt switch of attitude is a jarring reversal of what 
has gone before. Is Eliot's logic a momentary victim of a Whit- 
manesque mood: "Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contra­
dict myself"? Such a whimsical aboutface is foreign to Eliot's 
scrupulous habit of mind. Is she perhaps unaware of the contra­
diction implicit in her outlook? Her subsequent advice to the Flor­
entine citizen indicates not, and that indeed she is aware:
Or, if you go, mingle with no politicians on the marmi or else­
where; ask no questions about trade in the Calimara; confuse 
yourself with no inquiries into scholarship, official or monas­
tic. Only look at the sunlight and shadows on the grand walls 
that were built solidly, and have endured in their grandeur; 
look at the faces of the little children, making another sunlight 
amid the shadows of age; look, if you will, into the churches, 
and hear the same chants, see the same images as of old, -- 
images of willing anguish for a great end, of beneficent 
; and ascending glory; see upturned living faces, and lips
the
love
moving to the old prayers for help. These things have not 
changed.
(Final paragraph of the Proem)
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In this paragraph, Eliot harks back to her former theme of 
permanence, this time in references to grand solid walls, the faces 
of little children, old chants, prayers, and aspirations. Despite 
this reaffirmation of her earlier convictions, her admission to the 
Florentine shade that . . the changes are great ..." has weak­
ened the tenacity of her stand, especially since the action in Romola 
converges on those very changes which Eliot wishes the Florentine 
shade to avoid. Her illogical position, however, may be explained 
in terms of differing metaphysical perspectives. For example, the 
angel of the dawn as well as the resurrected shade belong to the 
realm of the immortal and therefore observe things sub specie 
aeternitatis and not as participants in the stream of history. In any 
case, one thing is clear: the novelist and the historian cannot com­
pletely disavow the passage of time, for the novelist's very choice 
of genre, the historian's very choice of discipline, betrays a keen 
interest in the make-up of the temporal scene.
Lured by the field of time, the novelist and the historian both 
enter a thicket of increasingly thorny issues. The prior attractions 
of time as the womb of becoming, of time as a catalyst transform­
ing the past into the present, of time as a secular providence govern­
ing the direction of the future, have withered under the onslaughts of 
twentieth-century thought. The conception of time as the prime 
coordinator of the sequence, the continuity, and the direction of 
historical events has been dispossessed and relegated to a limbo of 
discarded ideas at the bottom of Einstein's wastebasket. In short-, 
nothing is permanent, not even time; time too has changed. This
-20-
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state of affairs may be propitious for the advancement of physics but 
unsettling for the reconstruction of the past. How does a writer 
render the succession of historical events if the very notion of tem­
poral passage is obsolete? His quandary is epitomized in T. S.
Eliot's first of Four Quartets, "Burnt Norton, " in the lines:
Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future,
And time future contained in time past.
If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable.
What might have been is an abstraction 
Remaining a perpetual possibility 
Only in a world of speculation.
In an effort to rescue the writing of history from the quag­
mire of the relativistic time scheme implicit in T. S. Eliot's words, 
many current theorists of historical methodology have turned their 
attention to the art of narration in order to provide the idea of continu­
ity with a more stable footing. These writers interpret the nature 
of historical explanation as resembling a story rather than a verifi­
able proof. "The moment historical facts are regarded as instances 
of general laws, history is dismissed, " writes M. Oakeshott in 
Experience and its Modes, a point of view quoted and seconded by 
William Dray (Laws and Explanation in History, 1957, pp. 49-50). 
"History is the narrative statement of happenings in the past . . . ," 
states Frederick J. Teggart, and "the intelligibility which the his­
torian thus introduces into the materials which he selects for his 
composition is of the same order as that provided by the author of 
a historical novel or drama" (Theory and Processes of History,
1960, pp. 18, 78). Another advocate of this belief, W. H. Walsh, 
comments, "Just as a good novel or a good play appears to consist
-21-
not in a series of isolated episodes, but in die orderly development 
of the complex situation from which it starts, so a good history 
possesses a certain unity of plot or theme (Philosophy of History, 
I960, p. 33). And again, in the words of Paul Weiss, a similar 
comparison appears:
His [the historian's] artistry is something like that of a novelist 
or a playwright, who tries to drive his audience past the divi­
sions of his discourse, and to accept a book or play as an 
articulated or manipulatable unity. And like die novelist and 
playwright, the historian is inclined to attend to pivotal figures, 
to employ unexpressed norms, to give different weights to 
different items.
(History: Written and Lived,
1902, p. iUb)
These theorists envisage the interpretation of the past as a 
selective re-creation and support the philosophical convictions of 
Benedetto Croce and R. G. Collingwood. The combined comments 
of these historians represent a swelling opposition to the strong tide 
of opinion which rejects history as a member of the humanities and 
plants it squarely within die arena of the social sciences. One of the 
most recent champions of history as a form of narration is W. B. 
Gallie, who declares that while in science there is always a theory, 
in history there is always a story. In his Philosophy and the His­
torical Understanding (1968), W. B. Gallie tries with painstaking 
ingenuity to describe what it means to follow a story. He con­
cludes that the holding power of a story is its "teleologically- 
guided form of attention," pulled by human sympathy and human 
interest in a context involving a sequence of actions or experiences 
of a number of people reacting to change. In his attempt to seek out 
the imponderables in the art of narration, Gallie concentrates less
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on the importance of chronology than on the idea of internal coher­
ence, a sense of the whole. Like Gallie, Collingwood also stresses 
coherence as being an essential element in the reconstruction of the 
past:
The hero of a detective novel is thinking exactly like an historian 
when, from indications of the most varied kinds, he constructs 
an imaginary picture of how a crime was committed, and by 
whom.
(The Idea of History, p. 243)
These eight theorists seem bent on salvaging the idea of con­
tinuity from the wrecks of outmoded scientific paradigms of time 
by regarding continuity as a feature of the individual historical 
narrative rather than as a feature of an objective reality delin­
eated by quantum mechanics and thermodynamics. If history 
aspires to the status of a social "science, " the historian must reckon 
with the meaning of time as modern physics conceives it, a mean­
ing which threatens the very foundations of history as a formal 
discipline, since concepts such as pastness, succession, irrevers­
ibility, continuity, order, and direction have been roundly chal­
lenged in the scientific sphere. Yet by turning to the art of nar­
ration, to the storyteller's "once upon a time ..." 
time, the historian regains a certain measure of security, since 
time in a narrative structure is an indispensable instrument of 
intelligibility. In the preface to his book, Time in Literature (I960), 
Hans Meyerhoff described how he was struck by the startling con­
trast between the scientific meaning of time and le temps humain, 
when he attended a seminar on the analysis of time in science, an 
academic course given by his friend and colleague, Hans Reichen-
kind of
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bach. Meyerhoff writes:
While listening to the lectures, I began to think about how remote 
the scientific, logical construction of the concept of time was 
from certain aspects of time in human experience which litera­
ture has often singled out for analysis. What seemed most 
significant in terms of the experience of time was quite irrelevant 
to the logical concept of time as formulated by science; per contra, 
the scientific concept seemed to have little to say about the most 
significant aspects of time in the lives of human beings.
Meyerhoff exhibits the dilemma, which to a certain degree 
faces all writers who attempt to transcribe the passage of events in 
time, but, in particular, faces the so-called "scientific" historian, 
who seeks to ground his account of the past according to the objective 
reality described by modern physics. By centering his interest on 
the art of narrative, however, the historian views time as a condi­
tion of communication, a critical lens, a Kantian "category, "
through which human activity is focused and understood. In narration,
after," "order,"
duration, " "succession, " are still bona-
»» »» tt ftthen,such notions as "before, " "now,
"sequence," "direction, 
fide entities respected by the literary artist. "Scheherazade avoided 
her fate because she knew how to wield the weapon of suspense -- the
it ti
only literary tool that has any effect upon tyrants and savages,"
E. M. Forster comments wryly in the second chapter of Aspects of 
the Novel. "She only survived, " Forster goes on to say, "because 
she managed to keep the king wondering what would happen next." 
Forster insists that every successful novel has a clock, no matter 
how well it is hidden. His position is sensible and to a large extent 
true. Few clocks tick as loudly in literature as in the chaotic 
stream-of-consciousness novels, for example, Big Ben's striking 
of the hours in Mrs. Dalloway's London, or the timepieces which
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punctuate the day in Leopold Bloom's Dublin. Few chronological 
sequences are as meticulously wrought as in those novels which over­
whelm the reader with a bewildering disarray of events, as in The 
Sound and the Fury or Wuthering Heights.
If historians look to the art of the storyteller to stabilize the 
shifting sands of scientific ideas of time, they must still acknowledge 
that the very manner of narration adjusts in certain measure to those 
same shifting sands. Narration, which derives from the Latin root 
gnarus, knowing, is itself a mode of seeing which depends on the 
knower’s angle of vision. However much the novelist may use 
chronological tools to tell his story, however much he may insist 
on the reality of a personal time stream which is alien to the con­
structs of the physical sciences, the narrative thread of his novel 
will be conditioned not only by his temperament, his beliefs and 
feelings, but also by the idiosyncrasies of the fleeting moment. In 
each of George Eliot's novels, for instance, the sensitive antennae of 
her creative artistry respond even to the subtlest variations of tem­
poral outlook, variations which alter the structure of her stories. In 
a letter to her publisher, John Blackwood, she writes of Silas Mamer:
My chief reason for wishing to publish the story now, is, that I 
like my writings to appear in the order in which they are written, 
because they belong to successive mental phases, and when they 
are a year behind me, I can no longer feel that thorough identi­
fication with them which gives zest to the sense of authorship.
(Haight, ed. The George Eliot 
Letters, Vol. ILL, pp.
In Silas Marncr, time is regarded as a great moral teacher, 
a philosopher teaching by example, as Bolingbroke, the eighteenth- 
century statesman, would say.- Middle march, on the other hand, draws
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its pace from Spencer and Darwin, while Daniel Deronda draws heavi­
ly from the German romantics, Herder and Hegel. To use a modem 
instance, Marshall McLuhan's view of time where, "everything de­
scends upon us from everywhere all at once, " is foreshadowed in the 
eternal "pressant" of Finnegans Wake and dramatized in the spon­
taneous, unrehearsed, unstructured, unrelated sequences, "hap­
penings" of the "now-pop-fluid-action-accidental-cool" theater of 
the late sixties (paraphrase of "Is American History a Happening?" 
by Marshall Fishwick, Saturday Review, May 13, 1967, pp 19-21).
If the historian looks to the art of narration for clues to the nature 
of time, he must confront the same hurdles which face the novelist. 
Each writer must determine which particular narrative framework 
best suits his singular account of the past, which narrative frame­
work best reflects the unique bias of his historical point of view.
In what way does the static world-view presented in Romola's 
Proem shape the structure of the novel? What is the nature of the 
historical process in a work which shrinks the roles of time and 
change by engulfing them in a universal panorama of immutability? 
How is movement conveyed in an atmosphere of motionlessness, 
novelty in a climate of stasis, uniqueness in a pattern of uniformity? 
One basic strategy of a storyteller espousing such a world view is 
to dim the luster of epoch-making historical events by emphasizing 
their transiency. Such a storyteller attempts to mitigate the awe­
some psychological effects of an important happening by accentuating 
its ephemerality in an effort to assure the reader that however con­
vulsive, however turbulent and extraordinary the historical event,
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it too will pass. The momentous occurrence thus shrinks into the 
momentary episode.
A significant narrative technique which George Eliot uses to 
dwarf the prominence of outstanding incidents in die history of late 
fifteenth-century Florence is to juxtapose the "eternally" recur- 
rirg rhythms of religious festivals, peasants' fairs, commemorative 
anniversaries of favorite figures, and the familiar weekly 
activities of butchers, cheese-mongers, vendors of macaroni, 
vegetables, milk, and dried fruit, on market day. In the bustle 
and chatter of the townspeople and die vendors on this very day, 
the reader is first apprised of the death of Lorenzo, die Magnif­
icent. Wisps of conversation caught between the incessant buying 
and selling register the divergent feelings of Florentine citizens 
towards the passing of the Medici leader. Some are frankly worried 
about the ominous portents surrounding Lorenzo's death, for are 
not fallen waxen images, still-born calves, thunder in the starlight, 
and lightning striking the Duo mo sure signs of the coming scourge of 
God? Others are relieved to be rid of a rudiless tyrant, a hawk who 
squelched the rights of Florentines and drained the public treasury 
for his personal interests. Still others admit he was a hawk but add 
that he was "... a crested hawk, and there are plenty of hawks 
without crests whose claws and beaks are as good for tearing"
(Book One, Ch. I).
To offset the keen excitement in die topic of the hour, Eliot 
opposes the overriding weight of her description of the Mercato 
Vecchio, the old market itself, a perpetually reappearing spectacle
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of time-honored vintage. The piazza, she writes, had been . .
the scene of a provisional market from time immemorial, and may
perhaps, says fond imagination,
Fesulean ancestors of the Florentines descended from their high
fastness to traffic with the rustic population of the valley. ..."
Because it now was Lent, the butchers were in abeyance, Eliot goes
on to say, yet the picture was familiar:
... in all seasons there was the experimental ringing of pots 
and pans, the chinking of the money-changers, the tempting 
offers of cheapness at the old-clothes stalls, the challenges 
of the dicers, the vaunting of new linens and woollens, of
i
be the very spot to which the
excellent wooden-ware, kettles, and frying-pans; there was 
the choking of the narrow inlets with mules and carts, together 
with much uncomplimentary remonstrance in terms remarkably 
identical with the insults in use by the gentler sex of the present 
day, under the same imbrowning and heating circumstances.
(Book One, Ch. I)
Seen against a background of activity which stems "from time im­
memorial" and which is repeated "in all seasons . . . under the 
same imbrowning and heating circumstances, " the historical impact 
of Lorenzo's death wanes considerably, and the preeminence of 
"II Magnifico" is diminished in the recurring pageant of human in­
dustry with roots deep into the past.
The annual religious holidays of Carnival, Lent, and Easter, 
as well as the mid-summer festival of San Giovanni, also reinforce 
the cyclical temporal pattern of the novel. For example, the plot 
action of three chapters is pitted against the spectacular procession 
of elaborate mechanical floats, gigantic whirling towers, and tri­
umphal cars representing the arts, the guilds, the governing bodies 
of Florence, in a communal outpouring to celebrate the feast day of 
San Giovanni, who had been patron saint of Florence for the last
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eight hundred years. Eliot conveys the solemnity and majesty of 
this "ancient church festival already venerable in the days of St. 
Augustine" by describing the holiday in profuse detail. The petty lot 
of the individual dwindles in significance in the face of the author's 
powerful recognition of the city's puissant corporate life paying 
annual homage to San Giovanni. One of the spectators comments:
. . . the great bond of our Republic is expressing itself in ancient 
symbols, without which the vulgar would be conscious of nothing 
beyond their own petty wants of back and stomach, and never rise 
to the sense of community in religion and law. There has been 
no great people without processions, and the man who thinks 
himself too wise to be moved by them to anything but contempt, 
is like the puddle that was proud of standing alone while the river 
rushed by.
(Book One, Ch. VIII)
As the Florentines are made to pause before the passing exhibition, 
so the reader is made to pause and weigh the perishable actions of 
short-lived mortals against the background of hallowed and enduring 
traditions.
Another annual holiday which helps frame the action in 
Romola is the feast of the Fierucola, on September 7th, in 
honor of the nativity of the Virgin. Unlike other religious celebra­
tions, this day is a rough-and-tumble peasants' fair, a confused din 
of hooting, whistling, and buffoonery, as peddlars, quack doctors, 
magicians, and mountebanks, ply their arts, and street-boys indulge 
in their favorite Florentine sport: stone throwing. Again Eliot 
underlines the enduring quality of this popular rustic event, as, once 
a year, the peasant women descend into the city with their
. . . sun-dried, bronzed faces, and their strange, fragmentary 
garb, dim with hereditary dirt, and of obsolete stuffs and fashions, 
that made them look, in the eyes of the city people, like a way-
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worn ancestry returning from a pilgrimage on which they had set 
out a century ago.
(Book One, Ch. XIV)
Even the "unprecedented," "unexampled" entrance into Flor­
ence of Charles VIII of France on the 17th of November
1494, is viewed in the context of the past rather than as an unparal­
leled historical event heralding a new era of change. The reader 
beholds Charles through the minds of the Florentines, some of 
whom think of the king as a new Charlemagne, "reputed rebuilder of 
Florence, " while others prefer "the comparison to Cyrus, liberator 
of the chosen people, restorer of the Temple. " Only two weeks prior 
to Charles's entry, Eliot writes, "the spirit of the old centuries 
seemed to have re-entered the breasts of Florentines . . . ," as 
they expelled the corrupt Piero, son of Lorenzo, from the city. The 
French king served "to revive in the breasts of men the memory of 
great dispensations by which new strata had been laid in the history 
of mankind" (Book Two, Ch. I). Her use of the words, "revive, "
restorer," and "spirit of the old cen­
turies, " serves as a subtle reminder that while the appearance of 
the French was "unprecedented, " the Florentine mind saw very little 
that was new in the advent of Charles, excepting perhaps the exterior 
trappings.
it ifre-entered,"rebuilder, H ii
Another dramatic event, which embodied the quintessence of
novelty in the history of this period, Savonarola's dramatic burning
of the Pyramid of Vanities, is looked upon as a form of imitation, a
"sacred parody of the old. " Eliot writes:
Had there been bonfires in the old time? There was to be a bon­
fire now, consuming impurity from off the earth. Had there
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been symbolic processions? There were to be processions now, 
but the symbols were to be white robes and red crosses and olive 
wreaths. . . . Had there been dancing in a ring under the open 
sky, to the sound of choral voices chanting loose songs? There 
was to be dancing in a ring now, but dancing of monks and laity 
in fraternal love and divine joy, and the music was to be the 
music of hymns. As for the collections from street passengers, 
they were to be greater than ever, -- not for gross and super­
fluous suppers, but for the benefit of the hungry and needy. . . .
(Book Three, Ch. XXIX)
In the above description, the burning of the Pyramid of Vanities is 
not so much a change as an inversion of old Carnival customs. 
Viewed as a sacred parody, the singularity of this phenomenon is 
minimized, for the very existence of parody as a form of expression 
is grounded in the spirit of mimesis, a copy of what has gone before. 
In addition to religious ceremonies, anniversaries also transmit the 
idea of yearly return. The humanists of the Platonic Academy cele­
brate the alleged date of Plato's death: November 13th (Book 
Two, Ch. XIX), while Romola, the heroine of the novel, each May 
commemorates the date of Savonarola's martyrdom (Epilogue).
From beginning to end, the novel pulsates with the periodic rhythms 
of deeply entrenched recurring cultural patterns, whose drawing 
power sets the emotional pace in favor of a cyclical rather than a 
linear time scheme in which to set the plot.
Another narrative device used by the storyteller to convey 
the impression of permanence is to underscore ideas of rootedness, 
immobility, fixity. Sprinkled throughout the story of Romola are 
references to old families, old habits, familiar symbols, and en­
during themes. Eliot frequently uses plant imagery, especially 
vegetables, in order to anchor in the reader's mind the picture of 
concrete living roots, as in the following examples:
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... I come of a Greek stock planted in Italian soil much longer 
than the mulberry-trees which have taken so kindly to it.
(Book One, Ch. Ill)
Because he was a large melon, every other Florentine is not a 
pumpkin, I suppose.
(Book One, Ch. Ill)
Certain of our scholars hold that your Greek learning is but a 
wayside degenerate plant until it has been transplanted into 
Italian brains. ...
(Book One, Ch. Ill)
. . . a man who'll keep his word to you, even to the halving of 
a fennel seed:. ...
(Book One, Ch. Ill)
. . . looking no fresher than an apple that has stood the winter.
(Book One, Ch. Ill)
But an old Florentine family was many-rooted. . . .
(Book One, Ch. V)
. . . for I carry within me the fruits of that fervid study. . . 
which would have been the vintage of my life. . . .
(Book One, Ch. V)
. . . -- which pithy remark, it seems to me, was not an herb 
out of his own garden.
(Book One, Ch. XIII)
We are not the heads to plant such carrots as those in.
(Book One, Ch. XVI)
These picturesque images figured prominently in the idiom of 
fifteenth-century Florence, an idiom which Eliot found in such 
sources as the Novelle of Sacchetti, Varchi's Storie, Machiavelli's
Mandragola.and the jests and sayings in Lippi's Malmantile (J. W. 
Cross. George Eliot's Life, Vol. II, p. 264). She referred to 
these books in her intensive researches for the novel in the Maglia- 
bechiana library of Florence during May and June of 1861. To this 
day, foods are conspicuous in the metaphorical expressions of daily 
Italian speech, so that the imagery of carrots, apples, pump-
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kins, melons, and herbs in Romo la serves Eliot's purpose admir­
ably in making viable the idea of rootedness which is basic to the 
novel's temporal scheme. The plant metaphor also alludes to the 
system of binding ties between the individual and the community. On 
the first page of Book Two, Florence is pictured as a living tree, 
and Florentine citizens as buds, blossoms, or fruit, which depend 
for their destinies "on the primary circulation of the sap" (full 
quotation on p.4). Eliot's comparison is reminiscent of the "belly" 
analogy in the opening scene of Shakespeare's Coriolanus, in which 
the Roman Senate is conceived of as a storehouse of food for the 
whole body of Rome:
But, if you do remember,
I send it through the rivers of your blood,
Even to the court, the heart, to th' seat o' th' brain 
And, through the cranks and offices of man,
The strongest nerves and small inferior veins 
From me receive that natural competency 
Whereby they live;
(I, i, 135-141)
Since biological metaphors have been a favorite poetic 
device for expressing the organic relationship between microcosm 
and macrocosm, between man and cosmos, between man and nature, 
and between man and society, it is important to discover how Eliot 
uses this analogy. It would be hasty to assume that because 
biological comparisons between living structures and social aggre­
gates were rampant in the social Darwinism of Eliot's day that her 
plant metaphor implied a developmental theory of history. And it 
would be hasty to assume that because Eliot was quite familiar with 
the evolutionary philosophy of her good friend, Herbert Spencer, 
that the tree metaphor implied a developmental series of transfor-
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mations in which a community progressively improved through time. 
A correlation between the "body" politic and the life process can 
betoken any one of a host of diverging historical outlooks, each of 
which depends on those specific points of resemblance which a think­
er has in mind when he likens a living organism to society. Is he 
perhaps picturing a self-contained unity, or perhaps a growth 
pattern, or maybe a structural similarity? What exactly does he 
see in the figure of a tree? Oswald Spengler, for example, would 
envisage barren branches on a withering plant, which had once been 
a vigorous sapling. Spencer would fix his attention on the seed pods 
and glory in the emerging forests of the future. Bergson would find 
a resemblance between the creative thrust of society and the tree's 
vital sap. In Romola, Eliot sees a strong, stable trunk with fast 
roots, which manifest an imperceptible and virtually negligible 
growth through time. Nevertheless, she peers closely at the 
maturational behavior of the tree’s individual buds, blossoms, 
fruits, and flowers, which ripen and die in a short season. It is in 
this sense that Eliot perceives the tree of society in Romola. While 
changes do occur, the basic outline remains steady and unchanging. 
Though individual vicissitudes constitute the bulk of change, they do 
not radically alter the fundamental structure of the communal 
organism or the cyclical nature of history.
Time in Romola is a ripening process for human beings 
and their unique and perishable life stories; time is not a ripening 
process for society as a whole. The meaning of the tree image in 
this novel is much closer to such fixed classical configurations as
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the Great Chain of Being, or the Scala Naturae, rather than any 
particular brand of nineteenth-century historicism with which Eliot 
was familiar. Like the Great Chain, the tree is finite and stable, a 
form of being which time does not affect. Movement and becoming 
are characteristic of passing individual particulars, not of the 
eternal pattern. Change is Aristotelian, that is, an unfolding of 
inherent and limited potential, a self-fulfillment of the latent nature 
of each fleeting phenomenon. Time is the medium through which 
the life cycle of a specific person, a specific thing, deed, or event 
is brought to fruition. History is thus imbedded in the natural proc­
ess and becomes a harvesting ground with time as the reaper.
While mirroring a philosophy of society as old as Pythagoras, 
Eliot's idea of the community as a rooted organism was far from 
being an anachronism in her day. The traditional historical outlook 
and the conservative temper of mind which finds expression in 
Romola stem from intellectual currents crystallized by a late 
eighteenth-century figure, Edmund Burke, whose counter-revolu­
tionary ideas struck responsive chords in nineteenth-century Eng­
lish thought. For example, echoes of Burke resound in the pages of 
Samuel Coleridge's The Constitution of Church and State (1829),
J. H. Newman's The Ideal of a Christian Church (1844), Matthew 
Arnold's essay on "Democracy" (1861), as well as Eliot's conser­
vative political novel, inappropriately named Felix Holt, the Radi­
cal (1866). In his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), 
Burke writes:
Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and
symmetry with the order of the world, and with the mode of
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existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory 
parts; wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, 
moulding together the great mysterious incorporation of the 
human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or middle- 
aged, or young, but in a condition of unchangeable constancy, 
moves on through the varied tenour of perpetual decay, fall, 
renovation, and progression. Thus, by preserving the method 
of nature in the conduct of the state, in what we improve we 
are never wholly new; in what we retain we are never wholly 
obsolete.
(pp. 45-6)
Change affects the "transitory parts, " not the "unchangeable con­
stancy" of the "permanent body, " just as change in Eliot's Romola 
influences the leaves and fruit, not the framework of the tree.
This concept of the social organism not only recognizes 
but stresses the quality of uniqueness in each expression of corpo­
rate life and the distinctiveness of each cultural aggregate. Such a 
view champions the importance of historical context but only in a 
limited sense. Context becomes a consciousness of difference in 
location, of "local color, " rather than a consciousness of difference 
between past and present during which time human frames of 
reference and basic patterns of human behavior change and evolve. 
Historical context in Romola, for example, is rendered by a 
punctilious attention to countless numbers of external concrete 
details: accurate descriptions of dress, for instance, faithful de- 
scripiions of architecture and painting, idiosyncrasies of speech, 
rituals, or habits of work and play. Yet the novel does not pene­
trate very deeply into that prodigiously creative Florentine elan, 
which helped spark the Renaissance spirit and helped shape the 
beginnings of the modern mind. In a letter to Richard Holt Hutton 
about Romola, Eliot writes:
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It is the habit of my imagination to strive after as full a vision 
of the medium in which a character moves as of the character 
itself. The psychological causes which prompted me to give 
such details of Florentine life and history as I have given, are 
precisely the same as those which determined me in giving the 
details of English village life in 'Silas Marner' or the "Dodson" 
life, out of which were developed the destinies of poor Tom 
and Maggie. . . . [yet] great, great facts have struggled to 
find a voice through me, and have only been able to speak 
brokenly.
(Haight, ed. The George Eliot 
Letters, Vol. IV, p. 97J
While she attempts to give a full vision of the Florentine
medium, her description succeeds in a physical rather than a
"psychological" way. Romo la is a magnificent Baedaker of fif­
teenth-century Florence, but a sense of the greatness of this era, 
strangely enough, is lacking. Steeped in historical criticism, Eliot 
was thoroughly convinced that each age had a faith and symbolism 
suitable to its stage of development, a belief she affirmed on re­
peated occasions in connection with her translation of David 
Strauss's Das Leben Jesu in 1846, and her book reviews of Robert 
Mackay's The Progress of Intellect in 1851 and Wilhelm Heinrich 
Riehl's The Natural History of German Life in 1856. Yet in Romola, 
Eliot evinces none of the profound appreciation for the incredible 
"rebirth" of values epitomized by the Florentine milieu of that time, 
none of the profound admiration of fifteenth-century Italian culture 
which fills the pages of her contemporaries, Jakob Burckhardt, 
Walter Pater, and John Addington Symonds. In The Civilization of 
the Renaissance in Italy (1860), Burckhardt praises Florence as a 
"unique" and "remarkable State, " a cradle of "intellectual freedom 
and independence":
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The most elevated political thought and the most varied forms of 
human development are found united in the history of Florence, 
which in this sense deserves the name of the first modern State 
in the world. Here the whole people are busied with what in the 
despotic cities is the affair of a single family. That wondrous 
Florentine spirit, at once keenly critical and artistically creative, 
was incessantly transforming the social and political condition 
of the State, and as incessantly describing and judging the change.
(Part I, "The State as a Work of 
Art," p. 48)
John Addington Symonds supports Burckhardt's view of the 
Renaissance as a grand awakening of freedom and independence in 
the human spirit. In his History of the Renaissance in Italy (1875- 
86), Symonds states that in the fourteenth century, the Western 
races . . awoke as it were from a slumber. . . ," from a dor­
mant period when men lived in a cowl, blind to the beauty of the 
world: "The arts and the inventions, the knowledge and the books, 
which suddenly became vital at the time of the Renaissance, had 
long lain neglected on the shores of the Dead Sea, which we call the 
Middle Ages" (p. 4). Pater's The Renaissance (1873) celebrates the 
splendid freeing of the senses, the epicurean . . care for phys­
ical beauty, the worship of the body, the breaking down of those 
limits which the religious system of the middle age imposed on the 
heart and the imagination" all of which Pater finds compressed in 
the Italy of the fifteenth century:
... in that solemn fifteenth century which can hardly be studied 
too much, not merely for its positive results in the things of the 
intellect and the imagination, its concrete works of art, its 
special and prominent personalities, with their profound aesthetic 
charm, but for its general spirit and character, for the ethical 
qualities of which it is a consummate type.
(Preface)
By contrast, Eliot's conception of the same era in Romola 
is conspicuous by the omission of such praise. Her cyclical philo-
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sophy of history militates against the admission that the Florentine 
contribution of that time was an advance in the civilizational process . 
of mankind. More important, however, is the real likelihood that 
Eliot adopted a non-developmental theory of history for Romo la in 
the first place, because, like John Ruskin and many other Victorians, 
she had no taste for the very values which Burckhardt, Symonds, and 
Pater extolled. Eliot had a quick eye for the cruelty and egoism 
which masqueraded under the guise of the vigorous individualism 
which Burckhardt admired. She unveiled the lurkings signs of 
inoontrolled self-indulgence in the freeing of the senses and exposed 
the spiritual aridity of much that passed for the classical humanism 
which Pater so esteemed. She was far too sensitive to the ideas and 
traditions which men hold dear to dismiss the rich heritage of the 
Middle Ages to the "Dead Sea" of Symonds's metaphorical equation. 
While she tried to do justice to the "great, great facts" of the 
fifteenth century, her inherent distaste for the Renaissance temper­
ament caused a conflict of interest which constrained her to ignore 
the implications of historical change in favor of a philosophy of 
history which recognized nothing that was essentially new. Thus 
her picture of fifteenth-century Florence resembles an exotic plant, 
a wholly self-contained species in a remote temporal setting, an 
isolated and fixed organism, with movement and change applying 
only to the seasonal pattern of the plant's "transitory parts. "
The inexorable rhythm of the life cycle in society's "buds" 
and "blossoms" applies not only to the eternal tempo of human life 
but to human behavior as well. Just as individuals are born, grow
-39-
up, grow old, and die, human character germinates, develops, and 
matures from its inner proclivities compounded with its power of 
free choice. All actions have consequences, which return unrelent-
f
ingly to please, punish, or . . plague the inventor. " For . . 
our deeds, " Eliot writes in Romola, "are like children that are 
born to us: they live and act apart from our own will. Nay, children 
may be strangled, but deeds never: they have an indestructible life 
both in and out of our consciousness;. . . " (Book One, Ch. XVI).
By "indestructible life, " Eliot does not mean that actions have 
never-ending consequences in the world at large, like the ever- 
widening ripples from a stone thrown in a pond. She refers instead 
to the inevitable payment which attends each moral choice, call it 
"nemesis, " or "fate, " or the "even-handed justice " Macbeth 
speaks of, which ". . . commends the ingredients of our poison'd 
chalice/ To our own lips" (I, vii, 10-12). Sometimes late in com­
ing, the day of reckoning invariably arrives. Even if the gods take 
a holiday and postpone their judicial decisions, they always redress 
the moral balance in the end. In Romola's Proem, Eliot quotes the 
Florentine proverb, Iddio non paga il Sabato, that God does not pay 
on the Sabbath, a curious old saying which can, on the one hand, be 
taken to mean that life should be made into a series of carefree 
perpetual days of rest, because the Day of Judgment is a long way 
off; or the adage can be interpreted in the stern admonitory sense 
that the Sabbath is followed without fail by six sober workdays 
during which old debts are conclusively settled. Eliot, needless to 
say, supports the second view. A quick glance at some of the
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chapter titles in Romola reveals the slow, patient, infallible proc­
ess of moral retribution which permeates the novel: "The Shadow 
of Nemesis" (Book One, Ch. XIII), "Fruit is Seed" (Book Two, Ch. 
XI), "No Place for Repentance" (Book Two, Ch. XIV), "Waiting"
(Book Three, Ch. XXXV), "Ripening Schemes" (Book Three, Ch. 
XLIII), and "A Masque of the Furies" (Book Three, Ch. XLVI).
Cause and effect are linked in the moral order as integrally 
and as indissolubly as in the natural order: ends contain their 
means, conclusions their premises, results their agencies, deeds 
their inception, issue its genesis, choice its motives -- in short, 
"Fruit is Seed. " To reinforce the idea of retribution in the moral 
scheme of things, Eliot saturates the novel with the language of 
exchange and barter, the language cf the marketplace. That every­
thing has a price, that you get precisely what you bargain for, 
apply to all gradations of human choice from selecting a course of 
conduct to selecting a bunch of radishes. Buying and selling, bidding 
and trading, redeeming and defaulting, are activities which form 
the essential core of human behavior throughout the plot, activities 
which range from the serious to the frivolous, from the ransom of 
a man’s life to the redemption of a worthless trinket. The imagery 
of barter is transposed from lower to higher registers of signifi­
cance, each range interacting with the other to enrich the prevailing 
ethical principle: balance of payments. For example, the statement, 
"He did not like the price, and yet it was inevitable that he should be 
glad of the purchase" (Book Two, Ch. XIX), does not refer to a 
commercial tiansaction involving an object, but rather to the buying
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of personal security at the expense of a sacred trust.
The shopkeeper mentality of getting and spending, the couch­
ing of human values in terms of marketable commodities, is contin­
uous throughout the novel. The first voice heard in the opening 
chapter of Romola is that of a secondhand dealer in junk, Bratti 
Ferravecchi, who hawks his wares in the lingo of an aggressive 
bargain-hunting peddlar:
But it remains to be seen what is my profit in the matter.
Nothing for nothing, young man. . . . Three years ago, the 
Saint sent a dead body in my way, --a blind beggar, with 
his cap well lined with pieces, -- but, if you'll believe me, 
my stomach turned against the testoni [silver coins] I'd 
never bargained for, till it came into my head that San Giovanni 
owed me the pieces for what I spend yearly at the Festa; 
besides, I buried die body and paid for a mass, -- and so I 
saw it was a fair bargain.
Bratti's chatter is soon followed by other persons whose dialogue is 
rife with commercial allusions such as: 'It appears the Magnifico
is dead -- rest his soul! -- and the price of wax will rise?" and
/
"when the Church is purged of cardinals and prelates who traffic 
in her inheritance that their hands may be full to pay the price 
of blood, " or "Florence is the best market in Italy for such 
commodities [classical scholarship] as yours. " Images of materi­
alistic worth, money, taxes, jewels, dot the entire narrative and 
serve as leitmotifs which support the underlying rhetoric of exchange 
basic to the novel's commitment to the idea of debits and credits in 
the moral order. The rhetoric extends to divine actions as well; 
even God, in the quoted Florentine proverb, "does not pay" on the 
Sabbath. In the festival procession of the patron saint, San Giovanni, 
the principal triumphal car, which bears the figure of St. John the
-42-
Baptist, is that of the Zecca or Mint. "For where could the image of 
the patron saint be more fitly placed than on the symbol of the Zecca? ' 
Was not the royal prerogative of coining money the surest token that 
a city had won its independence" (Book One, Ch. VIII)? Money and 
divinity are thus coupled in the religious pageantry of Florentine life; 
divinity sanctions the fine art of barter; divinity sanctions the quid 
pro quo.
The vocabulary of trade used by Eliot in Romola is not a 
verbal embellishment of abstract ethical norms but rather an incarna­
tion of them. The novelist, sometimes deliberately, sometimes un­
consciously, selects words which are verbal co-ordinates of his 
unique intellectual stance, co-ordinates which do not depend upon 
but, on the contrary, control the very tenor of his abstract assump­
tions or his moral judgments. That the style reveals or more often 
betrays the man is no less true of the historian than of the novelist. 
As Kenneth Burke puts it in his Attitudes toward History:
A man organizes an essay. He necessarily chooses certain 
pivotal verbalizations about which he hinges his discussion.
He chooses these particular verbalizations because they appeal 
to him. Some other terms might be substituted in their place, 
so far as the pure logic of the case is concerned. But he makes 
a selection in accordance with subtle, personal tests of "pro­
priety. " Though the words are, on their surface, neutral, they 
fit together into an organic interdependent whole precisely 
because of their common stake in some unifying attitude of his. 
We may get cues prompting us to discern the underlying emo-. 
tional connotations of words that even the user may consider 
merely "scientific" or "neutral. " By locating these, we get 
glimpses of a subtler organization than is apparent when we 
take the words at their face value.
(Part III, Ch. Two, p. 237)
Like literary criticism, historical criticism seeks out the 
cues which characterize a writer's language set, the pivotal terms
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which shape his value judgments. In applying the tools of critical 
analysis to the historical documents at hand, the historian must 
also consider what verbal frame best suits his own "attitude" in 
discussing his material. To resist the iron grip of metaphor in an 
effort to be objective and dispassionate in writing history, is an 
honorable but somewhat short-sighted aim. To resist making moral 
j udgments in writing about the past, as Burckhardt, for example, so 
ardently advocates, is often to substitute one set of norms for 
another. In the vocabulary of his The Civilization of the Renaissance 
in Italy, Burckhardt's words for "good" cluster about the imagery of 
birth, " and "awakening, " while words for "bad" in­
veils, " and "bondage." We read, for instance, that 
the Italian . . was the firstborn among the sons of modern 
Europe ..." (Part II, p. 81), that Dante dreamed of a "newborn 
political speculation" (Part I, p. 49), that Sigismondo ". . . seemed 
born to all that he undertook" (Part III, p. 136). We picture the 
Middle Ages as a period which "... lay dreaming or half awake 
beneath a common veil . . (PartII, p. 81), and that this . . veil 
of illusion was torn asunder, when once the dread of nature and the 
slavery to books and tradition were overcome ..." (Part IV, 
p, 174). Phrases such as "the breath of life, " "the resuscitation of 
antiquity, " "fruitful union, " "a reproduction of the whole ancient 
view of life, " "gasp to be back in modern air, " "a wholly new ele-
the new monumental spirit, " "the new passions, " 
"the new learning," "a new cause in the world and a new class of 
men to maintain it" pervade the text. While Burckhardt's buoyant
"newness, 
volve "decay,
»i l»
li ii
n nment in society,
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vocabulary prompts the reader to join in the general congratulatory 
eclat on the birth of a new era, Eliot's choice of a commercial idiom 
in Romola induces the reader to question closely just what kinds of 
bargains were engaged in by the Florentines of the Renaissance, bar­
gains which just as easily swapped spiritual as well as worldly goods, 
bargains made for immediate gain but often carrying the heavy price 
tags of long-range Faustian contracts.
If Eliot saw the debit side of the ledger in the Florentine 
quattrocento, if she chose to portray the poverty of classical 
humanism, the grossness of the mercantile mentality, and the 
self-absorption of the epicurean spirit, it would seem fitting that 
she embody these negative values in a personality, a "bud" which 
flourished in such a society. If "fruit is seed, " and schemes 
"ripen"under "the shadow of nemesis, " as the chapter headings 
of Romola suggest, it would be natural for Eliot to observe at close 
range the blossoming, maturation, and demise of a figure who 
epitomized the worst features of the age: its unbridled egotism, 
its irresponsible pragmatic ethic, and its craving for a life of well- 
padded sensual comfort, the life of sybaritic ease, which Italians 
have dubbed la dolce vita. Eliot creates such a figure in Tito 
Melema, a character whose deplorable career constitutes the 
marrow of the plot. Despite the novel's title, it is not Romola but 
Romola's husband, Tito, whose behavior forms the dramatic and 
thematic hub of the story. Tito Melema is a strangely familiar 
twentieth-century blend of opportunist, a mixture of the "con" man, 
the playboy, and the flunkey. As subtle in the arts of treachery as
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any Elizabethan "machiavel, " Tito's brand of villainy is stamped 
with a peculiarly modern penchant for "soft" living, an aversion to 
anything unpleasant or unduly arduous, and a strong compulsion to 
follow, in any given instance, the path of least resistance. Tito sins 
less in the conscious zest for evil characteristic of his Tudor suc­
cessors than in his disinclination to exert himself in behalf of good. 
His immorality is rooted in sloth and cowardice, ugly traits which 
are, nevertheless, confounded by a resplendent facade, for Tito is 
an extraordinarily handsome young man and an accomplished Greek 
scholar. Perhaps because of her own physical limitations, Eliot was 
sensitive to the charismatic appeal of physical beauty, for she is 
pitiless in exposing the defects of character which often accompany 
allure, witness her portraits of Hetty Sorrel in Adam Bede, Rosa­
mond Vincy in Middlemarch, and Gwendolen Harleth in Daniel 
Deronda
Eliot creates un bel giovane, a "Phoebus Apollo, " "a bird of 
a Bacchus, " to use a few of the epithets used torare plumage,
describe Tito in the novel, yet Eliot's scalpel lays bare the kind of
• f tt
beauty which masks the most insidious form of treachery, a beauty 
which bribes the senses of the beholder, whether male or female, 
into mistaking an unblemished front for an untainted spirit. The 
name, "Melema, " is rich in connotative overtones, since the Indo- 
European root mel refers to softness, to darkness, to evil, and to 
deception. In addition, the Italian word for "apple" is mele, an 
allusion.not only to the loss of Eden, but also a punning reminder 
that Tito is a fruit of the Florentine milieu. What makes Tito a
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captivating study is not that he is a prince in a world without prin­
ciple, but that he develops from a morally irresponsible fledgling 
into a full-blown traitor through a progressive series of rationaliza­
tions by which he justifies his actions throughout the novel. Tito 
is not presented as a born betrayer, but a betrayer in the making. 
Because Eliot believes that character is destiny in the sense that 
human nature is a fixed component of mixed resources, which are 
shaped in greater measure through the exercise of free individual 
choice than by environmental pressures, she persistently seeks to 
uncover the embryonic habits of mind which govern the direction of 
moral growth. The formation of character far from being adven­
titious is predictable, if the psychologist but study the incipient 
sources, the early clues to behavior. Eliot sees human nature in 
Romola as a stationary quantity molded by warring stresses from 
within rather than from without. While she delves deeply into the 
springs of human motivation, Eliot's concept of character is based 
essentially on a traditional point of view, one which is impressively 
summed up by Warwick in Shakespeare's The Second Part of Henry 
the Fourth:
There is a history in all men's lives,
Figuring the nature of the times deceas'd;
The which observ'd, a man may prophesy,
With a near aim, of the main chance of things 
As yet not come to life, which in their seeds 
And weak beginnings lie intreasured.
(Ill, 1, 80-85)
Interested in observing the seeds of psychological develop­
ment, Eliot introduces Tito at the outset as a neutral moral entity 
rather than as a consummate wrongdoer. Entering Florence as a
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shipwrecked stranger, Tito attempts to sell his jewels with the 
noble intention of ransoming his stepfather and benefactor,
Baldassare Calva, a classical scholar who has been taken prisoner 
by a Turkish ship off the coast of Greece. Tito's success in disposing 
of the gems for a substantial sum and his success in gaining entry 
into exclusive Florentine social circles tempt him into a self- 
centered reappraisal of his position. Lulled by the ingratiating pros­
pects of Romola's love as well as a promising political career, ought 
he, he begins to ask, to risk himself for his father's sake? If it were 
certain that his father were alive, he would of course try to rescue 
Baldassare, but nothing could be further from that certainty. Did he 
not owe something to himself before giving up all he thus far had 
gained? If he were to quit Florence, he might himself be seized and 
have to spend all his money on ransom and again be a destitute 
wanderer, this time with no gems to sell. After much rumination 
along these lines, Tito conveniently chooses to think that his father 
is lost beyond a reasonable hope and sees little purpose in admitting 
either to himself or to anyone else the remote and irksome possibil­
ity that Baldassare may still be alive. This string of rationalizations 
conforming to the bent of his wishes is Tito's first prolonged 
colloquy with himself, a colloquy which constitutes his initiation 
into the habit of faithlessness and self-deception which spreads and 
deepens throughout the novel. "Under every guilty secret, " Eliot 
writes, "there is hidden a brood of guilty wishes, whose unwhole­
some infecting life is cherished by the darkness. The'contaminating 
effect of deeds often lies less in the commission than in the conse-
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quent adjustment of our desires, --the enlistment of our self- 
interest on the side of falsity; ..." (Book One, Ch. IX). When a 
friar brings news that Baldassare is alive awaiting rescue, Tito's 
former experience in fabricating ingenious excuses to suit his pleas­
ure serves again to absolve him from feelings of guilt. Why, after 
all, was he bound to search for Baldassare? Tito’s line of reasoning 
encompasses a whole chapter, the argument in substance being this:
What, looked at closely, was the end of all life, but to extract 
the utmost sum of pleasure? And was not his own blooming life 
a promise of incomparably more pleasure, not for himself only, 
but for others, than the withered wintry life of a man who was 
past the time of keen enjoyment, and whose ideas had stiffened 
into barren rigidity? Those ideas had all been sown in the fresh 
soil of Tito's mind, and were lively germs there: that was the 
proper order of things, -- the order of Nature, which treats all 
maturity as a mere nidus of youth. Baldassare had done his 
work, had had his draught of life: Tito said it was his turn now.
(Book One, Ch. XI)
Tito's pattern of self-exculpation leads him to sink deeper and 
deeper into deceit, a deceit directed not only towards his stepfather, 
but also towards his wife, Romola, to his father-in-law, Bardo de' 
Bardi, to Savonarola, and to the three contending political parties, 
each of which trusts Tito as its own loyal confidential agent. Ironi­
cally, the tissue of lies which shields Tito from unpleasant respon­
sibilities contributes to his lack of self-command in a fateful moment 
when a well-contrived falsehood would have freed him from the fatal - 
consequences of his stepfather's vengeance. Tito's hedonism rather 
than his delight in depravity causes his early downfall, for the 
thought of inflicting pain on anyone was distasteful to him:
He had simply chosen to make life easy to himself --to carry 
his human lot, if possible, in such a way that it should pinch 
him nowhere; and the choice had, at various times, landed him
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in unexpected positions. The question now was . . . whether 
all the resources of lying would save him from being crushed 
by the consequences of that habitual choice.
(Book Two, Ch. Ill)
In Romola, character is determined by die "reiterated choice 
of good or evil. " Just as the body may become habituated to cus­
tomary routines, so the spirit may become addicted to moral prac­
tices impossible to remold. Tito's hedonism^fed by duplicity^under­
mines his nerve and his cunning. The young Niccolo Machiavelli, 
who appears briefly in Romola in the role of an astute political real­
ist, would later render a verdict on men like Tito in The Prince. An 
opportunist who craves constant success must be a feigner, a dis­
simulator, must seem to be all mercy, faith, humanity, sincerity, 
and religion, must imitate the fox in order to protect himself from 
traps, must imitate the lion in order to frighten wolves. Tito's 
collapse, Machiavelli would say, is caused by the failure to master 
the example of these two beasts; Tito lacks the full measure of the 
lion's daring and the fox's guile. While Machiavelli implies that
men exist who do possess the necessary qualifications to be wholly
«
successful, Eliot believes that such "success" is illusory at best, 
that the price of "the means" is too high for the rewards of "the end. " 
When she states that Tito's ". . . conduct gave the character of an 
epoch to him, ..." and that he had "the air of a fallen prince, " not 
only does Eliot have Machiavelli's "prince" in mind but also the 
fallen prince of Milton's Paradise Lost. The human psyche in 
Romola is made up of finite and unchanging components, which 
resemble Plato's myth of human nature as a chariot pulled by the 
passions and the will but controlled for good or for ill by reason, the
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charioteer, through the reins of free choice. Character is a stable 
compound rather than a fountain of endless creative potential, in 
which the personality unfettered by inherent restrictions can explore 
infinite reaches of novelty. Character is self-formed, self-deter­
mined, and is based on the voluntary acceptance or rejection of 
options offered by the innate make-up of man as well as options 
offered by the make-up of the world in which he lives.
Eliot's conception of human nature in Romola as a universal 
and timeless complex of unevolving characteristics corresponds to 
her over-all vision of history in the novel as essentially static and 
unchanging. The influence of environment, the influence of imper­
sonal forces in the form of trends, tendencies, universal laws, or 
"the spirit of the age, " play but minor roles in fashioning the bent of 
the individual personality. A critical historical change such as the 
Reformation or the French Revolution may serve as fodder for cer­
tain human traits to feed, fatten, and multiply, but on the whole, the 
historical course of events is given little credit for altering the basic 
spiritual composition of man or for molding his personal destiny. 
Environmental pressures, which exert indomitable mastery over the 
human being in the naturalistic novel, have little relevance in Romola. 
If man is a victim, he is a victim of his own lack of self-control 
instead of being a helpless prey to the pulls and pushes of his sur­
roundings; if he has peace of mind, he has himself to thank. Despite 
the pervasive Greek trappings of "nemesis,
in Eliot's creative work, it would be hasty to interpret the use of 
these terms as being identical to their application in Greek drama,
fate, " and "the furies, "n tf
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if indeed these concepts could at all be considered identical amongst 
the Greek dramatists themselves. In Eliot's lexicon, the portrayal 
of nemesis does not resemble an external power stalking in the outer 
world, meting out due rewards and punishments, as does Hardy's 
"President of the Immortals, in Aeschylean phrase. " In Romola, 
nemesis is internalized in the seeds of character, seeds which 
mature in accordance with the individual determination to resist 
temptation or to submit to sin. Nemesis is thus viewed from a sub­
jective and personal standpoint rather than from a supernatural or 
external perspective. Character determines its own fate and creates 
its own future as a field cf torment a* bliss, in the same sense that 
Milton's lost Archangel boasts of:
A mind not to be changed by place or time.
The mind is its own place, and in itself
Can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven.
(Paradise Lost, Book I, 253-5)
Lucifer's exhilarating pronouncement on the unconditional 
freedom of individual volition must, like Eliot's position on human 
nature in Romola, confront massive evidence which argues against 
the unmitigated capacity of man's power to hold sway over his own 
development. Determinism in its many guises, to wit, "implacable" 
nature, "inexorable" historical laws, the decrees of science, pre­
ordaining providence, and the impelling "group-think" of social 
masses and classes, all clash to some degree with more sanguine 
estimates of man as a free moral agent. Nevertheless, Eliot's 
concept of character as an efficient cause of action enhances and 
preserves the idea of causality in human affairs, an idea which has 
continued to be a source of consternation to scientists, historians,
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and philosophers, ever since David Hume shattered the notion of 
cause and effect in his A Treatise of Human Nature (1740). Support­
ing Hume in the scientific sphere, Bertrand Russell states:
So far as the physical sciences are concerned, Hume is wholly 
in the right: such propositions as "A causes B" are never to be 
accepted, and our inclination to accept them is to be explained 
by the laws of habit and association. 1
(A History of Western Philosophy, 
Oh. XVLI,' p. 669)7
Yet Russell admits that in the psychological sphere, opponents of 
Hume have justifiable reasons for insisting that causal relations 
have valid claims to recognition. "The whole conception of cause, " 
he goes on to say on the same page, "is probably derived from 
volition, and it may be said that we can perceive a relation, between 
a volition and the consequent act, which is something more than 
invariable sequence. "
In historical circles during the last few decades, belief in 
causality has been at low ebb. The post hoc, ergo propter hoc fal­
lacy, in particular, haunts the historian, whose sense of security 
about relating events in the past has been undermined by the discard­
ing of causality as an outmoded myth. The fact that events follow one 
another in time has never been a sufficient reason for their being a 
necessary nexus between them, yet the latent hope of discovering 
and establishing an intrinsic connection between an antecedent and 
a consequent happening, a connection which would draw its strength 
from the weight of empirical evidence assembled and understood in 
terms of cause and effect, agency and execution, origin and outcome, 
has been an integral part of the historian's credo. While the scien­
tist has eliminated the notion of cause from the framework of his
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thinking, he has, nevertheless, maintained an indestructible faith in 
the principle of induction and the uniformity of nature in order to 
support the generalizations he draws from empirical data. Though 
deprived of the consummate gratification based on sure and certain 
knowledge that one event can cause another, he is content, nonethe­
less, with the partial gratification of probable knowledge, that given 
a controlled set of experimental conditions, the expected results will 
most likely repeat themselves over and over again. Not so the his­
torian. Unlike the scientist's world, the historian's very medium, 
the human past, deals with the non-uniformity of events and rests on 
unique occurrences which do not depend on die stability of nature but 
on the unpredictable and endlessly changing temporal panorama.
Once past, elements in this panorama cannot be isolated, controlled, 
and duplicated. "In history the presumption is not that the same thing 
will happen again but that the same thing will not happen again, "
E. H. Carr states in The New Society (quoted from William Dray, 
Laws and Explanation in History, pp. 48-9). Thus a generalization 
concerning the evidence of history cannot be tested, verified, vali­
dated, corroborated, "proved, " in the same manner as a generali­
zation based on the evidence of science. The strength of inductive 
reasoning in consequence rests on a far more tenuous base in the 
study of history than in the study of science.
Historical generalizations on the whole permit an inordinately 
wide range of abstraction, which often suffers from the kind of 
inductive logic employed by the man who used to dance in wild 
costumes on the streets of Chicago in order, he said, to chase away
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tigers. When told there were no tigers on the streets of Chicago, he 
jubilantly replied, "See, it works.' 
generalization escape this kind of thinking and be considered tenable 
with the same measure of assurance as an inductive statement made 
in the pure sciences? How can a modern historian assert with con­
fidence a connection between a series of past phenomena without the 
usual qualifying apologies that such an explanation in no way implies 
a necessary relationship between the two events, that such an explana­
tion is a reconstruction seen from a purely personal perspective, 
that such an explanation has relevance only in the historian's own day, 
that historical viewpoints are, after all, pluralistic, and that the 
matter of causes being far too complex to fathom ought best be 
dropped entirely? With what assurance can an Elie Halevy declare, 
for example, in A History of the English People in the 19th Century,
» »» In what way can a historical
that evangelicalism was the prime cause in shaping the ethical and 
political conservatism of Victorian England, because ". . . the elite 
of the working class, the hardworking and capable bourgeois had been 
imbued by the evangelical movement with a spirit from which the 
established order had nothing to fear" (Vol. I, p. 464)? Or with what 
assurance, for example, can a Gibbon attribute the decline and fall 
of the Roman empire to the successful encroachment of both barba- 
.rism andChristianity on decadent Roman life?
Like the novelist, the historian must appeal, directly or 
indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, to the fundamental con­
stancy in the psychological make-up of man. If the scientist rests 
his faith in the principle of induction on the uniformity of nature,
-55-
the historian and the novelist can buttress the validity of their ob­
servations on the basic uniformity of human nature, on the assump­
tion that the old human ego has through countless generations proven 
itself to be a fairly stable entity. Historical events may be singular 
and unique, but diey are objectively comprehensible because, although 
men have changed, they have not changed that much. Listen to Gibbon 
describe Diocletian, for instance:
. . . [his] abilities were useful rather than splendid: a vigorous 
mind improved by the experience and study of mankind; dexterity 
and application in business; a judicious mixture of liberality and 
economy, of mildness and rigour; profound dissimulation under 
the disguise of military frankness; steadiness to pursue his ends; 
flexibility to vary his means; and, above all, the great art of 
submitting his own passions, as well as those of others, to the 
interest of his ambition, and of colouring his ambition with the 
most specious pretences of justice and public utility.
(The Decline and Fall of the Roman
Lmpire, Gh. Vi, p. 1 $2)
We are struck by the universality of Diocletian's type and 
the familiarity of this recurring human pattern throughout the history 
of politics, ancient and modern. More important, however, we 
discover that the events in Diocletian's reign grow intelligible, in so 
far as we identify a recognizable paradigm of activity which is con­
sistent with the mold of the emperor's personality. Our conviction 
of a justifiable connection between occurrences, between cause and 
effect, or between motivation and subsequent behavior, resembles 
the verisimilitude, the truth-to-life, the indefinable air of authen­
ticity, which is one of the hallmarks of great fiction. The historian's 
"proof" does not arise from the singling out of Diocletian's unique­
ness, that is, by attention to the infinitesimal differences which mark 
the emperor as an individual unparalleled throughout space and time,
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but arises rather from the fact that Diocletian was a man and shared 
identifiable traits of human nature, which can be "tested," verified, 
validated, and corroborated by die experience of the historian and by 
the experience of the historian's audience. Such an interpretation of 
die historian's metier may be frowned upon as non-developmental, 
because this point of view emphasizes sameness rather than change 
of mental outlook in man's advance through time and thereby dis­
counts the importance of the collective in favor of the individual will 
as die propeller of human affairs. Nevertheless, to regard human 
agency as a prime cause of historical activity, to respect the integ­
rity of individual volition as a source of motive power is to pre­
serve a measure of sanity in dealing with the modem dissolution of 
the human personality under the overwhelming pressures of imper­
sonal social, economic, political, and evolutionary biological forces.
Such resistance to determinism is evident in the pages of
Romola. Eliot's belief in free will and personal accountability for
one’s acts holds a tenacious grip over the presentation of character
in the novel, a grip which she relaxes in her subsequent novels,
Middle march and die Zionist section of Daniel Deronda. To find
fault, as David Cecil does, with her characterization in Romola as
being too Victorian for the Renaissance setting is to misunderstand
Eliot's viewpoint on human nature in Romola, i.e
acted, act, and will continue to act in strikingly familiar patterns
throughout time. In Early Victorian Novelists, Cecil writes:
Savonarola may sweep his cowl round him, Romola garnish her 
conversation with appropriate topical allusions, but every 
sentiment they utter, every reaction they feel, betrays them 
unmistakably to be an evangelical preacher and a serious-
that people have• )
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minded young woman living somewhere near Warwick about 
1840, the recognizable brother and sister of the Rev. Mr. 
Tryan and Miss Dorothea Brooke.
(p. 293)
Eliot's novel has many literary faults, but Cecil's charge about the 
anachronistic behavior of leading chatacters is specious is view of 
Eliot's underlying assumption in the novel that man's spiritual make­
up is a fixed and abiding essence rather than a tabula rasa stamped 
with the imprints of a particular historical time. That Savonarola 
acts like an evangelical preacher in the year 1840 is true, but this 
fact ought not to be discredited, because from Eliot's standpoint, 
evangelical preachers in 1840 sounded very much as Savonarola did 
in 1494, and Savonarola's sermons of 1494 sounded very much like 
evangelical sermons in the Old and New Testaments, in particular, 
those of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Amos, Zephaniah, and The Revelation of 
St. John the Divine. In addition, dull, long-suffering, serious-mind­
ed women of Romola's temperament are hardly the priviledged mo­
nopoly of Victorian England but have existed in abundance, one may 
safely assume, in all nations in all ages. That Romola's character 
may be uninteresting and imperfectly drawn is a legitimate criticism; 
that her puritanical leanings do not fit her historical environment is 
not. The outbreak of austere asceticism, evangelical zeal, and 
"earnestness, " was as much a reality of Florentine history in the 
late fifteenth century, as it was in the English history of a later date.
In an introduction to the T. Fisher Unwin edition of Romola
(1907), an Italian critic, Guido Biagi, comments that Romola has 
"none of that quick Italian blood, " no "blazes of passion" of an offend­
ed woman, that she has "unfailing self-control" and "a sad and
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resigned coldness which does not belong to the Italian nature, and was 
still less a characteristic of the women of the Renaissance" (Intro­
duction, xl). Warm-blooded Italian stereotypes abound in the novel 
in the persons of Tessa, Monna Brigida, Monna Ghita, Monna Berta, 
and Camilla Rucellai, yet Eliot chose to cast Romola in the role of a 
Piagnone, a lay nun who pledges herself to a self-effacing life of 
dedication to the poor and plague-stricken. Women of Romola's 
description existed in the Florentine quattrocento and have been held 
up as models to be emulated by young girls, witness the short 
biography of Alessandra De'Bardi, the only woman whom Vespasiano 
deems worthy of inclusion in his memoirs of illustrious "men" of the 
fifteenth century, Vite d'Uomini Ulustri del Secolo XV. Very possi­
bly, Eliot drew directly upon Vespasiano's description of Alessandra 
for her portrait of Romola. Both women were of noble Florentine 
lineage, unusually tall, beautiful, learned, paragons of purity and 
self-sacrifice, and both women shared the same family name: 
De'Bardi. Vespasiano writes that Alessandra's house ". . . was kept 
like a well-ordered convent, " and that she led a frugal life:
To avoid idleness, the cause of all evil, she spent her time in 
repeating the offices and the breviary. She drew great comfort 
from her Bible, besides homilies on all the Gospels, which she 
read day after day as appointed, and other expositions by holy 
writers of old. She spent all her time in good works and gave 
freely to the poor and to others who were ashamed to beg.
(Renaissance Princes, Popes, and 
Prelates, The Vespasiano Memoirs,
Ch. VII, p. 4bi)
Alessandra represents a fifteenth-century Florentine ideal, after 
whom Romola is patterned. Though Romola may not fit the usual 
Italian stereotype which Guido Biagi describes, she, nevertheless,
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mirrors a rare and highly esteemed Renaissance precedent in die 
person of Alessandra De'Bardi.
Eliot's notion that men pilot their own affairs need not lapse 
into an oversimplified single-man theory of historical causation such 
as Thomas Carlyle's. Her affirmation of individual will is welcome 
to the modern reader, after a century during which the stature of 
man has been whittled down to the position of a cat's-paw of count­
less impersonal forces in a Kafkaesque universe. Thomas Carlyle's 
much-debated "Great man" theory of history should be understood in 
the context of defensive strategy against the growing Hegelian and 
later Marxian enthusiasm for the collective spirit of the times to the 
neglect of the individual's contribution. In his On Heroes, Hero- 
Worship, and the Heroic in History, Carlyle, for example, sardon­
ically censures the belittling of Luther by historians:
He was the 'creature of the Time,' they say; the Time called 
him forth, the Time did everything, he nothing -- but what we 
the little critic could have done too.’ This seems to me but 
melancholy work. The Time call forth? Alas, we have known 
Times call loudly enough for their great man; but not find him 
when they called. He was not there; Providence had not sent 
him; the Time, calling its loudest, had to go down to confusion 
and wreck because he would not come when called.
(Lecture I, "The Hero as Divinity")
Though Carlyle's protest has the bombast of a crusader for a 
weakening theoretical position, he defends, as Eliot does, the 
individual's contribution in the narration of past events, an element 
which has been too often shunted aside or taken for granted by 
historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in favor of large- 
scale abstruse "factors. " In our own day, J. H. Hexter’s provoc­
ative and iconoclastic Reappraisals in History (1961) attacks intel-.
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lectuals who shy away from the word "cause" and substitute the 
pseudo-scientific euphemism "factor" instead. I-Jexter states:
. . . somehow "cause" got into trouble with the philosophers and 
the scientists and was dropped by all the best and some of the 
less good intellectual clubs. The work the word had been doing 
had to go on being done, however, since everyone found it neces­
sary to go on talking about the species of relation which "cause" 
had formerly designated. So "factor" was slid into the slot 
which "cause" had once filled in the vocabulary of rational dis­
course, and this made everybody very happy. Thus die human 
mind progresses -- sideways.
(Partlll, p. 200)
For Hexter, as for Eliot and Carlyle, causality is bound up with the 
reinstatement of human volition as the major contributor of histori­
cal flux. Hexter recommends that the historian's vocabulary include 
terms which ". . . are directed to men's voluntary actions, to the 
alternatives men confronted and the choices they made" (Part III, 
p. 213). Rather than vague words such as "tended, " "grew out of, " 
"developed, " "evolved, " "trend, " "tendency, " "evolution, " he directs 
the historian to words which focus on human decision: "think, " 
"weigh, " "choose, " "decide, " "act, " "do, " because, as Hexter con­
cludes in the final sentence of his book, ". . . very often indeed at 
the junction between the way things were going and the way they went 
were the thoughts, the decisions, and the deeds of men. "
While Eliot in Romola affirms that man is a free agent who 
steers his moral fate by individual decisions responsible for weaving 
the moral fabric of his character as well as the net of corresponden­
ces between himself and society, she stops short of assigning, as 
Carlyle docs, any lasting historical value to the actions of men. His­
tory is fundamentally a repetitive process, as she declared in 
Romola's Proem, not, as Carlyle believed, the essence of innumer-
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able biographies of outstanding leaders, whose cumulative achieve­
ments direct the course of the future. Tito Melema, for example, had 
no enduring impact beyond laying waste his own petty life and vitiat­
ing the personal ties of love and loyalty of those who had the mis­
fortune to trust him. Yet, it might be argued, few would insist that 
men of Tito's calibre are instrumental in moving history; medioc­
rity, for good or ill, is of little consequence in producing historical 
changes, and Tito was decidedly second-rate.
Does Eliot still maintain her customary philosophical view­
point in Romola, that history does not progress, when she concen­
trates her attention on a "great man" who in his day convulsed the 
moral atmosphere of Florence, who caused drastic upheavals in the 
political administration in the city-state, and who stirred the con­
science of humanity by dying a martyr for his ideals? To answer this 
question, one must examine how Eliot, in Romola’s "star-studded" 
historical cast of kings, popes, artists, politicians, humanists, and 
speculative thinkers, treats her brightest star: Girolamo Savonarola. 
Historians in the nineteenth century expressed renewed sympathy 
for the achievements of this Dominican prior of St. Mark's Convent in 
Florence, a sympathy which had long lain submerged under impres­
sive attestations that Savonarola was an "arrant cheat, " a "false 
prophet,
the epithets of his harshest critics, 
is voiced by Bardo de'Bardi, the humanist, who refers to Savonarola 
and his monks as "those insect-swarms of besotted fanatics or howl­
ing hypocrites" (Book One, Ch. VI). In the graphic arts, Leonardo
an impostor, " and "a murderous fanatic, " to use some of
In Romola, such loathing
it n
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da Vinci sketched his distrust of the friar in a horrible caricature of 
Savonarola as the devil in a monk's robe. The growth of Savonarola's 
popularity in the nineteenth century may be jointly ascribed to the 
reanimated tolerance for the medieval outlook, to the evangelical 
revival, to the spread of democratic republicanism, to the expansion 
of Renaissance historical studies, and to the emerging spirit of 
Italian nationalism, all of which were to some degree associated with 
the figure of the monk.
Nineteenth-century biographers grapple with two central 
issues concerning the Dominican friar. The first is a moral one, 
which attempts to evaluate his "sincerity, " the genuineness of his 
martyrdom, the probity of his claims as a prophet and visionary; the 
second is a historical question which seeks to evaluate the pivotal 
place he holds in the temporal framework of religious ideas. Was 
Savonarola, for example, the last of the medievals, a devout and 
reactionary son of the Church, who tried heroically to revert to the 
moral austerity of early Christianity in order to stem the swelling 
tide of simony and corruption embodied in the Borgia pope, Alexander 
VI? Or does Savonarola's relentless defiance of the Vatican single 
him out as a revolutionary schismatic, who believed in justification 
by faith alone, a herald of the Reformation, a predecessor to Luther?
The German biographies of the friar by A. G. Rudelbach 
(1835) and Karl Meier (1836) supported the view that Savonarola was 
an unconscious Protestant, while later interpretations by the French­
man, M. Perrens, in 1853 and the Italian, Father Marchese, in 1855 
pineal the monk squarely within the Catholic tradition. The highly
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popular and respected scholarly study by Pasquale Villari in 1860,
Life and Times of Girolamo Savonarola, today still considered the 
"standard" biography, provided further solid scaffolding for the 
Catholic point of view. A good case can be made and has been made 
for both sides by novelists and historians, inasmuch as Savonarola's 
voluminous outpourings in sermons, treatises, books, devotional 
pamphlets, and letters, provide compelling testimony both of staunch 
loyalty to the audiority of the Catholic church as well as striking 
evidence of his determination to defy papal decrees, either by direct 
disobedience or by planning independently of the Pope to convoke a 
General Council of secular European sovereigns to reform the Church. 
The following sampling of quotations taken from both novels and his­
torical writings concerning the friar's opinions may serve to illu­
mine the ambiguity of his doctrinal position:
Wherefore it is manifest that all the faithful should be united under 
the Pope, as the supreme head of the Roman Church, the mother 
of all other churches; and that whoever departs from the unity 
and doctrines of the Roman Church, unquestionably departs from
Christ.
(Savonarola, "The Triumph of the 
Cross, " Book IV, Ch. VI, quoted from 
Pasquale Villari's Life and Times of 
Girolamo Savonarola, Vol ii, p. 240)
I testify, in verbis Domini, that this Alexander is no Pope, nor can 
be considered such, since, leaving aside this most execrable sin 
of simony, by which he bought the Papal throne . . . and his other 
manifest vices, I affirm that he is no Christian and does not be­
lieve in God, which passes the limit of every infidelity.
(Savonarola's letter to the sovereigns 
of France, Spain, England, Hungary, 
and Germany. Quoted from Ralph 
Roeder's The Man of the Renaissance,
p. 112)
A wicked, unbelieving Pope who has gained the pontifical chair by . 
bribery is not Christ s Vicar. His curses are broken swords: he 
grasps a hilt without a blade. His commands are contrary to the
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Christian life: it is lawful to disobey them, -- nay, it is not 
lawful to obey them.
(Savonarola's words quoted by George 
Eliot in Romola, Book Three, Ch. 
XLI1)
This was the moment [Savonarola's excommunication] in which, had 
he been a Luther, his protestantism would have developed; but such 
was not the turn of his mind.
(Margaret Oliphant, The Makers of 
Florence, p. 315)
Savonarola was an Italian Luther, -- differing from the great North­
ern Reformer as the more ethereally strung and nervous Italian 
differs from the bluff and burly German; ....
(Harriet Beecher Stowe,
Sorrento, p. 98)
Agnes of
In reality he neither shared the revolutionary genius of Luther, 
which gave a new vitality to the faiths of Christendom, nor did 
he sympathize with that free movement of the modem mind which 
found its first expression in the arts and humanistic studies of 
Renaissance Italy.
(J. A. Symonds, A Short History of 
the Renaissance in Italy, Ch. on 
Savonarola, p. 2oU)
Canonisat eum (quod aiunt) Christus per nos, rumpantur etiam
Papae et Papistac simul.
(Martin Luther, Meditatio pia 
Hieronymi Savonarolae, in which 
Luther canonizes the friar as a 
Protestant "saint." Werke (Weimar. 
1891, Vol. 12, p. 248)
\
The purpose of these random quotations is to illustrate the 
varied tenor of the friar's pronouncements, which could be used to 
justify any of a number of diverging historical evaluations with 
respect to Savonarola's contribution to the Reformation. The quo-
concern of biographers in weighing 
the significance of the friar's rebellious behavior either as a har­
binger of religious change or as a reactionary throwback to earlier 
forms of Christianity. Pasquale Villari's consuming interest, for 
example, lies in measuring the stresses in the taut balance held by
tations typify the continuing
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Savonarola's position as a fulcrum between the medieval and the 
modern world. According to her diary, George Eliot leaned heavily 
on Villari's Life and Times of Girolamo Savonarola as a source book
for Romola. A comparison of the novel and Villari's work, especi­
ally the descriptions of the warring political factions in Florence, the 
arrival of the French, Savonarola's trials and his execution, reveal 
Eliot's substantial debt to the Italian historian. It is no wonder that 
in Villari's "Preface to the New Edition" of his work, which appeared 
in 1888, he praised Eliot's Romola as "admirable, " though the novel, 
he says, ". . . contributed no new facts to history, since, as was 
only natural, its illustrious author accepted established conclusions 
without dispute. " Usually stinting in his compliments of other biog­
raphers, Villari, knowingly or not, applauds himself in congratu­
lating the author of Romola, since Eliot’s much-lauded historical 
accuracy rests squarely on the solid foundations of Villari's scholar­
ship. Nevertheless, while Eliot may have borrowed heavily from 
Villari's established factual evidence, she does not endorse his his­
torical estimate that Savonarola's pioneering exploits were a thrust 
forward in the progress of mankind. With characteristic mid­
nineteenth-century historical optimism, Villari'views Savonarola as 
a devout Catholic and a spiritual innovator, "a Columbus of the moral 
world. " In a final panegyric, Villari concludes that the friar:
. . . merits the title of the prophet of a new civilization . . . 
[which is moving] . . . towards a vaster synthesis of the human 
race. . . . [Men such as Savonarola] . . . disperse the darkness 
and cleave a passage for the new road . . . , " [and when his 
form shall be realized,' Christianity will] . . . attain to its true 
and perfect development in the world, and Italy will not be in the 
rear of the new march of progress.
re-
(Conclusion, pp. 418, 419, 421)
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Though Eliot is not impervious to the appeals of conventional 
mid-nineteenth-century hyperbole on humanity's advance through 
time, such sentiments are conspicuously absent in her appraisal of 
Savonarola in Romola. Consistent with her ahistorical stand in the 
novel, Eliot is silent on the issue of the friar's place in the history 
of ideas, or his relationship to Luther, or his "immortal" legacy 
to the "march of civilization. " In the novel's seventy-two chapters, 
there is one statement, however, which could be interpreted as an 
acknowledgement that man progresses through history, when Eliot 
declares: "Our lives make a moral tradition for our individual 
selves., as the life of mankind at large makes a moral tradition for 
the race; . . . (Book Two, Ch. XIX). In the context of its use in 
Romola, "a moral tradition" even when considered collectively does 
not necessarily imply the gradual improvement of society through 
time but acts instead as a further entrenchment of already established 
habits of good and evil. Savonarola's bequest to mankind, his mar­
tyrdom on behalf of an outraged conscience which refused to accede 
to the powers of corruption within the Church, serves no further end 
in Romola other than as an inspiring expression of man's yearning 
for goodness. This gesture may deepen and intensify man's moral 
idealism but lacks the needed impetus to steer the course of history. 
Unlike Villari's estimate of Savonarola as a pioneer, Eliot depicts 
the friar as a sacrificial victim, whose martyrdom was a magnifi­
cent gesture to man's aspirations, but a gesture which failed to ignite 
the sparks of historical change. In a revealing analogy, Eliot 
describes Savonarola as an ancient ox offered on "the altar of men's
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highest hopes" (Book Two, Ch. VI), an offering which was a dramatic 
but passing illumination of no lasting efficacy rather than a strong 
beacon guiding mankind's footsteps into the future. During the monk's 
last days as a prisoner awaiting execution, he uttered sad words of 
resignation and defeat: "1 count as nothing; darkness encompasses 
me: yet the light I saw was the true light. " Eliot uses this quotation 
as the conclusion to her fifty-first chapter of Book Three, a quotation 
which acts as a subtle undercurrent to reinforce Eliot's prevailing 
view in the novel that even great men, far from being the grand 
driving forces of history, as Carlyle had maintained, that even great 
men "count as nothing" in the total scheme of things.
Villari's comment that Eliot accepts established facts "without 
dispute" is misleading in view of her incisive probing into the traces 
of egotism and political ambition, which lurked in the recesses of 
Savonarola's character, traces which Villari's account overlooks.
In a dramatic encounter between Romola and Savonarola, for example, 
Eliot exposes the friar's narrow-minded equating of the ideals of 
Christianity with the ideals of his own political party, a habit which 
blinds him from seeing any merit in the convictions of opposing 
factions:
Romola: Take care, father, lest your enemies have some 
reason when they say that in your visions of what 
will further God’s kingdom you see only what will 
strengthen your own party.
Savonarola: And that is true.' . . . The cause of my party is^ 
the cause of God's kingdom.
Romola: 1 do not believe it! . . . God's kingdom is something 
wider, -- else, let me stand outside it with the beings 
that l love.
(Book Three, Ch. XXXIX)
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Romola in this conversation has the last word, yet Eliot balances 
evidence of the friar's fanaticism with instances in other sections of 
the novel of his self-effacing fervent faith. Though Eliot refuses to 
whitewash Savonarola's weaknesses, as Villari and other biogra­
phers tend to do, she nonetheless compensates for her rigorous 
inquest into the friar's motives by her generous capacity to tolerate 
the ascetic excesses of his intense religious idealism. For example, 
she condemns the extremism of Savonarola's burning of the Pyramid 
of Vanities and comments:
Sorrow and joy have each their peculiar narrowness; and a reli­
gious enthusiasm like Savonarola’s which ultimately blesses 
mankind by giving the soul a strong propulsion towards 
sympathy with pain, indignation against wrong, and the sub­
jugation of sensual desire, must always incur the reproach of 
a great negation.
(Book Three, Ch. XXIX)
Eliot draws a full-blooded portrait of the martyr as a man, 
who despite personal limitations sets a shining example of human 
ideals of goodness, but she refrains from picturing his martrydom,
as Villari does, as a thrust forward in the perfectibility of mankind. 
Her decision to portray Savonarola as an individual outside the
lies less in the fact that Eliot is a noveliststream of history 
rather than an historian, but lies instead in a view of human nature
in Romola, in which man, however great he may be, is still a 
transitory phenomenon with little power to effect change, with little 
power to redirect the . . broad sameness of the human lot which 
never alters in the main headings of its history, " as the
first paragraph of Romola's Proem affirms.
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Thus far this essay has sought to ferret out various narrative 
techniques in' the operational strategy used by the storyteller to con­
vey a particular historical point of view. In order to mitigate the 
striking testimony of historical change, Eliot, as we have seen, 
employed specific literary tactics to launch, bolster, and secure the 
traditional world picture of recurrence and uniformity announced in 
Romola's Proem, to wit: 1) the juxtaposition of the transient histori­
cal event against a backdrop of the periodicity and "eternal" return of 
religious festivals, pageants, fairs, and anniversaries; 2) the use of 
rhetorical aids such as a highly selective vocabulary, syntax, alliter­
ation, and prose rhythm, to convey the idea of repetition; 3) the ex­
tensive inweaving of metaphors connoting rootedness and stationary 
organisms, such as the "tree" of society and other plant imagery;
4) the seedbed conception of time and of causation as legitimate co­
ordinators of narrative continuity and intelligibility; 5) the represen­
tation of character as a fixed quantity of innate potential; and 6) the 
diminution of the "great" man's influence in controlling the course 
of history.
One last significant device Eliot uses to underscore her pre­
vailing ahistorical attitude in Romola is to draw extensive parallels 
in plot and theme in order to emphasize "the sameness of the human 
lot. " She duplicates plot patterns in kindred relationships so as to 
stress the idea of eternal recurrence in the universal problems which 
face men. For example, Tito's betrayal of his stepfather, Baldassare, 
is echoed in several subplots in which the question of loyalty versus 
disobedience is weighed in the context of a father's relationship to
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his son. Romola's brother, Dino, disobeys his father, Bardo de'Bardi, 
by joining the Dominicans, a religious order which is anathema to the 
old scholar, Bardo. Mortified by Dino's filial disloyalty, Bardo dis­
owns Dino and disavows Dino's existence by declaring resolutely:
"My son is dead" (Book One, Ch. XII). Savonarola's refusal to obey 
the Pope, the father of the Roman Catholic Church, may be interpret­
ed as another instance of filial disobedience. The word "Pope" 
derives from Latin and Greek sources for the word "father, " and the 
Italian equivalent of "Pope" is il Papa, i. e., the father. To Pope 
Alexander VI, Savonarola was a dangerous rebel who defied papal 
authority and fully deserved to be disowned as a son of the church, 
first through excommunication and finally through a series of legal 
trials which ended in the friar's execution. On a transcendent plane, 
the theme of filial loyalty is underlined in Savonarola’s attacks on 
Alexander's notoriously corrupt career of simony and debauchery.
As Christ's vicar, that is, as a substitute for the Son of God on 
earth, Alexander Vi's commitment to the divine commandments of 
God the Father was an impious fraud.
Both the plot and the subplots mirror varying angles of a 
perennial ethical question with its endless ramifications: where do 
sanctions lie when loyalties clash? What is the nature of allegiance? 
To what extent is self-interest justifiable, if it conflicts with filial 
duties and responsibilities? To what extent is rebellion justifiable in 
opposition to written or unwritten laws, either civil, ecclesiastical, 
or divine? Is individual conscience a legitimate court of appeal for 
a course of conduct? Within the context of her marriage, Romola,
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for example, defines warring commitments between her sense of 
duty as a wife to Tito and her conviction that the bond of wedlock in 
her life had become a travesty of a sacred tie. When she had first 
wanted to leave Tito, Savonarola told her not to break a sacramental 
vow but to make her sorrow an offering: "My daughter, if the cross 
comes to you as a wife, you must carry it as a wife" (Book Two,
Ch. XX). Yet Romola later challenges the friar's words, when she 
observes that Savonarola's refusal to obey the Pope is also the break­
ing of a sacramental vow: -
The law was sacred. Yes, but rebellion might be sacred too. It 
flashed upon her mind that the problem before her was essentially 
the same as that which had lain before Savonarola, -- the prob­
lem where the sacredness of obedience ended, and the sacredness 
of rebellion began. To her, as to him, there had come one of 
those moments in life when the soul must dare to act on its own 
warrant, not only without external law to appeal to, but in the 
face of a law which is not unarmed with Divine lightnings, -- 
lightnings that may yet fall if the warrant has been false.
(Book Three, Ch. XXXVI)
Plots and subplots interweave to illustrate gradations of diso­
bedience from high-minded conscientious objectors, such as Dino, 
Romola, and Savonarola, to base personifications of treacherous dis­
loyalty, such as Tito and Pope Alexander VI. Also rendered in 
parallel plot construction is a second theme, taken from the text of 
one of Savonarola's sermons in the Duo mo: "The day of vengeance 
is at hand! . . .And thou, 0 Italy, art the chosen land; has not God 
placed his sanctuary within thee, and thou has polluted it? Behold, 
the ministers of his wrath are upon thee, -- they are at thy very
While the friar compares Florence to 
a second Babylon soon to suffer the vengeance of God's wrath, 
Baldassare, listening to the sermon, is inspired to carry out his plan
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l fidoors (Book Two, Ch. IV).
of revenge against Tito, a plan of impassioned retribution conceived 
of by an insanely maddened and vindictive father to punish the behavior 
of his treacherous son. Savonarola's vision often reaches allegorical 
proportions with Florence resembling a battlefield for the struggle 
between the forces of good and evil, between spirituality and sensu­
ality, between what St. Augustine called the City of God and the City 
of Man, Civitas Dei et Civitas Terrena. To accentuate this contrast, 
Eliot juxtaposes antithetical tastes in music and art to set off the oppo­
sition between the spirit of renunciation and the spirit of self-indul­
gence. For example, a blunt counterpart to the hymn-singing amidst 
cries of Viva Gesu during the burning of the Pyramid of Vanities is 
Tito's singing of Lorenzo de'Medici's famous quatrain, which cele­
brates youth and pleasure and urges everyone to enjoy the present 
moment, for tomorrow brings uncertainty:
Quant' e bella giovinezza.
Che si fugge tuttavia!
Chi vuol esser lieto sia.
Di doman non c' £ certezza.
(Book One, Ch. XIII)
Appropriately enough, Tito dislikes medieval art with its "hideous 
smoked Madonnas; fleshless saints in mosaic, staring down idiotic 
astonishment and rebuke from the apse . . . looking like an index to 
perpetual spasms and colic" (Book One, Ch. Ill), but instead he pre­
fers more recent painters and sculptors who use ancient Greek and 
Roman models.
Despite Eliot's frequent identification of paganism and hedon­
ism in Tito's expressions of aesthetic taste, her treatment of the 
differences between medieval and classical art was not naively alle-
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gorical as was Savonarola's uncompromising distinction between the 
two, a distinction which classified as "vanity" much Florentine 
artistic expression which suggested pagan forebears. That rare 
editions of "worldly" books by Ovid, Boccaccio, and Petrarca should 
go up in smoke along with mirrors, perfumes, rouge-pots, and false 
hair, was to Eliot an exhibition of gross license on the part of 
Savonarola's lieutenants. One of Eliot's best-drawn minor charac­
ters in Romola, the painter Piero di Cosimo, treats the burning of 
the vanities with utter contempt: "Look at that Petrarca sticking up 
beside a rouge-pot: Do the idiots pretend that the heavenly Laura was 
a painted harridan" (Book Three, Ch. XXIX)? In Romola, Piero is 
the mouthpiece of sound common sense, which provides a good anti­
dote to the excesses of Tito's epicureanism and Savonarola's "hair 
shirt" asceticism. Piero's incisive commentary throughout the novel 
acts as a via media between immoderate points of view. He 
appreciates the value of what Walter Pater called "the splendid free­
ing of the senses, " yet balances this regard with an intense moral 
rigor capable of sensing the faintest traces of ethical irregularity 
unobserved by others. In Romola, Piero paints "Bacchus and Ariadne" 
as well as "Sinon Deceiving Priam, " two works which symbolize 
Piero's generous ability to sanction the best insights of Tito's and 
Savonarola's world. Piero's art reveals that individual well-being is 
grounded both in sensual refreshment as well as fervid moral energy 
against wrong.
Eliot uses Piero's paintings and sketches throughtout Romola 
in order to demonstate further the parallels between ancient and
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later forms of moral behavior. Piero, for example, paints Romola 
as Antigone, Tito as Bacchus, and old Bardo as Teiresias, the great­
est of mythological prophets. Just as Teiresias was blinded when he 
saw Minerva, the goddess of wisdom,unveiled, old Bardo lost his eye­
sight through the intensity of his classical scholarship, by his gaining 
a kind of wisdom which also made him blind to the merits of the 
Christian life chosen by his son, Dino. Eliot's analogues to the past 
as well as her repetition of parallel plot structures within the tem­
poral context of late fifteenth-century Florence form part of her total 
design to implement the non-developmental historical outlook in 
Romola, which is unequivocally asserted at the novel's outset.
This chapter has dealt with the practices a novelist may em­
ploy to embody historical consciousness in a work of fiction, prac­
tices which the historian may also wish to avail himself of in telling 
a story about a segment of time. An examination of Romola's narra­
tive structure discloses a modus operandi, which brings into play the • 
offensive strategy of a storyteller who is determined to present a non- 
developmental view of history, despite the paradoxical fact that she is 
writing a "historical" novel. In its attempt to cross the two dis­
ciplines of history and literature, historical fiction has too often 
produced sorry half-breeds, deservedly ostracized by the purer 
strains in each family group. Both novelists and historians have 
censured the glaring inaccuracies of fact, the anachronisms, the 
pompous and theatrical dialogue, which all too frequently permeate 
the contents of the historical novel. Mark Twain, for instance, wrote 
an abrasive satire, entitled "Fenimore Cooper's Literary Offenses, "
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which pokes savage fun at gross misrepresentations in The Lea the r- 
stocking Tales, and Henry Fielding condemns the grotesque exaggera­
tions of hero-worshiping biographers in his parody, The Life of Mr. 
Jonathan Wild the Great. Francis Palgrave once remarked that his­
torical novelists were mortal enemies to history; Leslie Stephen 
added that they were also mortal enemies to fiction.
Adverse criticism of the historical novel, needless to say, 
has not been wanting, yet the genre has enjoyed wide vogue despite 
the critics. Men like to look backward in time either through fiction 
or written history for a number of compelling reasons. Curiosity 
about the past may stem from man's desire to know and define him­
self, for history is a vast storeroom of individual and collective 
human behavior for each man to draw upon as he sees fit. To the 
nineteenth-century world historian, Henry Thomas Buckle, this 
storeroom was the fertile matrix of Western Europe's unswerving 
intellectual advance according to the "laws" of social progress, and to 
Edward Gibbon, history was a polluted wellspring of "little more than 
the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind. " For some, the 
appeal of history is not self-knowledge but lies in the fulfillment of 
an emotional need to revere, hallow, and reaffirm familiar traditions. 
The study of the past thus becomes a kind of ancestor worship, as 
the content of history is transformed into a reassuring psychological 
pillar to lean against while contemplating the uncertainties of the 
present and the future. For others, written history is a monument 
against the ravages of time, an antidote to flux, an effort to arrest, 
preserve, and eternalize the golden moments of an individual or a
!
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group. History has always been a good ego builder for those who 
thirst after immortal fame; for this end, the pyramids were fine, 
but papyrus was, after all, cheaper. And then, history has been a 
tireless utilitarian, a useful moral teacher "for the advancement 
of Vertue [sic] and the defacying [sic] of Vice, " to borrow a phrase 
from Tudor historians (Herschel Baker, The Race of Time, p. 47).
Not to be discounted, however, is history's universal
challenge to the intellect and imagination, a challenge which tempts
the scholar and the creative artist to reconstruct the chaotic pieces
of the giant puzzle of the past out of sheer curiosity to solve the
mysteries of bygone eras and also to satisfy one of mankind's most
steadfast and unadulterated loves: the love of a good story. This
blend of curiosity about the secrets of history, along with the
passion to listen to a promising tale is felicitously expressed in
Keats's well-known "Ode on a Grecian Urn, " when Keats addresses
the urn as a "sylvan historian" and asks:
What leaf-fring'd legend haunts about thy shape 
Of deities or mortals, or of both,
In Tempe or the dales of A ready?
(lines 5-7)
Doubtless Eliot combines some or all of diese motives in Romola.
For its proportions, the novel is a noteworthy attempt to 
provide a stereoscopic view of quattrocento Florence through the 
dimensions of history and literatui'e. If Romola suffers as a novel, 
its lapses lie on the side of literature rather than history, for 
its accuracy has been checked by zealous historians and literary 
editors down to the minutest particulars, such as checking 
the street numbers on the Floi'entine rent-rolls during the last
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decade of the fifteenth century. As for its fictional authenticity, 
se non e vero, £ ben trovato. Romola resembles a meticulous copy 
of a fine period piece, a trustworthy reproduction of a slice of time, 
a reasonable facsimile which quite naturally lacks the patina of the 
genuine antique. With all its faults, the novel, nevertheless, 
preserves and recalls a highly prized period in the history of man­
kind, a period of time well worth mulling over even in the guise of 
an imaginative reconstruction of the original.
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CHAPTER TWO
' HISTORY AS PROCESS: MIDDLEMARCH
To enter the temperate and unruffled atmosphere of Middle - 
march society in the wake of the convulsive upheavals which engulf 
die Florence of Romola's day is to discover a curious reversal of 
historical perspectives in George Eliot's outlook. In Romola, Eliot 
is committed to a philosophical vision of permanence, which treats 
Florence as "an almost unviolated symbol amidst the flux of human 
things, to remind us that we still resemble the men of the past more 
than we differ from them" (Proem). This vision of permanence re­
gards Florentine history as a monotonous echo of "the broad same­
ness of the human lot, which never alters in the main headings of its 
history" (Proem). As the previous chapter has shown, Eliot but­
tresses this view with strong structural scaffolding. In the teeth of 
the grand cataclysms of Florentine quattrocento life, she steadfastly 
deflates the significance of the unique temporal event in favor of 
notions of recurrence, repetition, and uniformity. Middlemarch, by 
contrast, is saturated with the consciousness of historial change, 
despite the prevailing impression that nothing much ever happens in 
the novel.
The story of this provincial English town of the 1830's seethes 
with the endless quotidian stirrings of rather ordinary doings: the 
familiar problems of growing up, the proverbial hazards of courtship 
and marriage, the usual pressures of earning a livelihood, and the 
typical frustrations and consolations of community life. In fact,
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events in Middlemarch are so undramatic as to defy at first glance 
a searching inspection of historical change. Yet the role of the 
uneventful and commonplace happening is as magnified in this novel 
as the role of the tumultuous historical event is minimized in Romola.
Our normal responses to the minutiae of movement are extremely 
coarse, Eliot writes in Middlemarch, as if to provide a fairly 
secure protective anchor against the instability of flux:
If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, 
it would be like hearing the grass gx>w and the squirrel's 
heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the 
other side of silence. As it is, the quickest of us walk about 
well wadded widi stupidity.
(Ch. 20)
Eliot wants a close-up of that l'oar and uses her creative power as 
a stedioscope and microscope, to borrow two common props from 
the novel. These props amplify the muffled pulsations of the old 
order yielding place to new and augment the barely discernible 
"threadlike connections" (Ch. 11) in the sinews of social transfor­
mation.
In Middlemarch, Eliot dwells on the nexus between one state
and another, that is, she concentrates her attention on processes,
functions, and relations, in order to render change as a form of
developmental energy in perpetual and steady slow motion rather
than as a mechanistic shuffling of inert masses. In a chapter on
Heraclitus, Bertrand Russell states that:
. . . energy, unlike matter, is not a refinement of the com­
mon-sense notion of a "thing"; it is merely a characteristic 
of physical processes. It might be fancifully identified with 
the Heraclitean Fire, but it is the burning not what burns.
"What burns" has disappeared from modern physics.
(A History of Western Philoso­
phy, P- T/)
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In this novel on the Reform era, Eliot shifts her historical emphasis 
to the "burning, " so to speak, rather than to "what burns. " Her ar­
tistic intention is analogous to Dr. Lydgate's, one of die central 
characters, and the novel's "real hero" according to Henry James. 
Lydgate was inspired, Eliot writes:
. . . with the imagination that reveals subtle actions inacces­
sible by any sort of lens, but tracked in that outer darkness 
through long pathways of necessary sequence by the inward 
light which is the last refinement of Energy. . . . [He] was 
enamoured of that arduous invention which is the very eye of 
research, provisionally framing its object and correcting it 
to more and more exactness of relation; he wanted to pierce 
the obscurity of diose minute processes . . . those invisible 
tiioroughfares . . . that delicate poise and transition which 
determine die growdi of happy or unhappy consciousness.
(Ch. 16)
Eliot explores the subtle and inaccessible actions, the "minute 
processes, " "the last refinement of Energy, " the "exactness of 
relation, " and the "delicate poise and transition" --in short, the 
functional dimensions of social evolution in a small community, 
just as Lydgate centers his medical research on the intangible 
processes of biological growth. In Middlemarch, she abandons the 
static world of Romola to create a developmental society in its 
protean state, pliant and plastic, a society in the act of shaping 
itself and being shaped by the assimilation of infinitesimal gossa­
mers of human activity, which make up the marrow of change.
Written in 1871-2, Eliot's Middlemarch is a probe into the 
recesses of social movement, a fictional re-creation of the period 
of the Reform Bill of 1832, which was a critical dividing line in the 
expansion of British democracy. Greville's diary of March 7, 1831,
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exclaims:
Nothing talked of, thought of, dreamt of, but Reform. Every 
creature one meets asks, What is said Now? How will it go? 
What is the last news? What do you think? and so it is from 
morning till night, in the streets, in die clubs, and in pri­
vate houses.
(Louis Kronenberger, ed. 
The Great World: Portraits 
and Scenes from Greviile's
Memoirs, Id 1-1-18bU, p. bO)
While Eliot acknowledges die influence of the Reform issue on 
Middlemarchers, the sphere of politics remains a secondary concern 
in the novel much like a distant obbligato to the immediate needs 
of everyday life in this provincial town. She had already written 
a political novel on the turbulent emotions aroused by the Reform 
Bill in Felix Holt, the Radical (1866), published just prior to 
Middlemarch in the sequence of her creative fiction. L ike 
Middlemarch, Felix Holt, the Radical was set in the same region of 
the English Midlands, yet Eliot in the earlier work dramatizes the 
intense political frenzy of which Greville speaks, and she dwells on 
die long list of political, ecclesiastical, and social abuses, the 
riots, the rick-burnings, and the violent struggles caused by popu­
lar discontent. Felix Holt, the Radical belongs to that popular 
genre of Victorian novel which is committed to "The Condition of 
England" question, a genre encompassing such works as Disraeli's 
Sybil (1845), Gaskell's Mary Barton (1848), Kingsley's Alton Locke 
(1850), and Dickens's Hard Times (L854) . Yet in Middlemarch, 
Eliot seeks to relegate national politics to its just proportion in 
affecting the routine life of a community, as if to counter die dictum 
of Sir John Seeley, the nineteenth-century British historian, who
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affirmed that "History is past politics and politics present history. " 
In The Red and the Black, which like Middlemarch is set in 
the early 1830's, Stendhal likens the introduction of politics into a 
novel to a pistol-shot in the middle of a concert (Ch. 52), yet he 
maintains that if his characters did not talk politics, they would no 
longer be the Frenchmen of that time, and his novel would no longer 
be a mirror of the period. In reconstructing a past era, the historian 
and the novelist must assess the extent to which a political idea, a 
new law or manifesto, or a great leader alters the course of events, 
or whether indeed, as Tolstoy argues in War and Peace, the vicissi­
tudes of history can be influenced by humans at all. In English 
Political Thought of the 19th Century, Crane Brinton puts the prob­
lem as follows:
. . . the modern historian of ideas can hardly avoid a haunting 
fear that after all he is dealing in unrealities. For one thing, 
much modern social psychology. . . has insisted that ordinary 
men are immune to the contagion of philosophical ideas. If 
ideas really do influence the crowd, it is only after they have 
been transformed into symbols, rituals, stereotypes. . . . 
Thei-e thus arises. . . another way of writing the history of 
political ideas, . . . rather of opinion than of thought. . . .
Its sources must be whatever reveals the intellectual baggage 
of the ordinary man -- periodical literature, novels, 
newspapers. . .
(Introduction, pp.3-4)
The writing of such history recognizes that the broad base of his­
torical transformation is nurtured by slowly evolving widespread 
common habits, attitudes, opinions, and prejudices, which control
social behavior rather than by spectacular revolutionary decisions 
of important people in high places. Historical change in Middle- 
march is viewed from below rather than from above, that is, by!■
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observing the seemingly inconsequential shifts of grassroots con­
victions, whose cumulative weight turns the scales in affecting the 
values of national life.
Eliot's novel may be regarded as a fictional foray into his­
torical sociology. Both the sociologist and the historian are con­
cerned with the processes of change, but the former generally looks 
for prevailing patterns and fixed causes of social behavior independ­
ent of the flow of temporal events, while the latter for the most part 
is interested in relating unique, non-recurring happenings within 
the time-stream. In practice this distinction is easily blurred. The 
sociologist, Max Weber, for example, delved deeply into the history 
of the Reformation in order to correlate the Protestant ethic with 
the spirit of capitalism. And the historian, Elie HaMvy, for ex­
ample, leans heavily towards sociology in his first volume of A His­
tory of the English People in the 19th Century. In Middlemarch,
Eliot uses the tools of both the historian and the sociologist in pre­
senting a provincial society in a state of slow transition, a society 
equidistant from the cataclysmic turmoils of Greville's London in 
the vanguard of social change, yet equidistant from the immutable 
hamlets of Thomas Hardy's Wessex, so far from the madding crowd 
as to seem as immune to change as Stonehenge. Instead Middle- 
march, as its title plainly suggests, literally follows the middle 
course. The town's pace moves quickly enough to dispel illusions 
of permanence yet slowly enough to permit inspection of "that 
delicate poise and transition which determine the growth" (Ch. 16) 
of one stage to another, that fine quantum which . . traces out
i
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the suppressed transitions which unite all contrasts. . . " (Ch. 20).
The following pages seek to clarify those compositional 
elements in Middlemarch which reveal how the contours of its com­
plicated structural design are governed by the equally complicated 
metaphor of the evolutionary process. The overriding unity of the 
novel rests on a comprehensive social analogue to the intricate 
mechanism of biological inheritance, growth, continuity, and 
development, to wit, the strategy of adaptation by virtue of variation, 
the struggle for existence, natural selection, and die survival of the 
fittest. This unity also rests on less heralded concomitants of 
biological cohesion and adjustment, such as cooperation, mutual 
assistance, and imitation, stemming from consanguinity and 
consciousness of kind. Any comparisons of organic evolution with 
die social process may yield loose and far-fetched correlations; 
nevertheless, such equations were acceptable intellectual 
shibboleths in Eliot's day. In a much quoted phrase, Henry James 
speaks of Middlemarch as "a treasurehouse of detail but. . . an 
indifferent whole, " and he mentions in a book review of the novel 
that this work contains "echoes of Messrs. Darwin and Huxley. "
By alluding to these scientists, James drops a clue which this chap­
ter intends to pursue, namely that the novel's coherence lies in its 
evolutionary outlook, an approach which provides a focus, a 
thematic center, for the novel's seemingly disparate parts.
The evolutionary analogy will also help pull together the 
valuable but disjointed studies of Middlemarch's imagery by, for 
example, Barbara Hardy, who regards the work as a multi -
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colored spectrum of egoism; by Mark Schorer, who classifies its
syntax of unification, antithesis, growth, and progressive movement;
by William Harvey, who dwells on the web image; by Hilda Hulme,
who delves into the novel's medical metaphors; or by Walter
Houghton, who stresses its ethics of self-realization. Seeking out
those Darwinian echoes may provide a congruity of meaning to the
profusion of admirable particulars in this novel, a profusion which,
as David Daiches states in his critical analysis of Middlemarch,
. . defies formulation. " For instance, the widespread use of
verbs of entanglement, merging, mixing, connecting, associating,
comprehending, and bending, listed by Mark Schorer in his study
of the novel, helps integrate the unifying picture of a glutinously
enmeshed society, as interdependent and interconnected as Darwin's
ecological conception of the evolutionary process in the last
paragraph of The Origin of Species:
It is interesting to contemplate a tangled bank, clothed with 
many plants of many kinds, with birds singing in the bushes, 
with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling 
through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately 
constructed forms, so different from each other, and depen­
dent upon each other in so complex a manner, have all been 
produced by laws acting around us.
Middlemarch is a fragment of humanity's "tangled bank, " the 
social equivalent of Darwin's natural tableau. Far from being an 
"indifferent whole, " the novel is a calculated rendering of a richly 
variegated medium, evolving step by step in an open-ended seg­
ment of historical time and proceeding for endless millenia from 
an unknowable origin towards an unknowable future.
To embody the imperceptible movement of change in the vast
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temporal panorama of social development, Eliot chose a fraction of 
time which marked a turning point in nineteenth-century England. 
Middlemarch is set in the years just prior to the passage of the 
Reform Bill, from September 1829 through May 1831, a slice of his­
tory characterized by "mixed conditions" (Ch. 1), to borrow the 
words of the novel, and by "dim lights and tangled circumstance, " 
which were . . helped by no coherent social faith and order. . . " 
(Prelude). A keen sense of instability, uncertainty, and confusion 
permeated many phases of personal and public life at that time, 
so much so that John Stuart Mill dubs this period "an age of transi­
tion" in his essay, "The Spirit of the Times" (1831). Like Mill, 
Thomas Carlyle describes the "Dyspepsia of Society" in his 
"Characteristics, " an essay also published in 1831, ,in which he 
blames the general malaise on the breakdown of traditional values, 
because, ". . . Change, or the inevitable approach of Change, is 
manifest everywhere. " In 1830, Charles Lyell published his influ­
ential F^inciplesofGeology, which argued persuasively in favor of 
the slow persistent transformation of the earth's surface through 
infinite reaches of time. But it was the encroachment of democracy, 
incarnate in the Reform Bill, which best symbolized the breakdown 
of established patterns of power. The literature of the day was a 
faithful barometer of the rising interest in politics. One of the 
characters in Edward Bulwer-Lytton's Pelham, or the Adventures 
of a Gentleman (1828) deplores the unsettling drift of new democratic
ideas:
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. . . it is really dreadful to see those upstarts rising around us, 
and throwing everything that is respectable and ancient into the 
background. Dangerous times these, Mr. Pelham, -- dangerous 
times; nothing but innovation upon the most sacred institutions 
. . . new fashioned doctrines, which lead to nothing but 
anarchy and confusion. . . .
(Ch. XXXV)
Greville, the Boswell of these years, reflects kindred sentiments 
on the Reform Bill of 1831:
I have always been convinced that the country was in no danger 
of revolution, and still believe that if one does come it will 
be from the passing of this Bill, which will introduce the 
principle of change and whet the appetites of those who never 
will be satisfied with any existing order of things. . . .
God only knows how it will all end.
(The Great World: Portraits 
and Scenes from Greville's 
Memoirs, 1814-1860, pp. 68-69)
And young Disraeli in Contarini Fleming (1832) views change as the 
outcome of political processes:
When I examine the state of European society with the unim­
passioned spirit which the philosopher can alone command,
I perceive that it is in a state of transition, a state of transi­
tion from foedal [sic] to federal principles. This I conceive 
to be the sole and secret cause of all the convulsions that 
have occurred and are to occur.
(Part VII, Ch. 2, last page)
Thus Eliot in Middle march selected a setting in which the 
conspicuous signs of political transformation parallel less obvious 
vicissitudes throughout a broad range of spiritual and material 
values as well. To Mr. Vincy, mayor of Middlemarch, the unset­
tled times are a severe threat to his finances: "We may all be ruined 
for what I know -- the country’s in that state! Some say it's the 
end of the world, and be hanged if I don't think it ’ ks like it"
(Ch. 36). To the tenant farmer, Dagley, the Bil 
. . for them say it as knows it, as there's to
■ esents a hope: 
Rinform, and
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them landlords as never done the right thing by their tenants 'ull be 
treated i' that way as they'll hev to scuttle off" (Ch. 39). Yet to old 
Mrs. Farebrolher, the "age of transition" marks a pronounced 
shift of moral certainties:
When I was young, Mr. Lydgate, there was never any question 
about right and wrong. We knew our catechism, and that was 
enough; we learned our creed and our duty. Every respectable 
Church person had the same opinions. But now if you speak 
out of the Prayer-Book itself, you are liable to be contradicted.
(Ch. 17)
To Middlemarchers, the transition of the 1830's produced a 
bewildering muddle of old and new, a social metamorphosis 
tantalizing for Eliot to observe from the vantage point of the 1870's. 
It is no accident that she deliberately fixes upon these years in 
order to depict social movement in flagrante, so to speak.
Unlike her former novels she examines this era not to complain, 
as Carlyle does, of a sick "gouty" society, or to indulge in 
nostalgia, a weakness for which she is in other novels all to often 
prone. Instead Eliot observes with the dispassionate eye of a 
naturalist the fascinating spectacle of Middlemarch society adapting 
to new conditions, an adaptation she delineates with a tolerant yet 
ironic gaze, which notes both the fortunate limitations as well as 
the fearful assets of this mysterious evolutionary process.
Since the principle of variation is one of the fundamental 
features of an evolutionary landscape, Eliot populates her Middle- 
march canvas with a teeming diversity of social "organisms. " 
Variety is expressed in sheer quantity in addition to the qualitative 
proliferation of higher and lower "breeds" of social life and action. 
No fewer than one hundred and sixteen individuals contribute to the
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plot, and no fewer than thirty-two assorted occupations are woven 
into the texture of the story, she creates the landlord, the farmer, 
scholar, mayor, banker,' manufacturer, lawyer, coroner, bailiff, 
auctioneer, real-estate broker, tax-collector, justice of the peace, 
ironmonger, tanner, carrier, waggoner, brewer, draper, glazier, 
shoemaker, barber, dyer, grocer, druggist, horse-dealer, actress, 
pawnbroker, newspaper editor, headmistress, as well as an array 
of servants, housewives, clergymen, and especially, doctors. 
Further diversification is provided by gradations of rank from 
gentry to rabble, gradations of wealth from plutocrat to pauper, 
gradations of age from infancy to senescence, gradations of temper­
ament ranging from idealism to realism and from altruism to ego­
ism, as well as gradations of "adaptive" talent exhibiting varying 
degrees of intelligence, cunning, naivete, or stupidity. The social 
organism swarms with multiples, in themselves thick with intermi­
nable possibilities and probabilities, with points of view ". . . as 
various," Eliot writes, ". . . as the faces to be seen at will in 
fretwork or paperhangings: every form is there, from Jupiter to 
Judy. . . " (Ch. 32). Even simple Caleb Garth conceives of business 
as many-pronged "myriad-headed, myriad-handed labour" (Ch. 24), 
and Mrs. Garth in her own small way contributes to the novel’s pre­
occupation with proliferation by devoting one of her grammar les­
sons to the study of "nouns of multitude or signifying many" (Ch. 24).
Eliot organizes this human abundance into family clusters, 
such as the Brookes, the Chettams, the Vincys, the Farebrothers, 
the Featherstones, and the Garths. The family is the social
I
■
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"species" of the social "genus": the Middlemarch world. In the 
novel, the family is portrayed in motley combinations of assorted 
social molecules, as each cluster shapes itself and is shaped by the 
restrictions and the free play of the surrounding medium. The 
luxuriance of family entanglements is pictured by seemingly endless 
contrasting and comparable patterns of behavior between parents 
and offspring, among siblings, cousins, nephews, uncles, aunts, 
but especially in the nucleus of the family unit: the link between 
husband and wife. With respect to the copiousness of its raw 
material, Middlemarch resembles many other tightly crowded 
novels, such as Tom Jones, Vanity Fair, War and Peace, or The 
Brothers Karamazov. Yet Eliot's purpose is to underscore the 
biological forces underlying the nodes of family life in the commu­
nity by rendering the interplay of distinct forms of social flora and 
fauna, similar to the different breeds and variants of biological life. 
For example, individuals in Middlemarch are alluded to as insects, 
fish, reptiles, poisonous and benign plants, domesticated or savage 
animals, as if the community were a vast menagerie of living forms, 
competing, cooperating, and reproducing themselves in a civilized 
social jungle, which is in Eliot's mind a sophisticated, "higher, " 
or "more advanced" extension of the natural behavior of lower life.
As the following pages will show, Eliot develops the plot, 
the syntax, and the imagery of Middlemarch to construct a unified 
picture of a social community as an extended continuation of 
biological nature moving slowly in a developmental process. Yet it 
must be stressed that Middlemarch is merely one of scores of
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diverse interpretations, in which writers adapted the ideas of The
Origin of Species for their own purposes. Some used Darwinian
theory to exhibit the brutality of human nature and the hostility of the
environment, as in the fiction of Thomas Hardy, George Meredith,
✓
Stephen Crane, or Emile Zola, while others sought to justify an 
economic law, a social programme, a philosophy of history, or a 
petty prejudice. John Galsworthy in The Forsyte Saga,for example, 
emphasizes the mechanism of natural selection in the evolutionary 
structure of the family, which he conceives as follows:
.
. . . that mysterious concrete tenacity which renders a family 
so formidable a unit of society, so clear a reproduction of 
society in miniature. [He who has observed an upper middle- 
class family in full plumage] . . . has been admitted to a vision 
of the dim roads of social progress, has understood something 
of patriarchal life, of the swarmings of savage hordes, of the 
rise and fall of nations. He is like one who, having watched a 
tree grown from its planting --a paragon of tenacity, insulation, 
and success, amidst the deaths of a hundred other plants less 
fibrous, sappy, and persistent -- one day will see it flourish­
ing with bland, full foliage, in an almost repugnant prosperity, 
at the summit of its efflorescence.
(The Man of Property [1906], Part I, 
Uh. i, tirst paragraph)
While Galsworthy develops his "saga" longitudinally, that is, by 
choosing to observe one species across several generations, Eliot 
takes a horizontal cross-section of several families living con­
temporaneously. In this way she can more readily depict the 
"tangling" of intermingled species and lay bare the amalgamating 
forces of fellowship and trust, of venerated customs, habits, and 
traditions, which bind society together. The bloodier aspects of 
social nature, "red in tooth and claw, " and the cynicism which 
became the trademark of the naturalistic literature of a later day . 
are hinted at in Middlemarch but are counteracted by Eliot's well-
i
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tempered Sophoclean irony, which sees life steadily and sees it 
whole.
One of the most obvious techniques Eliot uses to convey the 
impression that the Middlemarch community is a part of nature is 
to look upon its inhabitants either singly or collectively as various 
members of the plant and animal kingdoms. The sense of wonder 
with which Darwin regards the staggering multiplicity of shapes 
and forms in the biological world is akin to Mrs. Cadwallader's 
feeling in the novel, as she watches Middlemarchers pour out of 
church at Peter Feather stone's funeral: "Dear me, what a wonder­
fully mixed set! " and she refers to them as "collections of strange 
animals" (Ch. 34). Eliot as narrator also comments on the 
"Christian Carnivora, " which formed Peter Feather stone's funeral 
procession, each family like an "allied species" with its mind bent 
on a limited store of fodder, which constituted old Featherstone's 
money (Ch. 35). Constant reminders of man's biological nature 
pervade the work. The Featherstone relatives are "assiduous 
beetles" (Ch. 32), and old Peter is alternately described as "an old 
fox" (Ch. 12), "an aged hyena" (Ch. 33), or a poisonous insect, 
who said . . biting things. . . .Too languid to sting, he had the 
more venom refluent in his blood" (Ch. 32). Casaubon is a white- 
blooded "ruminant animal" (Ch. 20), while Fred is "an idle dog"
(Ch. 40), Sir James a "cochon de lait" (Ch. 2), Lydgate a "jellyfish" 
(Ch. 27) and an "emotional elephant" (Ch. 45); Will Ladislaw is a 
"loose fish from London" (Ch. 37) and "a spirited horse" (Ch. 37); 
Laure is a "divine cow" (Ch. 16), and Mr. Brooke a "stray tortoise"
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(Ch. 35); Rigg is "frog-faced" and "batrachian" (Ch. 35), and 
Raffles is a "baboon" (Ch. 41) and also "a dangerous reptile" with 
slimy traces (Ch. 68). Politicians are referred to as "insects of the 
bloated kind" (Ch. 60), and farmers as "buffaloes or bisons" (Ch.
34). Animal names and nicknames supply appropriate hints of the 
temperaments of their bearers. Throughout the novel, Celia is 
called "Kitty" and Dorothea "Dodo, " the latter name richly sugges­
tive of an extinct species, that is, the Don Quixotes of the novel, 
who ai-e dumb to the workaday realities which the Sancho Panzas see 
so clearly. Caleb Garth's name, which means "faithful dog in an 
orchard" points to Garth's trusting and trustworthy character in his 
role of manager of the large agricultural estates of Freshitt Hall and 
Tipton Grange. Beautiful specimens of nature also appear. Mr. 
Peacock is a wealthy retired doctor in town. Rosamond is "one of 
the rare conjunctions of nature" (Ch. 16), a "bird of paradise" 
(Finale), and "the flower of Mrs. Lemon’s school" (Ch. 11), though 
Lydgate, her husband, calls her his "basil plant" (Finale).
The main characters are often spoken of as sports or variants 
who find it difficult to adjust to die "clogging medium" of Middle-
m
march. Dorodiea, for example, is "one of Nature's inconsistencies" 
(Ch. 9), whose uncommon aims and aspirations are easily frustrated 
for want of suitable outlets. "Here and there, " Eliot writes of 
Dorothea's type, "a cygnet is reared uneasily among the ducklings 
in the brown pond, and never finds the living stream in fellowship 
widi its own oary-footed kind" (Prelude). Lydgate, whose disposi­
tion is similar to Dorothea's in a number of ways, also finds it hard
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to steer free of inhibiting social entanglements. Resolved to go his 
independent way unhampered by community encumbrances, unsus­
pecting Lydgate is easy prey for the ensnaring social organism; 
"Middlemarch, in fact, " Eliot writes, "counted on swallowing 
Lydgate and assimilating him very comfortably" (Ch. 15).
Other such comparisons of social activity to biological 
processes are frequent throughout the narrative. Mr. Bulstrode, 
for example, had "a sort of vampire's feast in the sense of mastery" 
(Ch. 16). Much to his credit, Sir James ". . . did not regard his 
future wife in the light of prey, valuable chiefly for the excitements 
of the chase" (Ch. 6). Lydgate, at one point, watched and spoke 
"with that narrow consciousness which reminds one of an animal 
with fierce eyes and retractile claws, " and in the same chapter,
Eliot states: "It seemed to Fred that if Mr. Farebrolher had had a 
beak and talons instead of his very capable tongue, his mode of 
attack could hardly be more cruel" (Ch. 66). Even ethereal 
_ _ Dorothea couches her thoughts in terms of predator, parasite, and 
prey. Early in the novel, Sir James offers her a tiny Maltese 
puppy, "one of nature's naive toys" (Ch. 3), a gift which she peremp­
torily rejects with the words: "They are too helpless: their lives 
are too frail. A weasel or a mouse that gets its own living is more 
interesting. . . . Those creatures are parasitic" (Ch. 3). The 
image of the predatory and parasitic animal even appears in por­
traying religious forms of expression such as evangelicalism, 
described by Mr. Farebrother as ". .. . a sort of worldly-spiritual 
cliqueism: they really look on the rest of mankind as a doomed
;
i.
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carcass which is to nourish them in heaven" (Ch. 17). Also para­
sitic are the art studios in Rome, which are likened to "a form of 
life that grew like a small fresh vegetation with its population of 
insects on huge fossils" (Ch. 22), the "huge fossils" being the rem­
nants of extinct successive cultures incarnate in the monuments of 
the "eternal" city.
It is part of Eliot's design to include Rome in the novel in 
order to provide a visible symbol of social evolution. "We know 
what a masquerade all development is and what effective shapes may 
be disguised in helpless embryos" (Ch. 10), Eliot comments. Yet 
Rome's very miscellaneousness, its "visible history, where the 
past of a whole hemisphere seems moving in funeral procession 
with strange ancestral images" (Ch. 20), a miscellaneousness 
. . which made the mind flexible with constant comparison. . . 
saved you from seeing the world's ages as a set of box-like parti­
tions without vital connection" (Ch. 22). Rome's funeral procession 
of the ages with its conspicuous assortment of cultural species is a 
developmental image writ large, a monumental historical panorama 
which lingers in the imagination to form a comprehensive evolution­
ary backdrop to another funeral procession appearing in a later 
chapter, that of Peter Featherstone, at which Mrs. Cadwallader 
exclaims: "What a wonderfully mixed set! "
The heterogeneity of living forms in Middleniarch society is 
further augmented by Eliot's references to odd biological 
specimens collected by scientific amateurs and her r.emote allusions 
to the more sophisticated research on microscopic life in the find-'
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ings of Bichat, Vesnlius, Louis, and Jenner, not to speak of the 
paltry efforts of Lydgate himself. The Middlemarch clergyman and 
naturalist, Mr. Farebrother, for example, stuffs his den with 
pickled sea-mice, pond animalcule, and insects in fine gradations; 
and he also fills his conversation with the latest news in natural his­
tory. He talks with Lydgate about a recent publication, Microscopic 
Observations on the Pollen of Plants, about the habits of spiders, the 
’’delicate orthoptera" (Ch. 17), and on another occasion speculates 
with Dorothea about "the possible histories of creatures that con­
verse compendiously with their antennae, and for ought we know 
may hold reformed parliaments" (Ch. 80). Farebrother's hobby is 
akin to that of his contemporary, Dickens's Mr. Pickwick, who 
also engaged in the nineteenth-century popular craze for the scien­
tific study of the earth and its creatures. While Farebrother 
lectured on insects, Pickwick in 1827 gave a talk on the "Source of 
the Hampstead Ponds, with some Observations on the Theory of 
Tittlebats, " if we can trust the accuracy of The Posthumous Papers 
of the Pickwick Club (Ch. 1). Eliot and her husband, George Lewes, 
spent much of their leisure time as amateur naturalists, collecting 
shells, barnacles, and other forms of marine life. Lewes published 
Seaside Studies, Physiology of Common Life, and Studies in Animal 
Life , books which embodied his lifelong fascination with biology
!
and geology.
While Eliot's commitment to the theory of evolution was 
strengthened by scientific findings, her understanding of social 
development stemmed from nineteenth-century historical criticism
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rather than the discoveries of science. The evolutionary theories of 
social thinkers such as Saint-Simon, Comte, Hegel, Riehl, 
Feuerbach, Mackay, Spencer, and Buckle were thoroughly familiar 
ideas to her, as her letters and essays reveal. Darwin's work 
served to cap her convictions, yet the secular spirit which underlay 
the scientific evidence did little to nullify her quasi-religious sense 
of wonder at the driving power behind the life force itself. Com­
menting on The Origin of Species in a letter to Madame Bodichon 
(Dec. 5, 1859), Eliot declared that she had long ago accepted the 
developmental theory, yet Darwin's book was a pivotal point in the 
popularization of the idea:
... it makes an epoch, as the expression of his thorough 
adhesion after long years of study, to the Doctrine of Devel­
opment -- and not the adhesion of an anonym like the author 
of the "Vestiges, " but of a long-celebrated naturalist. . . .
It will have a great effect in the scientific world, causing 
a thorough and open discussion of a question about which 
people have hitherto felt timid. So the world gets on step 
by step towards brave clearness and honesty! But to me the 
Development Theory and all other explanations of processes 
by which things come to be, produce a feeble impression 
compared with the mystery that lies under all these processes.
(Haight, ed. The George Eliot
Letters, Vol. lli, p. £H)
Other letters written in her younger years foreshadow the 
Middlemarch emphasis on social evolution as an outgrowth of lower 
stages of life. In her Ilfracombe Journal covering the period from 
May 8th to June 26th, 1856, Eliot compares men to shell-secreting 
animals, who live like barnacles on a rock. During this vacation 
at Ilfracombe, she went on zoophyte hunts for sea anemones, algae, 
and molluscs, and she describes her ventures as follows:
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In hilly districts, where houses and clusters of houses look so 
tiny against the huge limbs of Mother Earth one cannot help 
thinking of man as a parasitic animal, an epizoon making his 
abode on the skin of the planetary organism.
(Haight, ed. The George Eliot 
Letters, Vol. it, pp. 241 -z)
Molluscs and shells also play their part in adding to the marine 
imagery of Middlemarch. Mr. Brooke recommends the study of 
conchology to Casaubon as a light diversion from the scholar's 
painstaking work on the Key to All Mythologies. Ironically, 
Casaubon's researches at the time of Brooke's suggestion con­
cerned mythological fish-deities, and the scholar had just been 
smarting over an academic quarrel with hated adversaries who bore 
the names of Carp and Tench.
The strong lens of the microscope, the naturalist's tool 
which permits a close inspection of nature, is used metaphorically 
by Eliot to peer into the social actions ordinarily invisible.
To be at all detected, Mrs. Cadwallader's match-making operations, 
for example, require scientific instruments to bring her activities 
to light:
Even with a microscope directed on a water-drop we find our­
selves making interpretations which turn out to be rather 
coarse; for whereas under a weak lens you may seem to see 
a creature exhibiting an active voracity into which other 
smaller creatures actively play as if they were so many 
animated tax-pennies, a stronger lens reveals to you certain 
tiniest hairlets which make vortices for these victims while 
the swallower waits passively at his receipt of custom. In 
this way, metaphorically speaking, a strong lens applied to 
Mrs. Cadwallader's match-making will show a play of minute 
causes producing what may be called thought and speech 
vortices to bring her the sort of food she needed.
(Ch. 6).
The microscope pops up at other intervals in the novel, when
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Lydgate's attempts to explore varieties of living tissue, and when 
Farebrother investigates his microorganisms. This scientific tool 
even informs a witty remark made on the nature of Casaubon's 
blood, which under a magnifying glass is "all semicolons and 
parentheses" (Ch. 8). This captivating double image points not only 
to the desiccated life of this scholar "buried in books" (Ch. 4) but 
also to the fanciful punctuational shapes of microorganisms, as they 
appear under the lens of a microscope.
In addition to scientific apparatus, Eliot borrows freely 
from the language of natural science to express various modes 
of human thought, feeling, and interaction. For example, Celia 
regards the influence of "Mr. Casaubon's learning as a kind of 
damp which might in due time saturate a neighbouring body" (Ch.
28), and Rosamond has the mild persistence which ". . . enables 
a white soft living substance to make its way in spite of opposing 
rock" (Ch. 36). Prejudices are "like odorous bodies" (Ch. 43), 
the misdeeds of Bulstrode, the banker, are "subtle muscular move­
ments" (Ch. 68), and the scandal of his former life becomes "the 
full-grown fang of a discovered lie" (Ch. 71). Casaubon's languid 
soul . . went on fluttering in the swampy ground where it was 
hatched, thinking of its wings and never flying" (Ch. 29), and a . . 
remark lay in his mind as lightly as the broken wing of an insect 
among all the other fragments there. . . " (Ch. 2). He courts 
Dorothea with frigid words "as sincere as the bark of a dog, or the 
cawing of an amorous rook" (Ch. 5). Celia's hands were clasped 
by Sir James "as a bud is enfolded by a liberal calyx" (Ch. 29).
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Needless to say, Farebrother's spiders are busy at work metaphor­
ically spinning and weaving fine webs of human dealings throughout 
the novel. Eliot speaks of the "pilulous smallness" of "the cobweb 
of pre-marital acquaintance" (Ch. 2), "the gossamer web" of young 
lovemaking (Ch. 36), the rationalizations which pad the moral 
sensibility like "masses of spider web” (Ch. 61), and of hints which 
". . . get woven like slight clinging hairs into the more substantial 
web" (Ch. 31) of one's troubles.
The hobby of the naturalist, which contributes to the penetrat­
ing biological atmosphere of Middlemarch, is a small compositional 
element as compared with the major contribution made by another 
profession concerned with the science of living organisms, that of 
the Middlemarch doctors. Besides Lydgate, these include Toller, 
Peacock, Sprague, Minchin, Gambit,., and Wrench. In keeping with 
the Darwinian substructure of the novel, Eliot labels these country 
practitioners "an irritable species" (Ch. 26). The theory and 
practice of medicine is an endless source of conversation at all 
social levels in Middlemarch, at public gatherings such as board 
meetings, neighborhood taverns, dinner parties, town-hall assem­
blies or in intimate family scenes close to a sickbed. Talk in this 
provincial city almost invariably includes a mixture of stale as well 
as fresh medical gossip; for example, the running of the New Fever 
Hospital, Toller's "lowering system, " Wrench's "strengthening 
system, " Peacock's administering of boluses, Sprague's treatise on 
meningitis, Gambit's abilities as accoucheur, Lydgate's refusal to
. .. •' A. J w > ■
dispense drugs, or the merits of an esteemed old remedy. Widgeon’s.
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Purifying Pills (Chs. 45, 15, and 16). The physical condition of the 
individual is a constant source of preoccupation not only with the 
inhabitants of Middlemarch but also with the reader, since the human 
being is continually depicted in natural or physiological terms as a 
highly developed organismjprey to the afflictions of his corporeal 
frame.
The advanced biological research of the human body forms 
part of the medical backdrop of the novel, a backdrop infinitely 
enriched by the fund of medical folklore and old wives' tales, which 
Middle marchers love to repeat. Eliot, for example, alludes to the 
glorious pioneering work in anatomy by Bichat:
That great Frenchman first carried out the conception that 
living bodies, fundamentally considered, are not associations 
of organs, which can be understood by studying them first 
apart, and then as it were federally; but must be regarded 
as consisting of certain primary webs or tissues, out of which 
the various organs -- brain, heart, lungs, and so on -- 
are compacted. ...
(Ch. 15)
Despite the latest advances in medical science and the best profes­
sional advice, Middlemarchers have their own unassailable notions 
about the way illness should be treated. Take the case of Nancy 
Nash's tumor, for instance:
Most hearers agreed that it would have to be cut out, but one 
had known of oil and another of "squitchineal" as adequate to 
soften and reduce any lump in the body when taken enough of 
into the inside -- the oil by gradually "soopling, " the squitch­
ineal by eating away. (Ch. 45)
The ubiquitous medical talk in the novel shifts the reader’s focus
from the "human" to the "natural" being by centering interest on
what Lydgate calls "the viscera of his own patients" (Ch. 15). The
organs of the human body are a habitual topic of discussion among
-102-
the townspeople. Images of hearts, lungs, lost limbs, "of macer­
ated muscle or of eyes presented in a dish' (Ch. 36) appear, used 
either in a literal or figurative sense. Casaubon, for example, is 
unkindly described by one of his detractors as "a great bladder for 
dried peas to rattle in" (Ch. 6).
The "viscera" of the characters in Middlemarch not only 
intensify the rich biological overtones present in this work but also 
serve to unify the five seemingly disjointed plots which make up the 
novel, to wit: the Dorothea-Casaubon story, the Fred-Mary story, 
the Lydgate-Rosamond story, the Featherstone story, and the 
Bulstrode story. Lydgate's medical practice is the hub around which 
the separate plot strands cross. His diagnosis and treatment of 
Casaubon's heart ailment draws the doctor into Dorothea's upper- 
class social circle of the Brookes and the Chettams. Peter Feather- 
stone's dropsy brings Lydgate into contact with Mary Garth and 
Fred Vincy. At old Peter's bedside, Lydgate first meets his future 
wife, Rosamond, who is Fred's sister. During his professional 
visits to the Vincy household when Fred is sick with typhoid fever, 
Lydgate's relationship with Rosamond is secured. His medical 
practice also links him with Bulstrode's New Fever Hospital and the 
ill-starred episode with Bulstrode's enemy, the dying alcoholic, 
Raffles. Heart disease, dropsy, typhoid fever, delirium tremens, 
not to mention the pneumonia of Trumbull, the auctioneer, the 
"cramp" of Nancy Nash, the charwoman, or the sanitary precau­
tions taken against the encroaching cholera epidemic -- these events 
are forcible reminders that the body social of Middlemarch is made
=
i
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up of human beLngs who are biological organisms as well.
To sum up, Darwin's principle of variation of the species is 
exhibited without stint in this provincial community of the early 
1830's. Eliot packs the novel with multitudes of natural forms 
engaging in diverse biological activities, because her conscious 
artistic intent is to create a voluminous, well-stocked store of 
evolutionary progeny from which to supply her moving diorama of 
Middlemarch social development.
A second fundamental tenet in The Origin of Species is a 
phrase which is one of the capstones of nineteenth-century philo­
sophy: "the struggle for existence. " The idea of life as a battlefield 
is as old as man, but what makes the struggle peculiarly modern is 
the emphasis on the grandeur of the fight, not the gaining of the goal. 
Darwin borrowed the phrase from a provocative socio-economic 
treatise by Thomas Malthus, Essay on the Principle of Population 
as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on
the speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers
(1798), and he applied the idea to the entire animal and vegetable 
kingdoms. Prior to its application to biology, the notion of life as 
a struggle runs through the gamut of human expression in the nine­
teenth century, from poetry to politics, from individual strivings of 
self-realization to the struggle of egos in the "battle" between the 
sexes. Struggle is the keynote in the "dialectical" clash of social 
classes, in the competition for economic markets, in jingoistic 
nationalism, or in grappling with the acute anomie of living in an 
alien cosmos. Conceived of as a philosophy of becoming, the accent
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is forever on action. "The all of things, " Carlyle said, "is the verb 
TO DO. " This is an echo of the grand epic celebrating human striving, 
Goethe's Faust: "Whoever aspires unweariedly/ Is not beyond re­
deeming. " Some, like Matthew Arnold, found man's struggle a 
diseased spiritual symptom:
. . . the hot race 
Wherein he doth for ever chase 
That flying and elusive shadow, rest.
("The Buried Life, " 91-3)
Others like Tennyson's Ulysses and Browning’s Rabbi Ben Ezra 
found the challenge of the contest exhilarating, a sentiment which 
Dorothea in Middlemarch miriored.with the statement: "Failure 
after long perseverance is much grander than never to have a 
striving good enough to be called a failure" (Ch. 22). The struggle 
for existence crops up in many spheres in the novel along with 
added biological reinforcement from Darwin and Huxley. Interest­
ingly enough, Eliot, like many others, regarded society in terms 
of a biological contest long before the publication of The Origin of 
Species in 1859, which "officially" sanctioned the theory of biolog­
ical evolution. In a letter to her teacher and friend, Maria Lewis, 
Eliot wrote in 1840:
La vie est un combat, pas un hymne. . . . Society is a wide 
nursery of plants where the hundred decompose to nourish 
the future ten, after giving collateral benefits to their con­
temporaries destined for a fairer garden. An awful thought.'
(Haight, ed. The George Eliot 
Letters, Vol. L, pp. 71-2)
Despite the biological cast of the multiple planes of struggle 
in Middlemarch, life in die novel does not appear solely as a 
Hobbesian war or a continuous free fight, to paraphrase the gladia-
-105-
,
I torial survival ethics of T. H. Huxley, but also emerges as a 
Mutual Aid Society. While individuals flounder and fail, others re­
peatedly come to the rescue. The cementing power of generosity, 
love, fellow feeling, clan support, and community pride are as 
often as not contending forces in the fight for existence as are the 
ruthless, self-seeking qualities destructive to group cohesion. One 
of the most widespread kinds of struggle in the novel is the wrestling 
for self-realization in a fettering and oppressive environment, in 
which the individual is pervaded "by the sense of moving heavily 
in a dim and clogging medium" (Ch. 50). Other kinds of struggle 
which appear are the clash of wills in marriage, the competition 
among family groups, the professional rivalry among clergymen 
and among doctors, community contention over the New Fever 
Hospital, and the national political battle over the proposed Reform 
Bill. That Eliot deliberately parallels her planes of struggle from 
microcosm to macrocosm is apparent in her comment introducing 
Ch. 46:
While Lydgate, safely married and with the Hospital under his 
command, felt himself struggling for Medical Reform against 
Middlemarch, Middlemarch was becoming more and more 
conscious of the national struggle for another kind of Reform.
The dim, clogging and "embroiled medium" (Ch. 30) which 
hampers individual ambition and striving in Middlemarch is pro­
jected by Eliot's interplay of two common nouns, which along with 
a few other select substantives occur with uncommon frequency 
throughout the work. The two nouns are "world" and "opinion. " 
This "world" may appear as the tiny personal sphere bound by the 
crust of one's conceptions and illusions. For example, Casaubon
;
■
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was "the centre of his own world" (Ch. 10), and "Dorothea was not 
only his wife: she was a personification of that shallow world which 
surrounds the ill-appreciated or desponding author" (Ch. 20). Will 
Ladislaw's habitual rounds are referred to as "his familiar little 
world" (Ch. 82); the collapse of Rosamond's amorous fancies about 
Will left "her little world in ruins"-(Ch. 78); or "Poor Lydgate! or 
shall I say, Poor Rosamond! Each lived in a world of which the 
other knew nothing" (Ch. 16). In a moment of personal crisis, the 
"little world" of the individual's making becomes transfigured.
Eliot draws upon a biological analogy to mark a decisive stage in 
Dorothea's self-development:
She might have compared her experience at that moment to the 
vague alarmed consciousness that her life was taking on a new 
form, that she was undergoing a metamorphosis in which 
memory would not adjust itself to the stirring of new organs 
.... Her world was in a state of convulsive change. . . .
(Ch. 50)
On other occasions, Eliot uses the word "world" in a more general 
sense to mean the material universe, the all-inclusiveness of things, 
the kind of world apparent in such commonplace expressions as the 
following which abound in the novel: "Not for the world, not for the 
world" (Ch. 1); "He can't be long for this world. . . " (Ch. 11); "I 
would not tell mamma for the world" (Ch. 12); "the best girl in the 
world" (Ch. 16); "I wouldn't have hurt you so for the world. . . " 
(Ch. 25); "Some say it's the end of the world" (Ch. 36); "Is there 
so little business in the world. . . " (Ch. 56); "not the least in the 
world" (Ch. 57); "the quietest most familiar horse in the world" 
(Ch. 58); "the happiest fellow in the world" (Ch. 57); "a world of 
reasons" (Ch. 62); or "the growing good of the world" (last page).
I■
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Unobtrusive turns of speech such as these are tucked into the every­
day conversation of Middlemarchers. When repeated with inordinate 
frequency, these phrases emphasize the entirely secular spirit of 
the Middlemarch milieu, in which the unworldliness of Mr. Bul- 
strode's evangelical pursuits, for example, is greeted with strong 
community antagonism.
The most prevalent connotation of "world, " however, lies in 
its application as a loose term to cover whatever inhibits individual 
striving. The "world" is a form of social control, a system of 
protective and opprobrious fetters, which thwart, defeat, and blunt 
personal initiative depending on one's ability to circumvent the 
confining situation. The "world" serves as a catch-all for the un­
seen but profoundly felt mesh of repressions stifling and redirecting 
human impulses and energies, a term which comes close to what 
the youth of today like to call "the establishment. " Eliot describes 
the Middlemarch medium as an elaborate network of restrictions by
saturating the narrative with images of yokes, harnesses, pincers,
Her use of "yoke"labyrinths, prisons, tombs, fetters, and ties, 
and "harness" fits in well with the creation of human beings in
Middlemarch as a motley assortment of sophisticated animals and 
plants. Living under Dorothea's domineering presence, Celia, for 
example, . . had always worn a yoke. . . " (Ch. 1); Mayor 
Vincy . . felt his neck under Bulstrode's yoke. . . " (Ch. 13); 
Mrs. Garth said she had . . borne the yoke in her youth, and 
learned self-control" (Ch. 24); Fred is under Caleb's "bit and 
bridle" (Ch. 68); Dorothea feared Casaubon . . might make a
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new yoke for her" (Ch. 48); certain natures improve "when the yoke 
of life ceases to gall them" (Ch. 52); Lydgate was "galled with his 
harness" (Ch. 58) and ". . . was bowing his neck under the yoke 
like a creature who had talons. . . "(Ch. 58); later Lydgate continues 
to writhe under the burden of an indifferent wife and the "vile yoke" 
of debt. He fails to follow Farebrother's advice about staying 
independent by steering clear of financial obligations. "Very few 
men can do that, " says Farebrother. "Either you slip out of service 
altogether, and become good for nothing, or you wear a harness and 
draw a good deal where your yoke-fellows pull you" (Ch. 17).
Worldly obstacles in the struggle for self-fulfillment occur 
in the shapes of family obligations, "the real yoke of marriage"
(Ch. 48), the lack of money, the lack of a "coherent social faith and 
order " (Prelude), provincial backwardness, or to borrow Walter 
Bagehot's phrase, "the cake of custom. " Perhaps the most perva­
sive form of worldly control in Middlemarch is the power of 
community opinion. A substantial portion of the Middlemarch 
medium is made up of what others think. Dorothea's guardian and 
uncle, Mr. Brooke, for example, was . . brave enough to defy 
the world -- that is to say, Mrs. Cadwallader, the Rector's wife, 
and the small group of gentry with whom he visited. . . " (Ch. 1). 
"Rural opinion, " (Ch. 1), "the world's opinion" (Ch.22), "the town 
opinion" (Ch. 46), "people's opinion" (Ch. 76) play a significant 
role in checking the spread of human voracity. Thus the world of 
Middlemarch emerges as an invisible pseudo-environment of public 
opinion, as Walter Lippmann would say, a habitat made up of those
=:
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) intangible fictions which exert extraordinary pressures on the 
actions of men. The unseen pseudo-environment is a coercive 
collective power, whose felt presence serves as a binding force of 
the social organism. When Middlemarch rejects Bulstrode, Eliot 
comments: "Who can know how much of his most inward life is 
made up of the thoughts he believes other men to have about him, 
until that fabric of opinion is threatened with ruin" (Ch. 68)? A 
large share of Dorothea's inner struggle to overcome the barriers 
which separate her from Will Ladislaw lies in her swelling resolve 
to suffer the social ostracism accompanying such a marriage:
And yet, so heavily did the world weigh on her in spite of her 
independent energy, that with this idea of Will as in need of 
such help and at a disadvantage with the world, there came 
always the vision of that unfittingness of any closer relation 
between them which lay in the opinion of everyone connected 
with her.
(Ch. 62)
Environment in Middlemarch assumes a far more conse­
quential role than the significance of individual will. In her previous 
novels, Eliot accentuates the efficacy of human endowments to 
subdue circumstances, the efficacy of morality and strength of 
character to resist the encroaching demands of society. One of her 
favorite ideas had always been the dictum of Novalis that "Character 
is destiny, " that a person reaps what he sows, that the balance of 
payments awaits each of us sooner or later. The avenging furies 
lie in ambush to even out the moral score for better or worse. 
Eliot's novel, Silas Marner, and her short story, "Brother Jacob," 
are parables on the subject of retribution. The theme of nemesis 
runs vigorously through Adam Bede and Romola, but begins to
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I slacken considerably in the cluster of novels centering on the Re­
form era: The Mill on the Floss, Felix Holt, the Radical, and 
Middlemarch. In The Mill on the Floss, the community of St. Oggs 
looms into prominence as a stultifying sphere dominated by the 
oppressive narrowness of the Dodson clan, whose creed was cus­
tom, whose lives . . were irradiated by no sublime principles, 
no romantic visions, no active, self-renouncing faith. . . " (Book 
Fourth, Ch. 1). In Felix Holt, the Radical, the pseudo-environment 
of public opinion becomes a formidable influence on the lives of men 
because of the expansion of democracy. In the Reform novels,
Eliot begins to shift her perspective on the capacity of individual 
strength of character alone to affect a course of conduct. "Char­
acter is destiny. . . she concedes in The Mill on the Floss,"but 
not the whole of our destiny" (Book Sixth, Ch. 6). In Middlemarch, 
this thought is expressed in the epigraph to Ch. 4:
1st Gent. Our deeds are fetters that we forge ourselves.
2nd Gent. Ay, truly: but I think it is the world 
That brings the iron.
The expose of Bulstrode's unsavory past comes closest to- 
Eliot's employment of nemesis in the novel, yet the sense of right­
eousness which usually attends the sinner's undoing is mitigated 
by the ironic fact that Bulstrode's "dirty money" is the mainstay 
of the New Fever Hospital benefiting the entire town. Apart from 
Bulstrode, the residents of Middlemarch possess the usual run of 
petty vices stemming from self-interest, but on the whole they lack 
the glaring moral deficiencies which call for severe redress. Rather 
than a moral flaw, the "medium" becomes the victimizer, yet this
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I medium, it must be added, is a blend of the "little" world of the 
victim with the larger world outside. Even the strongest characters 
often find themselves unable to cope with the pressures of environ­
mental circumstances, because their very appetites have to a large 
extent been molded by those very pressures. With repeated insist­
ence, Eliot punctuates her commentary with compassion for the
victims, as we read of "Poor Dorothea, " "Poor Casaubon, " "Poor 
Lydgate, " "poor boy [of Fred], " "Poor Rosamond, " "Poor Harriet, " 
"Poor Walter, " "pray pity him [of Brooke], " "poor devil [of Will], " 
"Poor Bunch, " "Poor Romilly, " "Poor Mary, " "Poor Mrs. Vincy, " 
"Poor Peter, " "Poor Dagley, " and so on. Poor Fred, for example, 
naturally sets his sights high and . . wants to cut a figure in the 
world" (Ch. 14), because he believes that he possesses the unques­
tionable superiority of a university education. Poor Rosamond 
naturally dreams of climbing the social ladder towards "that middle- 
class heaven, rank" (Ch. 12), because she is surrounded by opinion 
which considers her to be "the best girl in the world" (Ch. 16),
"the flower of Mrs. Lemon's School" (Ch. 11), where Mrs. Lemon 
herself had said that no pupil ". . . exceeded that young lady for 
mental acquisition and propriety of speech, while her musical 
execution was quite exceptional" (Ch. 11). Mayor Vincy, who says 
that he is ". . . contented to be no worse than my neighbours"
(Ch. 13), finds Bulstrode's otherworldly ambition to be "first chop 
in heaven" (Ch. 13) repugnant. Yet each wants success in his own 
way, one through the glory of the evangelical elect, the other 
through the glory of the Middlemarch trade.
■
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Loftier forms of the struggle of self-realization appear in 
the striving of three central characters, Casaubon, Dorothea, and 
Lydgate. Casaubon literally works himself to death in attempting 
to pull together the infinitesimal strands of his scholarly research, 
Key'to All Mythologies, a project in which he tries desperately to 
reconstruct the past, "as it used to be, in spite of ruin and con­
fusing changes" (Ch. 2). Lydgate's plan for the future "... was 
to do good small work for Middlemarch and great work for the 
world" (Ch. 15). Dorothea is a gifted gentlewoman with the spirit­
ual ardor of a St. Theresa, a Santa Barbara, or a Santa Clara, to 
use Eliot's saintly comparisons for her. Being a woman in a man's 
world, her talents find no stirring constructive outlets; being a 
religious enthusiast in a secular and materialistic environment, she 
is a misfit. Her intense "... passion was transfused through a 
mind struggling towards an ideal life ..." (Ch. 5), a life which 
she broadly defines as "widening the skirts of light and making the 
struggle with darkness narrower" (Ch. 39). Her soul-hunger finds 
no vent except as a helpmeet to a Pascal, a Milton, the' Judicious”[sic] 
Hooker, or a Locke, all of whom she sees incarnated in the person 
of her prospective husband, Casaubon. By marrying him, she 
could help in his grand endeavors, for "... here was a living 
Bossuet, whose work would reconcile complete knowledge with 
devoted piety; here was a modern Augustine who united the glories 
of doctor and saint" (Ch. 3).
Despite the noble aspirations of Casaubon, Lydgate, and 
Dorothea, Eliot deftly traces out the naivete of their exalted enthusi-
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asms, which camouflage baser tinctures of egoism. Casaubon's 
mind, for instance, seals itself from threats of adverse scholarly 
criticism endangering the theory of his Key. Dorothea combines 
the quixotic qualities which both her name and nickname denote.
Her ardent yearning for good is her "Dorothea" side, a name mean­
ing "gift of God," while her mulish insistence in having her own way 
and her childlike ideas about commonplace realities make her 
sobriquet of a dumb "Dodo" appropriate. Lydgate's professional 
zeal is curbed by his unreflecting self-indulgence, which Eliot 
designates as "spots of commonness" (Ch. 15). These "spots" make 
him blind to the cost of expensive luxuries and the prepossessing 
lures of beautiful women such as Laure and Rosamond: .
... he was an emotional creature with a flesh-and-blood 
sense of fellowship which withstood all the abstractions of 
special study. He cared not only "for cases," but for John 
and Elizabeth, especially Elizabeth.
(Ch. 15)
For each person, the struggle for existence is unique; the 
world weighs in different ways. The scholar fights for recognition;
I
the doctor battles against the backwardness of provincial medicine; 
the social climber plots her strategy to enter the haut monde; the 
gifted woman forges a makeshift course, when the secular spirit 
of the era finds her capacities irrelevant to the nature of the times 
and irrelevant to the nature of her sex. For most of the characters, 
however, the struggle for existence involves the scramble for the 
limited store of available money and goods. In his essay, "Manners, 
Morals, and the Novel, "Lionel Trilling states that the novel is born 
with the appearance of money as a social element and that every
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situation in Dostoyevsky, no matter how spiritual, starts with a 
point of social pride and a certain number of rubles. This obser­
vation is no less true of Middlemarch. In keeping within the evo­
lutionary framework, money becomes "food" for survival in the 
novel. Describing the rivalry of the family clans for old Feather- 
stone's wealth, Eliot conforms to her biological design by wryly 
picturing them as animals competing for provender:
When the animals entered the Ark in pairs, one may imagine 
that allied species made much private remark on each other, 
and were tempted to think that so many forms feeding on the 
same store of fodder were eminently superfluous, as tending 
to diminish the rations.
(Ch. 35)
Rather than stress the moral limitations of men, Middlemarch 
seems bent on showing the constant adjustment of inner and outer, 
private and public worlds, of what one wants with what is to be had, 
of honorable and mean aspirations slowly coming to grips with 
changing earthly realities, in the spirit of the Spanish proverb intro­
ducing Ch. 46: "Since we cannot get what we like, let us like what 
we can get."
Another widespread kind of struggle which appears in the 
novel is the battle between the sexes in marriage. To enter the 
state of wedlock for some is to enter a state of war, in which the 
contest of egos resembles the "critical tumult," Eliot writes, "of 
a shrimp pool" (Ch. 20). Marriage as a battlefield was a popular 
theme in mid- and late Victorian literature, especially in the novels 
of George Meredith and in his dramatic poem, "Modern Love," 
which speaks of a:
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. . . marriage tomb, the sword between; 
Each wishing for the sword that severs all.
(I)
Middlemarch portrays many accommodations in the "marriage 
tomb, "the varying adjustments of dominance and submission made 
between husband and wife. Accommodations sometimes appear in 
the form of an easy, sometimes an uneasy truce, sometimes "a 
creeping paralysis" (Ch. 58), and at other times they appear as a 
creative dialectic of wills, the free and frank exchange which kneads 
mutual respect and honest communion into a profound consonance of 
shared purpose. In this novel, marriages fail chiefly because of 
the lamentable ignorance of each sex about the other and the inordi- 
. nate expectations demanded of the nuptial tie. Dorothea, for ex­
ample, saw in Casaubon "a Protestant Pope" (Ch. 5), a spiritual 
director who could guide her hesitant steps by the lamp of knowledge. 
Casaubon, on the other hand, regarded his future wife as a source 
of self-sacrificing affection which would view his erudition with the 
wonderful awe of "an elegant-minded canary bird" (Ch. 20). Each 
naturally is disappointed. In time, Dorothea finds Casaubon's 
project a vacuous undertaking crippling her soul. And Casaubon 
finds that "instead of getting a soft fence against the cold, shadowy, 
unapplausive audience of life ..." (Ch. 20), he gets a critical spy 
"... watching everything with a malign power of inference" (Ch.20). 
Each suffers a deep sense of subjection exemplifying the truth of 
Ambrose Bierce's cynical witticism that marriage is a community 
of master, mistress, and two slaves, making in all, two.
Eliot directs some of her most satirical barbs at time-hon-
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I ored misconceptions about marriage, which she sees rooted in 
conventional stupidity about the nature of women. Regarded as a 
frailer "feebler species" (Ch. 65), the middle- and upper-class 
English girl of the nineteenth century was given a paltry practical 
preparation for her future role as wife and mother. Her education 
consisted of a "toy-box history of the world" (Ch. 10), with extras 
such as singing, piano-tinkling, and "getting in and out of a car­
riage" (Ch. 11), as "the suitable garnish for girls" (Ch. 12). Mr. 
Brooke, Dorothea's uncle, is the major spokesman of the custom­
ary notions about the limits of the female mind. He believes that 
ladies are too flighty and incapable of understanding political econo­
my. "Your sex are not thinkers, you know -- varium et mutabile 
semper -- that kind of thing" (Ch. 6), he patronizingly informs Mrs. 
Cadwallader, who, ironically enough, is infinitely more acute than 
he is. Mr. Brooke's comments are a delightful satire on masculine 
complacency, since he himself has "a too rambling habit of mind" 
(Ch. 1). In some quarters, he is called "a leaky-minded fool"
(Ch. 63) and "... pulpy; he will run into any mould, but he won't 
keep shape" (Ch. 8). Nevertheless, Mr. Brooke faithfully parrots 
the prejudices of his time, when "women were expected to have 
weak opinions ..." (Ch. 1). Each bachelor in the novel has his 
peculiar idiosyncrasies as to what constitutes excellence in a wife. 
Being a sportsman, Sir James believes every lady ought to be a 
perfect horsewoman in order to accompany her husband; Trumbull 
feels a wife should be a nurse; Casaubon wants a hero-worshiper; . 
and Lydgate sees his ideal mate as an exquisite adornment, a fount
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of endless enchantment and surcease from care. In a society domi­
nated by such ideas, the gifted woman is thought to be an anomaly, . 
"nature," as Eliot comments dryly, "having intended greatness for 
men" (Ch. 39). Yet the times are also at fault for recognizing or 
allowing no callings for women beyond those in the domestic sphere. 
Eliot sums up Dorothea's problem in die Finale as follows:
Many who knew her, thought it a pity that so substantive and 
rare a creature should have been absorbed into the life of 
another, and be only known in a certain circle as a wife and 
mother. But no one stated exactly what else that was in her 
power she ought rather to have done . . . .
The best adjustments in marriage are to be found in the 
Garth household, between Susan and Caleb, and later between Mary 
and Fred. These unions are cemented by a strong practical in­
telligence about human nature, about the values of hard work, thrift, 
a sense of responsibility, and a spirit of generosity, values which 
convert the "yoke of marriage" into the blessed tie that binds. To 
Caleb, "marriage is a taming thing" (Ch. 68), a condition which 
matures a man, that is, if that man is matched to the right woman.
In Lydgate's case, the taming is the slow death of his best self. 
Following the evolutionary paradigm of the novel, Eliot tells the 
story of the courtship and the conjugal struggle between Rosamond 
and Lydgate through the use of biological rhetoric strongly remi­
niscent of the Darwinian themes of variation, the struggle for exist­
ence, natural selection, and survival of the fittest. The following 
charts the sequence of this development:
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VARIATION
Higher forms of the "feebler species" (Ch. 65) are represent­
ed in two outstanding Middlemarch women, Dorothea Brooke and 
Rosamond Vincy. Dorothea is uncommonly intelligent for her sex, 
"one of nature's inconsistencies" (Ch. 9), while Rosamond is un­
commonly beautiful and sophisticated, one of "the rare conjunctions 
of nature" (Ch. 16). Observing both, Lydgate finds Dorothea "a 
good creature," but far too earnest and intellectual. "It is trouble­
some to talk to such women," he reflects. "They are always want­
ing reasons ..." (Ch. 10). Lydgate concludes that Dorothea is 
"altogether a mistake" (Ch. 10). By contrast, Rosamond possesses 
the undemanding charm of music and flowers, and her company, he 
felt, was like "reclining in a paradise with sweet laughs for bird- 
notes, and blue eyes for a heaven" (Ch. 11). Flirting with Rosa­
mond, Lydgate tells her, "I am sure you could teach me a thousand 
things -- as an exquisite bird could teach a bear if there were any 
common language between them. Happily, there is a common 
language between women and men, and so the bears get caught"
(Ch. 16). Rosamond registers his every look and word, especially 
the fact of his good birth, since she sees marriage as a prospect 
for rising in rank.
THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE
Lydgate stoutly rejects the possibility of an early marriage 
because of his ambitious professional plans. Rosamond's mind, 
however, "... had a shaping activity and looked through watchful 
blue eyes, whereas Lydgate's lay blind and unconcerned as a jelly-
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fish which gets melted without knowing it" (Ch. 27). When Lydgate 
withdraws his attentions out of fear of deeper involvement, Rosa­
mond's tears flow "like water on a blue flower" (Ch. 31) and shake 
flirtation into love. Lydgate is . . completely mastered by the 
onrush of tenderness at the sudden belief that this sweet young crea­
ture depended on him for her joy . . . " (Ch. 31), and in half an hour 
he leaves the "house an engaged man, whose soul was not his own, 
but the woman's to whom he had bound himself" (Ch. 31). Lydgate 
convinces himself that marriage is the best thing for a man who 
wants to work steadily. Another delightful thought which occurs to 
him is that by marrying his blue flower, he would give her "a much- 
needed transplantation" (Ch. 36) from the vulgar annoyances of the 
middle-class Vincy household.
The bear gets caught and the contest of wills begins. The 
proverbial "submissiveness of the goose as beautifully correspond­
ing to the strength of the gander" (Ch. 36) undergoes a reversal of 
roles. Lydgate had earlier called himself "her captive, meaning all 
the while, not to be her captive" (Ch. 27). After living with Rosa­
mond a short time, he begins to see signs of her unshakable obsti­
nacy, and he "... secretly wondered over the terrible tenacity of 
this mild creature. There was gathering within him an amazed 
sense of his powerlessness over Rosamond" (Ch. 58). Their mutual 
extravagance over material luxuries leads them deeper and deeper 
in debt. Rosamond, however, is unconcerned with her own prodi­
gality and prefers to berate Lydgate as being a poor breadwinner.
"It seemed that she had no more identified herself with him, "Eliot
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comments, "than if they had been creatures of different species and 
opposing interests" (Ch. 58). Facing bankruptcy and an indifferent 
wife, Lydgate's efforts at medical research wither noticeably. He 
bows "his neck under a yoke like a creature who had talons" (Ch. 58). 
Thinking of his former passion for Laure, a French actress who 
murdered her husband, Lydgate wonders about Rosamond: "Would 
she kill me because I wearied her? and then, "It is the way with all 
women" (Ch. 58).
NATURAL SELECTION
In this marriage, Rosamond emerges as the "natural" su­
perior over Lydgate by the cunning stratagem of making him believe 
that he is treating his fragile flower brutally. Unlike other women, 
she takes full advantage of so-called female limitations and thrives 
in Ibsen's "doll house." On three occasions, Lydgate calls himself 
a brute for burdening this frail being with his financial cares. She 
insists that he give up his research and move to a wealthier town, 
where income is easier. Reluctantly, Lydgate accedes. "He wished 
to excuse everything in her if he could -- but it was inevitable that 
in that excusing mood he should think of her as if she were an animal 
of another and feebler species. Nevertheless, she had mastered 
him" (Ch. 65).
SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST 
Lydgate's earlier presentiment "of slackening resolution" 
(Ch. 58) and "the creeping paralysis" (same phrase used by him in 
Ch. 58 and Ch. 76) which envelops his ardor for medical research 
becomes a fully acknowledged admission of failure in the final
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chapter of the novel. His successful medical practice . . pro­
vided all flowers and gilding" for Rosamond "... fit for the bird 
of paradise that she resembled" (Finale), yet Lydgate remained 
unfulfilled, because he never did what he had set out to do. He died 
prematurely of diphtheria, leaving Rosamond to marry a rich 
physician, whose wealth allows her all "the happiness" that she 
regards as "her reward" (Finale). No longer his blue flower, Rosa­
mond becomes Lydgate's "basil plant," a botanical variety which, 
as he tells her, ", . . flourished wonderfully on a murdered man's 
brains" (Finale).
Middlemarch was published in 1871-2, during the very time 
when The Descent of Man (1871), Darwin's second major work, 
appeared. Two-thirds of Darwin's book is a long digression on 
sexual selection, a topic which encouraged the facile application of 
the naturalist's ideas to the relation between the sexes in Victorian 
marriage. The Descent of Man cautiously applies the broad con­
cepts of The Origin of Species to include the human being. However, 
the less scientifically attuned mind of the novelist had already 
jumped to this conclusion, finding in the drama of Darwin's vision 
of nature in 1859 a new reservoir of metaphor with which to command 
a comprehensive view of the human spectacle.
In addition to the independent struggles of individual persons 
attempting to find satisfaction in sublime or petty private pursuits, 
a second plan of combat exists in Middlemarch: the cooperative
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fight of the community against the invasion of disease. Threats to 
the social organism are grounded not only in the physical menace of 
an impending cholera epidemic, alluded to briefly in Chapters 45,
63, 67, and 71, but also are grounded in a wider context of the idea 
of disease. Ill-boding solvents of community solidarity such as new, 
foreign, or unorthodox ways of thinking are warily,even hostilely 
scrutinized by Middlemarchers in their zeal to conserve traditional 
patterns which have withstood the tests of time. Lydgate, for exam­
ple, . . has lots of ideas, quite new, about ventilation and diet, 
that sort of thing," Mr. Brooke tells his dinner-party companion, 
the lawyer Standish. Not in the least impressed, Mr. Standish 
responds, "Hang it, do you think that is quite sound? -- upsetting the 
old treatment, which has made Englishmen what they are" (Ch. 10)? 
In providing for its physical health, the community keeps a watchful 
eye on possible impairments to its mental constitution, that is, risks 
which imperil its social stability. On the whole, Middlemarchers 
believe that group solidarity rests on a firm adherence to past 
usages, and that group self-preservation rests in conformity with 
habitual practices. "Sane people did what their neighbours did, so 
that if any lunatics were at large, one might know and avoid them" 
(Ch. 1).
i
The townspeople are nonetheless aware of the necessity for 
change in order, for instance, to root out an old abuse, though they 
are often perplexed as to precisely what constitutes the proper 
measure of that change. How does one recognize the ever-shifting 
golden mean between obsolescence and improvement? Pondering
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} over the Reform Bill, Mr. Brooke is puzzled by Parliament's pro­
posed extension of the vote to the ten-pound householder. "These 
ten-pound householders, now: why ten?" Brooke inquires. "That's 
a difficult question, now, if you go into it" (Ch. 51). The just pro­
portion of political reform which would insure social progress is 
expressed in medical terminology in a conversation between the 
political conservative, Lydgate, and the political liberal, Will 
Ladislaw, on the proposed Parliamentary bill: "That is the way with 
you political writers, Ladislaw -- crying up a measure as if it were 
a universal cure, and crying up men who are a part of the very 
disease that wants curing. " Ladislaw replies that ". . . your cure 
must begin somewhere . . . and one can't wait until "immaculate 
men" with unimpeachable motives turn up to represent an "injured" 
class, but rather one must support the man who fights for their 
claims. "When I say, I go for the dose that cures," Lydgate re­
torts, "it doesn't follow that I go in for opium in a given case of 
gout" (Ch. 46).
In comparing physical disease with the malaise of the body 
social or the body political, Eliot employs a structural device with 
a long literary tradition. Paralleling the ills of society with the 
presence of a physically diseased environment forms part of the 
design of Hamlet, where "Something is rotten in the state of Den­
mark," and also the design of Thomas Mann's tubercular 
society in The Magic Mountain, and Albert Camus's plague-ridden 
city in La Peste. Eliot's use of the analogy, however, amplifies . 
the physical rather than the moral implications of the comparison.
i
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I Society is prone to illness not only because it is made up of "politi­
cal" animals, but especially because it is.made up of political "ani­
mals. " The removal of the banker Bulstrode from the Middlemarch 
social organism occurs at a Town-Hall meeting on a pressing sani­
tary question occasioned by the presence of a cholera case in town. 
Yet the ostracism of Bulstrode is less a moral act of outraged jus­
tice than a hasty, bungled, and highly prejudiced affair, based on 
hearsay about the nature of Raffles's death. Not only is Bulstrode 
"quarantined" in the misguided zeal of the community to keep its 
health, but Lydgate, an innocent member, is also cut off, and 
becomes like Bulstrode a social outcast.
Alien ideas^ like immoral acts, are also treated as forms of 
disease. Since hereditary custom fashions the accepted social code, 
it is no wonder that the greatest boosts toward community progress 
are initiated by the outsiders: Bulstrode, Lydgate, and Ladislaw.
Will Ladislaw's editorship of the "Pioneer," the liberal Middlemarch 
newspaper, popularizes national efforts at reform. To Mr. Brooke, 
Will is "... a kind of Shelley, you know .... I don't mean as to 
anything objectionable -- laxities or atheism, or anything of that 
kind, you know .... But he has the same sort of enthusiasm for 
liberty, freedom, emancipation -- a fine thing under guidance -- 
under guidance, you know" (Ch. 37). Lydgate introduces advanced 
French theories for the treatment of disease in a "dark period"
(Ch. 7) filled with medical quackery, and Bulstrode's philanthropy 
is responsible for the building of the New Fever Hospital. Each man 
meets with the mixed envy and hostility which often greet the
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vigorous innovator. In Bulstrode's case, however, town antipathy 
is directed against his pronounced Evangelicalism, inimical to the 
moderate Anglicanism practiced by Middlemarchers. "It's this 
sort of thing -- this tyrannical spirit, wanting to play bishop and 
banker everywhere Mayor Vincy declares of his brother-in-law, 
Bulstrode, "it's this sort of thing makes a man's name stink" (Ch. 13).
Throughout Eliot's fiction, the spread of Evangelicalism is 
resisted as a blight, "a murrain," by those characters who feel 
threatened by it. Eliot as author-commentator is usually fair minded, 
even sympathetic towards the merits of evangelical enthusiasm, as 
witness her affectionate portrayals of Dinah Morris in Adam Bede, 
Rev. Tryan in "Janet's Repentance," and Rufus Lyon in Felix Holt, 
the Radical. The penetrating analysis of Savonarola in Romola is 
another instance of Eliot's tilting of the scales in favor of the evan­
gelical cast of mind. In Adam Bede, she speaks of the spiritual 
strength imparted by early Methodism:
I
. . . where a crowd of rough men and weary-hearted women 
drank in a faith which was a rudimentary culture, which linked 
their thoughts with the past, lifted their imagination above 
the sordid details of their own narrow lives, and suffused 
their souls with the sense of a pitying, loving, infinite 
Presence ....
(Ch. Ill)
In "Janet's Repentance," Evangelicalism is portrayed as a fine 
antidote to moral complacency, and in Felix Holt, the Radical, old
Rufus is an admirable standard-bearer of unshakable moral truths, 
which resist the growing ethical relativism of the times. Eliot's 
earlier novels are a searching and dispassionate assessment of the 
evangelical temper. Yet in Middlemarch, her appreciation towards
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that form of religious enthusiasm decidedly cools. This coolness
manifests itself not only by making the evangelical Bulstrode the
principal transgressor, but emerges also in Eliot's own intrusive
author commentary, for example:
The Vincys had the readiness to enjoy, the rejection of all anx­
iety, and the belief in life as a merry lot, which made a house 
exceptional in most county towns at that time, when Evangeli­
calism had cast a certain suspicion as of plague-infection over 
the few amusements which survived in the provinces.
(Ch. 16)
Eliot's implicit criticism of evangelical enthusiasm lies in 
one of the major plot strands of Middlemarch: Dorothea's self- 
development from a fervidly puritanical young lady to a compassion­
ate and tolerant young matron. From the very first chapter, an air 
of satire surrounds Dorothea's religious ardor, an air which is later 
dispelled as Dorothea grows to emotional maturity. Tart-tongued 
Mrs. Cadwallader wishes Dorothea the "joy of her hair shirt," since
I
". . . those Methodistical whims, that air of being more religious 
than the rector and curate together, came from a deeper and more 
constitutional disease than she had been willing to believe" (Ch. 6). 
Will Ladislaw educates Dorothea away from what he calls her "fa­
naticism of sympathy. " Summed up in the following words, Will's 
philosophy of life serves as an antidote to Dorothea's "disease":
The best piety is to enjoy -- when you can. You are doing the 
most then to save the earth's character as an agreeable 
planet. Such enjoyment radiates. It is of no use to try and 
take care of all the world; that is being taken care of when you 
feel delight --in art or anything else. Would you turn all the 
youth of the world into a tragic chorus, wailing and moralising [sic] 
over misery? I suspect that you have some false belief in the 
virtues of misery, and want to make your life a martyrdom.
(Ch. 22)
;
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The everyday parlance of Middle marc hers, as was mentioned 
previously, is filled with medical vocabulary displaying their inter­
est in the physical aspects of illness. The townspeople also employ 
medical phraseology to describe social and domestic "ailments. "
For example, Casaubon ". . . is as bad as the wrong physic -- nasty 
to take and sure to disagree" (Ch. 10). One way for a good family 
. . to get rid of troublesome sprigs" is to ". . . empty a pot of 
leeches ..." on them (Ch. 38). In a conversation with Dorothea, 
Farebrother tells her that character ". . . is something living and 
changing, and may become diseased as our bodies do. " Answering 
in the same vein, Dorothea replies, "Then it may be rescued and 
healed" (Ch. 72). Lydgate's debts worked on him "like a recognized 
chronic disease" (Ch. 58); criticism of others is "good lowering 
medicine" (Ch. 54); and talk about the need for "a disinfecting 
apparatus within” applies to the necessity for reforms within the 
medical profession.
Disease of the human body and disease of the social organism 
are unifying common denominators of both plot and metaphor in the 
novel. The mortal struggle of man against heart disorders, dropsy, 
alcoholism, typhoid fever, and pneumonia is accentuated in the 
effort of the group to combat the deadly cholera. As the individual 
fights for life, so does the collective body of the community. The 
physiological imagery on each plane, personal or social, transmits 
a picture which dwells on elemental components of the human make­
up: flesh and blood. In so doing, the novel follows the impress of 
its Darwinian stamp.
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The intense debate over Lord Grey's proposed Reform Bill, 
which pervades the political climate of Middlemarch, widens the 
scope of community attempts to cope with national as well as local 
ills. The awakening of political awareness over the nation's needs 
begins to pull together disparate social groups in a cooperative 
search for "the proper dose" of the suggested prescription: in­
creased manhood suffrage. At a time when "... . there was a 
clearer distinction of ranks and a dimmer distinction of [political] 
parties" (Ch. 10), members of the gentry and the middle classes in 
Middlemarch are seen mixing socially under the pressures of com­
mon local and national interests. For example, Mr. Brooke, whose 
social connections ". . . though not exactly aristocratic were un­
questionably 'good'" (Ch. 1), mingles freely with all social classes 
in Middlemarch in his attempt to stand for Parliament as an inde­
pendent candidate. Much to the exasperation of Mrs. Cadwallader,
"a lady of immeasurably high birth" (Ch. 6), Brooke fraternizes with 
men who have neither blood nor position, "monsters" who, in her 
opinion, "... could not be taken account of in a well-bred scheme 
of the universe" (Ch. 6). Despite Mrs. Cadwallader's firm sway 
over the Middlemarch gentry, democracy begins its sweep as the 
great social leveler under her very nose, and "monsters" such as 
the manufacturer, Mayor Vincy, and the Methodist banker, Bul- 
strode, appear as dinner guests at Mr. Brooke's estate, Tipton 
Grange. Democracy weaves endless "threads of connection" (Ch. 11) 
among the social classes and promotes a greater consciousness of 
interdependence in the "embroiled medium" (Ch. 30) of the com-I
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I munity.
The interconnectedness of all realms of activity, of part and 
whole, of large and small, of then and now, forms one of the pre­
dominating themes in the novel, a theme which is dramatized overtly 
and subtly in an irridescent prism of reflecting images. That no man 
is an island, or any group for that matter, is repeatedly empha­
sized both in the thoughts and deeds of the characters and also within 
the grammatical structure of the novel. Discussing the language of 
Middlemarch in an essay, "Fiction and the Analogical Matrix," Mark 
Schorer points, as was previously mentioned, to the widespread use 
of metaphors of unification in verbs of mingling, associating, merg­
ing, mixing, embracing, comprehending, binding, and connecting. 
Another Eliot critic, W. J. Harvey, singles out the web imagery in 
the theme of unification along with such phrases as Caleb Garth's 
"things hang together," Trumbull's "trifles make the sum of human 
things, ..." and Will Ladislaw's ". . . the little waves make the 
large ones ..." (The Art of George Eliot, p. 175). These phrases 
may be found in Chapters 40, 60, and 46, respectively, in Middle- 
march. Mr. Brooke echoes the theme in political terms when he 
discusses the democratic implications of the Reform Bill with Mr. 
Mawmsey, the grocer. Mr. Mawmsey wants to consider Reform 
. . in a family light .... Will it support Mrs. Mawmsey, and 
enable her to bring up six children when I am no more (Ch. 51)?" 
Brooke replies: "I quite agree with you that you've got to look at the 
thing in a family light: but public spirit, now. We're all one family, 
you know -- it's all one cupboard” (Ch. 51).
I
-130-
> The sense of community identification with the commonwealth 
of England and the still larger commonwealth of mankind has strong 
biological as well as humanistic connotations. All too often, inter­
preters of Eliot’s outlook of life have conveyed the impression that 
her convictions about the need for fellow feeling and her altruistic 
concern result from a magnanimous but thoroughly sentimental 
nature, whose benevolent and high-minded remarks would make fit 
slogans for Brotherhood Week yet are hardly suitable for the year- 
round "rat race." To read Middlemarch as such is to invert Eliot's 
point of view. The consanguinity of men is a palpable fact to her; 
mutual dependence and support are urgent realities in the battle for 
survival; the helping hand helps itself. Her notions bear a kinship 
with the best religious thinking, but her attitude, it must be 
stressed, is not otherworldly nor even ethical in die Judeo-Christian 
sense. It has been said that Darwin does not deny God; he simply 
forgets Him. This observation is also true of George Eliot. Both, 
like Montaigne, possess a large-hearted tolerance, yet their spirit­
ual energies are balked by skepticism and secularism.
Morality in Middlemarch is utilitarian and is grounded in a 
strong pragmatic base. That "it’s all one cupboard," as Mr. Brooke 
says, underlines in a literal way the elemental communal ties which 
link creature and creature in the mutual quest for subsistence. In 
his discussion of the struggle for existence in the third chapter of 
The Origin of Species, Darwin stresses a fundamental preconception 
upon which his theory depends, to wit, "the mutual relations of all 
organic beings," and he sums up his section on "the struggle" with
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) the following trenchant reminder:
A corollary of the highest importance may be deduced from 
the foregoing remarks [on the struggle for existence], namely, 
that the structure of every organic being is related in the 
most essential yet often hidden manner to that of all the other 
organic beings, with which it comes into competition for food 
or residence, or from which it has to escape, or on which it 
preys.
In The Descent of Man (Ch. IV), Darwin roots the moral sense in the 
refinement of instincts which have proved themselves to be socially 
useful down through the ages. Thus the philanthropic virtues of 
altruism, love, sympathy, fellow feeling, and attachment to man­
kind become an extension of man's animal nature rather than man’s 
divine affinities with the angels.
The Darwinian orientation of the vital interrelatedness of 
all organic life is expressed in Middlemarch by dwelling on social 
connections which rest on fossilized metaphors of birth, breeding, 
and blood. In so doing, Eliot delicately employs vestigial traces in 
language to link man's social environment to his biological heritage. 
The frequent coupling of rank and social position with images of 
genesis, reproduction, and heredity, and the frequent identification 
of family clusters as blood-relations accentuate the underlying cor­
respondences between social ties and the very maw of life. Mrs. 
Cadwallader represents the gentry's defensive rear guard against 
foreign invasions by middle-class strains . . because she be­
lieved as unquestionably in birth and no-birth as she did in game and 
vermin" (Ch. 6). Her interest in the social composition of a per­
son's blood merges with her biting comments about the physical
"White-blooded" (Ch. 22) Casaubon, for
I
contents of this vital fluid.
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example, is well-born, she concedes: "As to his blood, I suppose 
the family quarterings are three cuttle-fish sable. . . " (Ch. 6), 
but she makes fun of his sterile personality by describing his blood, 
as was mentioned earlier, as "all semicolons and parentheses"
(Ch. 8). Continuing in the same socio-biological frame of mind in 
a later chapter, Mrs. Cadwallader says of Will Ladislaw: "It must 
be admitted that his blood is a frightful mixture. . . .The Casau- 
bon cuttle-fish fluid to begin with and then a rebellious Polish 
fiddler. . . " (Ch. 84).
Rank and social connections are repeatedly rendered with 
lingering overtones of man's status in the animal kingdom, for 
instance, ". . . perhaps even in the highest aristocracy there are 
Brobdingnag specimens" (Ch. 32), the word "specimens" imparting 
a peculiarly physiological air to a fleeting thought about social 
station. The mongrel middle classes in Middlemarch are naturally 
unconcerned about the purity of blood, yet they are careful watch­
dogs about guarding the hereditary rights of blood-relations. The 
upper classes think as a solid group, while the middle classes think 
as separate clans. When Mrs. Cadwallader declares that ". . . we 
should all have pulled together" (Ch. 38), her "we" includes the 
entire Middlemarch gentry. Yet when Mr. Vincy uses similar 
words in telling his brother-in-law, Bulstrode, that families should 
". . . hang by the same nail" (Ch. 13), the mayor is alluding to an 
alliance between the Vincys and the Bulstrodes as opposed to the 
interests of other middle-class families such as the Featherstones 
or the Garths. Compared to the gentry, families like the Feather- 
stones arc united by little sense of solidarity beyond that of blood-
I
)
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relationship. Eliot links the Featherstone consciousness of the 
family tie with a concrete^even humorous picture of the dropsical 
Peter who, with too much water in his body, despises the lawful 
claims to his wealth made by hated blood-relations. Nevertheless, 
the Featherstone clan believed that:
. . .an own brother "lying there" with dropsy in his legs 
must come to feel that blood was thicker than water, and if 
he didn't alter his will, he might have money by him. At any 
rate some blood-relations should be on the premises and on 
the watch against those who were hardly relations at all . . . . 
those who were no blood-relations might be caught making 
away with things -- and poor Peter "lying there" helpless:
(Ch. 32)
Despite their vigilance, old Peter's money goes to a complete 
stranger, the frog-faced Joshua Rigg, who". . . must be of another 
blood. . ." (Ch. 34). Nevertheless, Peter honors the Featherstone 
esteem for blood over social ties by discharging his obligations to 
the very letter, since Rigg, the heir to the Featherstone fortune, is 
Peter's bastard son.
Images of blood, breeding, and birth are used in figurative 
contexts as well. Casaubon's research is "food for a theory which 
was already withered in the birth like an elfin child" and failed to 
keep "the embryos of truth a-breathing" (Ch. 48). Lydgate believes 
that with a medical practice in the provinces, ". . . one makes less 
bad blood . . ." (Ch. 17). Caleb, whose pet maxim is "Business 
breeds" (Ch. 56), exhibits his independence by telling Fred: "I 
don't want your young blood. I can take care of myself" (Ch. 56). 
One of the most striking comparisons is the equation of money with 
blood and breeding. Throughout Middlemarch, wealth is regarded 
as a form of natural sustenance, "a store of fodder" (Ch. 35), "a
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I sort of seed-corn" (Ch. 23), and "honey to . . . catch lady-birds" 
(Ch. 60). Money, however, is also looked upon as an essential 
ingredient in the circulation of the body social just as blood is in­
dispensable in the circulation of an animal organism. Money in 
Middlemarch can ooze away like blood in a phlebotomy, and six­
pences can be sucked from misers by a pot of leeches (Ch. 38).
Not only productive, money is reproductive. Joshua Rigg, for ex­
ample, leaves town to become a pawnbroker in order to handle 
"the breeding coins of all nations" (Ch. 53). Like his natural son, 
old Peter had a fondness for treating money as a form of hatching 
life: "Ay, ay; money's a good egg; and if you've got money to leave 
behind you, lay it in a warm nest" (Ch. 12). The association of 
money with blood and reproduction widens the aura of significance 
attending several of the major plot strands which deal with questions 
of inheritance, namely, the Ladislaw-Casaubon relationship, the 
Ladislaw-Bulstrode affiliation,and the wills of Edward Casaubon and 
Peter Featherstone. The idea of a financial inheritance in Middle- 
march ultimately becomes bound up with the idea of biological 
heredity. The struggle for existence, natural selection, and the 
survival of the fittest in the novel depend on the enormous wielding 
power of inheritance, based to some degree on legacies of beauty, 
talent, and intelligence, but in greater measure based on legacies 
of money.
l
The interconnectedness of things is an evolutionary fact to 
Eliot, a fact based on a scientific rather than a religious appraisal 
The binding unity of all matter derives from the secu-of the world.
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> lar spirit of the laboratory, not the mystical elan of a William Blake, 
who sees a world in a grain of sand and eternity in an hour, 
makes her orientation clear in a comment on the theory of develop­
ment in The Mill on the Floss:
Eliot
. . . for does not science tell us that its highest striving is 
after the ascertainment of a unity which shall bind the small­
est things with the greatest? In natural science, I have 
understood, there is nothing petty to the mind that has a 
large vision of relations, and to which every object suggests 
a vast sum of conditions. It is surely the same with the 
observation of human life.
(Book IV, Ch. 1)
In Middlemarch, Eliot portrays society as one single related 
world composed of an intricate mesh of close or remote connections, 
so as to give the impression that nearly everyone is related by 
blood or marriage to someone else. The Featherstones are dis­
tantly related to the Garths through Peter's first wife and are dis­
tantly related to the Vincys by virtue of his second one. To the 
Featherstones this sort of kinship belonged to "that generally ob­
jectionable class called wife’s kin" (Ch. 34). The Bulstrodes and 
the Vincys are linked by Vincy's sister, Harriet, who is Bulstrode's 
wife. Will Ladislaw, the outsider, who claims that he belongs to 
nobody (Ch. 37), turns up with the most involved genealogy of all.
I
Will is Bulstrode's step-grandson and Casaubon's second-cousin, a 
descent which straddles both the upper and middle classes. An 
efflorescence of uncles, nephews, and cousins populates and compli­
cates the plot. Much to their mutual disgust Casaubon and Ladislaw 
are mistakenly taken for uncle and nephew on four different oc­
casions (Chapters 9, 19, 34 and 46). A German artist, Naumann, . 
teases Ladislaw for subconsciously playing a role in Goethe's
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> Per Neffe als Onkel, that is, wanting to be in Casaubon's shoes in 
order to be married to Dorothea. Considering the closeness of the 
tie, uncles are often a great disappointment in helping a niece or 
nephew with the struggle for existence. Uncle Brooke offers his 
niece, Dorothea, little guidance. Uncle Peter deludes his nephew, 
Fred,with false expectations, and Uncle Godwin fails Lydgate at a 
critical moment. The interminable claims and counterclaims of 
endless ramifications of kith and kin are demanding enough to make 
one cheer Mr. Vincy's exasperated outburst: "Damn relations"
(Ch. 36).' Nevertheless, complicated social bonds are indispensable 
to the intricate pattern of entanglement necessary to the novel's 
theme of interconnectedness.
In short, Eliot delineates the struggle for existence 
with multilayered density in Middlemarch. The battle for life is 
presented in personal striving, in the competition between the sexes, 
in the community fight against disease, and the national debate over 
Reform. Struggle in Eliot's lexicon includes "the various entangle­
ments, weights, blows, clashings, motions, by which things sever­
ally go on" (Ch. 31). Some, like Lydgate, give up the fight. Others 
flounder then are rescued, like Fred; some are content with com­
promise, like Dorothea, while others flourish by dint of their meager 
demands, like Caleb and Celia, or by dint of their driving energies, 
like Rosamond and Will. In addition, Eliot implements that Darwin­
ian corollary on the struggle for existence by using the tools of met­
aphor and plot construction to convey the knotted interrelatedness of 
a giant web: the social organism.
I
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) In society as in biology, the phenomenon of inheritance 
stands in the foreground in the adaptation of living creatures to 
their milieu. Inheritance is the cardinal asset or stumblingblock 
which determines "natural selection," or to use Herbert Spencer's 
phrase, "the survival of the fittest. " The bequest of a patrimony 
in Middlemarch involves such tangibles as the landed property of 
Tipton Grange, Lowick Manor, Freshitt Hall, or Stone Court, and 
"fodder" in the form of hard cash. Endowments, however, are also 
portrayed in less material terms. The steering of the younger 
generation through the resourceful or lax pilotage of the old order 
is a leitmotif which runs through the novel. The stabilizing anchor 
of a thoughtful loving father, for instance, recurs with noticeable 
frequency. Most conspicuous in the success or failure of adaptation 
is a hereditary disposition in tune with the times. "Souls have com­
plexions too ..." (Ch. 1), and that complexion or temperament 
may find itself content, like Celia, to accept the given niche without 
a murmur while another, like Dorothea, may wander uneasily 
throughout life like the forementioned cygnet unable to find its place 
with its own oary-footed kind among the ducklings in the brown pond 
(Prelude).
I
Survival is easiest for those with the connections and afflu­
ence provided by a "good family. " A person with rank and money is 
twice-blessed having "that'sort of high-breeding which consists in 
being free from the petty solicitudes of middle-class gentility”
(Ch. 58). Lydgate's cousin, a baronet's son, maybe "the greatest 
a vapid fop" and "a conceited ass" (Ch. 58) to others, butit t»bore,
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he thrives in the security of an exalted social status sustained by 
a handsome -income. By virtue of their provisions, the provincial 
gentry such as the Chettams and the Brookes are the aristocrats of 
Middlemarch society, being "of gentle birth" and aristos, the Greek 
word for "best." It is akin to the Greek word arariskein, meaning 
On the other hand, middle-class Fred, the son of a Middle- 
march manufacturer, laments that he . . was not born to very 
splendid chances ..." (Ch. 14) and is an "inevitable heir to nothing 
in particular" (Ch. 12). Nevertheless, descent from "a good family" 
is no guarantee of easy adjustment to one's environment. Lydgate 
has high-born connections through his uncle and guardian, Sir God­
win, but lacks the means to match the ingrained aristocratic habits 
of a gentleman's upbringing and the necessary luxuries to satisfy 
Rosamond's mandates for material display. Mrs. Cadwallader,- on 
the other hand, successfully copes with her genteel yet penurious 
heritage by treasuring the augustness of her "immeasurably high 
birth" (Ch. 6), though she is obliged, she says, "to get my coals by 
stratagem, and pray to heaven for my salad oil" (Ch. 6). And the 
leisure afforded by wealth is a source of stifling oppression to 
Dorothea, for it robs her of a need to be of service and also impairs 
her rapprochement with penniless Will Ladislaw.
In general, however, money in Middlemarch emerges- as a 
great power of plasticity, which allows men more freedom to move 
about in a close medium. Debt has a crippling effect on the finest 
talents. Farebrother tells Lydgate ". . . you have got a good start; 
you are in the right profession; the work you feel yourself most fit
"fit."
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for . . . " (Ch. 17), but warns that the loss of independence is a by­
product of financial liability. And Raffles literally refers to the sum
of money he wants from Bulstrode as "an independence" (Ch. 53).
The problem of money, inheritance, and wills shapes not only Lyd­
gate's story but each of the major plot strands in the novel. The 
function of the Featherstone plot and the complications afforded by 
many minor figures such as Raffles and Rigg are not mechanical 
adjuncts to the novel, as some critics have said, but contribute to 
the materialistic scale of values in Middlemarch society. To Eliot, 
the changeover from the appraisal of men in moral terms to their 
appraisal in the light of their pocketbooks is a fact of modern life.
In the Impressions of Theophrastus Such, she comments sardoni­
cally that what a man is worth has come to mean how much money he 
possesses (Ch. XVI).
To watch the Featherstone relations hovering over Peter's 
gold is to witness the role of money as an extension of man's preda­
tory instinct. And to observe Rosamond's willful insistence on 
parading the trappings of wealth is to behold a concrete illustration 
of Thorstein Veblen's theory of the leisure class,' in which conspic­
uous consumption is deemed an evolutionary expression of success­
ful predatory prowess. In Middlemarch, Rosamond's fastidious 
attention to details of dress, details which necessitate elaborate 
lace-edging, petticoat-tucking, and double-hemming on all her 
cambric frilling forms a sharp contrast to Dorothea's utter uncon­
cern about feminine fashion. The first page,indeed the first sentence, 
of the novel describes the "well-bred economy" of upper-class
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provincial society with regard to dress: "Miss Brooke had that kind
of beauty which seems to be thrown into relief by poor dress" (Ch. 1).
Nevertheless, Eliot points out that upper-class girls were prone to
less conspicuous material exhibitions of a pecuniary culture:
Young women of such birth, living in a quiet country-house, and 
attending a village church hardly larger than a parlour, naturally 
regarded frippery as the ambition of a huckster's daughter. Then 
there was well-bred economy, which in those days made show in 
dress the first item to be deducted from, when any margin was 
required for expenses more distinctive of rank.
(Ch. 1)
One of the most important functions of Borthrup Trumbull's 
auction in the novel is to portray on a community scale the zestful 
group pursuit after material goods. Eliot remarks: "At Middle- 
march in those times a large sale was regarded as a kind of festi­
val" (Ch. 60). This sale was occasioned by Mr. Larcher's success 
in the carrying trade, a fact which necessitated the purchase of a 
fully furnished mansion in high style replete with "such large frame- 
fuls of expensive flesh-painting in the dining-room, that Mrs. Lar- 
cher was nervous until reassured by finding the subjects to be 
Scriptural" (Ch. 60). The adulation and exhibitionism of wealth are 
two concomitants of a society intoxicated with money. This intoxi­
cation is symbolized in the fulfillment of Joshua Rigg's dream, after 
he inherits Featherstone's estate of Stone Court, die dream of 
opening up a pawnshop and becoming a money-changer. Money is an 
agent of flexibility and interchange, a sustaining fluid which circu­
lates throughout Middlemarch society like the cyclic flow of blood
For example, the substantial profits made byin a living organism.
Bulstrode's early career as a pawnbroker end up in Joshua Rigg's
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i hands through Bulstrode's purchase of Stone Court. Rigg in turn 
uses the money to open his own money-changer's shop. Thus the 
"breeding coins" (Ch. 53) come full cycle in reproducing their own 
kind.
Just as a solid financial inheritance from a "good family" is 
an asset in natural selection, so also is the inheritance which can 
boast of a strong father and mother. It is no accident that both 
Lydgate and Dorothea, flounderers in the struggle for existence, 
have been raised by uncles as guardians, uncles who provide vir­
tually no help during periods of critical adjustment. Mr. Brooke 
insists ambiguously that he must be a father to Dorothea "up to a 
certain point" (Ch. 84), but his "miscellaneous opinions" (Ch. 1) 
and "too rambling habit of mind" (Ch. 1) provide little succor for 
Dorothea's spiritual vacuum. She marries Casaubon, because she 
needs a counselor:
. . . and since the time was gone by for guiding visions and 
spiritual directors, since prayer heightened yearning but not 
instruction, what lamp was there but knowledge? Surely 
learned men kept the only oil; and who more learned than Mr. 
Casaubon?
(Ch. 10)
Dorothea's need for a father-figure is revealed in her notion that 
. . the really delightful marriage must be that where your hus­
band was a sort of father, and could teach you even Hebrew, if you 
wished it" (Ch. 1). She repeats this thought to Casaubon during 
courtship by telling him that she will read aloud to him, "as Milton's 
daughter did to their father" (Ch. 7). Like Mr. Brooke, Mayor and 
Mrs. Vincy make unsatisfactory parents because of their incapacity 
to supply their children, Rosamond and Fred, with the protective
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mooring of firm discipline and respect for their middle-class lot. 
They spoil their children by furnishing them with educations unsuit­
able to their social station. University training does Fred little 
good except to increase his material expectations, and Rosamond's 
success at Mrs. Lemon’s School only serves to deepen her penchant 
towards social snobbery. Though Mr. Vincy appears resolute, his 
offspring know that "Papa was not a rock: he had no other fixity than 
that fixity of alternating impulses sometimes called habit..."
(Ch. 36).
By contrast, the Garths give their daughter, Mary, the solid 
backing of deep family affection and the mainstays of an attitude 
toward life which makes the most of things. Mrs. Garth ". . . had 
that rare sense which discerns what is unalterable, and submits to 
it without murmuring" (Ch. 24). Both Caleb Garth and his wife,
Susan, make no unrealistic demands on others and find their chief 
rewards in hard work, careful economy, and the judicious direction 
of their children. Caleb's personality is similar to one of Eliot's 
best known characters, that of Adam Bede. Both Caleb and Adam 
are dedicated workmen, rough-hewn and simple, thoroughly honest 
and dependable, and disposed to plain talk. Mary Garth acknowl­
edges the profound contribution made by her parents on her up­
bringing, when she tells Peter Featherstone: "I consider my mother 
and father the best part of myself, sir ..." (Ch. 25). Caleb also 
uses his sound advice with others, for example, in redirecting Fred's 
misguided intention to enter the Church by steering the young man 
into a vocation more suitable to Fred's practical bent of mind. WhenI
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Fred protests that he has no claim on Caleb for help, the latter 
responds: "Yes, my boy, you have a claim .... The young ones 
have always a claim on the old to help them forward" (Ch. 56). The 
Garths are the only Middlemarch family whom Eliot spares from her 
nipping irony. According to several biographers, Caleb and Adam 
resemble her own father. Perhaps these two figures are protected 
by a sacrosanct emotional core of affection deep within Eliot. Each 
human being, even the ironical author, possesses an inner sanctum 
which defies the intrusion of any irreverent thought or feeling.
Besides the role of paternal inheritance, the survival of the 
fittest depends on one's personal capacity to meet the needs of the 
times. Dorothea's spiritual drive is far too intense to suit her 
secular environment and far too "masculine" to meet nineteenth- 
century standards of womanhood. Like Miniver Cheevy, Dorothea 
was born too late to live the epic life demanded by her religious 
ardor, a life which Saint Theresa of Avila, with whom she is com­
pared, lived successfully three hundred years before. Casaubon 
does not thrive, because he is not beyond but behind the times. His 
historical inquiries fail to consider important advances in his field 
made by German scholarship, and he gropes "about in woods with a 
pocket-compass while they [the Germans] have made good roads" 
(Ch. 21). The idea of temperamental fitness as an important means 
to a flourishing adjustment is re-echoed on numerous occasions.
Mr. Brooke ". . . is not fitted to be a public man ..." (Ch. 46); 
Fred ". . . is not fit to be a clergyman" (Ch. 12); Mary tries to be 
a teacher but says: "I am not fit for that" (Ch. 14); and Mr. Fare-
)
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* brother, the vicar, is stalemated in his choice of profession by his 
want of "spiritual tobacco" (Ch. 17). Farebrother loses the chap­
laincy of the New Fever Hospital, because the medical board decides 
that he is not "the fittest man" (Ch. 16) for that particular post. 
Fitness also depends on the ability to coerce circumstances into 
meeting one's material expectations. Fred is not "fit to be a poor 
man" (Ch. 14) nor Rosamond "fit to marry a poor man" (Ch. 31), 
for "what can the fitness of things mean, " Eliot asks, poking fun at 
Fred, "if not their fitness to a man’s expectations" (Ch. 14)? Yet 
Rosamond succeeds in her resolve to become rich by virtue of her 
"victorious obstinacy" (Ch. 58) as a parasite, who battens on the 
productive income of her husband, Lydgate, and secures the 
required "gilding, fit for the bird of paradise that she resembled. " 
Fred, on the other hand, simply tailors his presumptions to meet 
the limitations of his skill and his restrictive surroundings".
If Middlemarch is a novel of partial successes and partial 
failures which stem from being out of step with the times either 
intellectually like Casaubon, or spiritually like Dorothea, or 
professionally like Farebrother, or materially like Fred, what 
individual traits make for unqualified success? Who survives the 
battle unscathed? Who is the most temperamentally fit? Such a 
choice involves the elimination of those who are superior by no 
abilities of their own, for example Sir James and Celia, who 
prosper because of their enormous material inheritances. In the 
older generation, Caleb Garth is a possible choice, because he 
represents the principle of continuity in his dedication to improve-
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ment of the land and his dedication for work. Yet Caleb's intel­
ligence is of a limited kind, one which understands the practical 
benefits of a practical scheme such as the invasiveness of the 
railroads, but one which would be hard put to divine the political, 
economic, and social conditions of a country which heralded the 
railroad’s advance. The person most in tune with his age is an 
individual who, of all the characters in Middlemarch, has found 
the least sympathy among literary critics, namely, Will Ladislaw. 
The general complaint about Eliot's portrait of Will is that he is not 
fully developed and from an artistic standpoint remains obscure.
Will is also assailed for the indefiniteness of his outlook and is 
regarded as a rather strange match for Dorothea's impassioned 
need for direction. Notwithstanding these criticisms, it is impor­
tant to place a high priority on the character of Will Ladislaw in 
order to understand Eliot's "message" in Middlemarch. As Mr. 
Brooke informs us in his droll way, "Everything is symbolical, you 
know. . . " (Ch. 34), so the function of Ladislaw's presence through­
out the novel ought to be construed in a symbolic light. Will 
represents the new spirit of Demos, the man of the future, the 
incarnation of the ideals of the buoyancy of youth. These attributes 
are suggested in the first syllable of his last name, that is, "lad, " 
and his name also suggests a link with the burgeoning of democracy 
inherent in the latest law, "ladis-law. "
The use of proper names to convey personal characteristics 
is a familiar device in Eliot's work. The symbolism in Dorothea's 
name and nickname has already been discussed. Mr. Brooke's
I
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> voluble mind flows like a running brook. The obstructions to Lyd­
gate's career are foreshadowed in the double barriers of his two- 
syllable last name. Farebrother is a benevolent soul. Doctors 
Sprague, Minchin, Toller, and Wrench hint at associations with 
disease and pain, for instance, Sprague with plague, Minchin with 
"pinchin'," Toller with holler, and Wrench with wrench. Raffles 
taunts Nicholas Bulstrode about his early corrupt career: "Some 
said you had a handsome family likeness to old Nick, but that was 
your mother's fault, calling you Nicholas" (Ch. 53). Rosamond 
Vincy.who has a "Providence of her own" (Ch. 27), is a beautiful 
victorious flower, and Caleb Garth, as was mentioned earlier,
• means "faithful dog in an orchard, " an appellation which his person­
al qualities suggest. Not to be ignored are the grosser puns in the 
names of the characters, for example that of Mr. Hackbutt, the 
tanner, whose wife is named Fanny. Brooke's estate like his 
shifting ideas is called Tipton Grange; Sir James's Freshitt Hall 
recalls his interest in farming and horses; and Casaubon’s Lowick 
Manor is a rather direct allusion to Casaubon's low-keyed sexual 
ardor, a "man" whose flame of passion is like a candle at low wick. 
As in the novels of Fielding, whose literary technique is briefly 
mentioned in Middlemarch (Ch. 15), Eliot is careful in controlling 
the connotations of proper names in her fiction. For this reason, 
it is not far-fetched to conclude that Will Ladislaw's name incor­
porates specific references to his role as an enterprising politician 
who bends to the needs of the new period of transition: the Reform
i
era.
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Middlemarch opinions about Will Ladislaw, whether com- 
limentary or not, bear out this idea. In addition, the narrator - 
author commentary of Eliot herself supports a description of Will 
as a protean personality who is able to flex himself easily with the 
changing times. Eliot's portrayal of Will is enveloped with images 
of youth, movement, and force. His speech at a Reform meeting 
has "the violence of an energumen, " which}much to the disgust of 
conservative Middlemarch politicians was "a miserable effort to 
shroud in the brilliancy of fireworks the daring of irresponsible 
statements" (Ch. 46). To more liberal elements, he is "a sort of 
Burke with a leaven of Shelley" (Ch. 51), "our mercurial Ladislaw" 
(Ch. 71), and Lydgate regards him as "a sort of gypsy, rather 
enjoying the sense of belonging to no class" (Ch. 46). Will's keen 
mind is alive with the critical issues of the day, but he is a prag­
matist who is impatient with quibbling perfectionists of political 
theory. He argues with both Lydgate and Brooke on the urgency of 
voting for the current Reform Bill despite its loopholes and odd 
compromises: ". . . if you are to wait till we get a logical Bill, you 
must put yourself forward as a revolutionist. . . " (Ch. 51). Flexi­
bility keynotes his temperament, which has quick shifts of mood 
like "a gay little chime after the great bell" (Ch. 22), yet . . he 
was a creature who entered into every one's feelings, and could take 
the pressure of their thought instead of urging his own with iron 
resistance" (Ch. 50).
Will embodies the principle of activity and dynamism in 
Middlemarch and represents the vitalism inherent in the evolution-
>
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ary force. In Rome he teaches Dorothea how to envision the world's 
ages as organically connected, not "a set of box-like partitions"
(Ch. 22), and he interprets Marlowe's Tamburlaine as a symbol of 
evolutionary power in which Tamburlaine represents "the tremen­
dous course of the world's physical history lashing on the harnessed 
dynasties" (Ch. 22). Even Will's physical appearance incarnates 
the spirit of metamorphosis. He has curly hair and a "nose with a 
little ripple in it" (Ch. 9). Though he is an outsider to Middlemarch, 
he is, nonetheless, very much at home in the world, a classless 
man fit for the classless society to come. His legacy is a tempera­
ment which masters the present and points to the future, a tempera­
ment which is an embodiment of Goethe's exuberant words:
My inheritance how wide and far
Time is my fair seed-field; of time I'm heir!
(Flyleaf of Carlyle's Sartor Resartus)
WillLadislaw is an opportunist in the best sense of the word, one 
who seizes the moment for the betterment of the human condition.
He fittingly uses his talent by finding his place as a member of 
Parliament at the end of the novel. There is a dash of Disraeli in 
Will, and one cannot help but wonder if Eliot may have had the 
Prime Minister in mind when she drew her portrait. Both Will and 
Disraeli are artists turned politicians; both started their early 
careers as radical thinkers, and both share a Jewish background.
The close scrutinization of Will Ladislaw's character is 
essential in tracing a persistent statement made in Middlemarch 
on the twofold nature of life and death. This dichotomy is clothed 
in imagery of pliancy and rigidity, especially in the contrast be-
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tween the personalities of Ladislaw and his cousin, Casaubon. 
Casaubon lives "too much with the dead" (Ch. 2), and according to 
his neighbors ". . . has one foot in the grave" (Ch. 6). His schol­
arship is stiffly set upon reducing the contents of all myths to one 
basic Key. Casaubon's world is made up of documents neatly 
pigeonholed and footnoted yet bereft of the irregular and irreducible 
animating springs of intellectual truth. Even his proposal of 
marriage to Dorothea is regarded by him as one of the "stages 
towards the completion of a life's plan" (Ch. 5). Casaubon dehy­
drates his capacity for love by hoarding the sterile fruits of his 
shortsighted analytical intellect into the somber protective cell of 
his egoism. Another gnarled miser, Peter Featherstone, hoards 
his banknotes and uses their power to promote his misanthropy.
Just as Casaubon dies^leaving his Key and his voluminous notes, 
Peter dies ". . . with his right hand clasping the keys, and his left 
hand lying on the heap of notes and gold" (Ch. 33). Eliot parallels 
these deaths to illumine the bankruptcy of both lives smothered by 
their lethal notes and keys.
A strong thematic undercurrent in Middlemarch is a Words­
worthian defiance of pat intellectual formulae, which murder to 
dissect. Eliot's romantic dislike of rationalistic systems which 
force facts into preconceived cast-iron patterns is implicit in the 
failure of Casaubon's Key. Herbert Spencer, her friend, had this 
objectionable genius for abstract deductive logic. She writes of 
him:
I went to Kew yesterday. . . on a scientific expedition with
Herbert Spencer, who has all sorts of theories about plants
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- - I should have said a proof-hunting expedition. Of course 
if the flowers didn't correspond to the theories, we said, 
tant pis pour les fleurs.
i
(Gordon S. Haight. George 
Eliot: A Biography, Ch. IV)
Of another popular rationalistic programme, that of Henry Thomas 
Buckle, she states in a letter of 19 May 186l^to John Blackwood: "I 
am very far behind Mr. Buckle's millennial prospect. . . whereby 
superstition will vanish and statistics will reign for ever and ever" 
(Haight, ed. The George Eliot Letters, Vol III,p. 417). The search 
for truth lies less in armchair philosophy than a headlong splash 
into the turbulent chaos of observable phenomena in order to 
experience nature and humanity first hand. An empirical rather 
than a rationalistic approach to life lessens the dangers, she 
believes, of using our compelling curiosity about life for the pur­
pose of aggrandizing our natural egoism. "We are all of us bom in 
moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme 
selves" (Ch. 21), Eliot declares. Casaubon attempts to be "a 
scrupulous explorer" (Ch. 20) of the distant reaches of history, but 
his scholarship fails,because it is never "liberated from a small 
hungry shivering self" (Ch. 29). The true explorers in Middle- 
march are those who are willing to sacrifice the defensive armor 
of their egoism in a quest for knowledge of the world and of them­
selves. Lydgate in his bachelor days dreamed of discovering "the 
primitive tissue" (Ch. 15). He is, as Farebrother puts it, "... a 
sort of circumnavigator come to settle among us, and will keep up 
my belief in the antipodes" (Ch. 17). And Dorothea's search for 
self-identity is likened to the exploits of Sinbad, the sailor: ". . .
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starting a long way off the true point, and proceeding by loops and 
zigzags, we now and then arrive just where we ought to be" (Ch. 3).
Yet Will, in contrast to Dorothea, Lydgate, and Casaubon, 
is not temperamentally a seeker after the Grail. He tells Dorothea 
that he prefers not to know the sources of the Nile, and finds that a 
life-long dedication to a specific goal is a harness which blunts the 
appreciation of the present hour. He is an artist with "no bent 
towards exploration," as Casaubon says disapprovingly of Will 
(Ch. 9). At one point Ladislaw asks himself for what end he had 
"harnessed" himself with the publication of Brooke's newspaper, and 
his answer is: "Well, for no definite end" (Ch. 47). Ladislaw's' 
refusal to be circumscribed by a charted course is characteristic 
of his pliant vision, which conceives of an open-ended future rich 
with new possibilities which call for malleable talents. He reflects 
how much happier he is in working as Mr. Brooke's campaign man­
ager than ". . . in the sort of life Mr. Casaubon would have me 
trained for, where the doing would all be laid down by a precedent 
too rigid for me to react upon" (Ch. 46). Will possesses a good 
measure of flexibility needed in the new man, a measure midway be­
tween the extremes of his two patrons, Mr. Brooke and Mr. Casaubon. 
Brooke is all formlessness and believes like Ladislaw that "life 
can't be cast into a mould-- not cut out by rule and line, and that 
sort of thing" (Ch. 4). Brooke claims that he and Will . . are 
alike, you know. . . " (Ch. 39), nevertheless Brooke's putty-like 
mind is so shapeless that he cannot be pinned down to a stable 
commitment. Either temperamental pole, be it Casaubon's or
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Brooke's, results in stagnation, one mind by shutting too much out 
and the other by permitting anything to come in, one by being too 
taut and the other by being too lax.
That Will symbolizes "the fittest" specimen in the struggle 
for existence and a natural heir of the selective evolutionary proc­
ess is also manifested in the development of the plot line. As a 
mature young woman, Dorothea chooses between two alternate 
courses at the end of the novel, namely that option offered by 
Casaubon's will, which specifically inhibits her marriage to Ladis- 
law, and that option offered by an alliance with Will. In marrying 
Ladislaw, Dorothea gives up one will for another Will. With her 
growing comprehension of human values, she has learned to love the 
expansive life-affirming qualities of Ladislaw as against the stifling 
funereal companionship of Casaubon. Will is also a fit symbol of 
the era of transition from aristocratic to democratic control in that 
his background, like the Reform Bill, intermixes both the upper and 
middle classes, and also because he invades the hitherto 
inviolable precincts of established patterns of power. To Mrs. 
Cadwallader, as was pointed out previously, Ladislaw's ". . . 
blood is a frightful mixture. . . " (Ch. 84).' Will is of genteel 
descent through his Casaubon connections, yet linked to the middle 
classes on his father's side. In portraying him as the personifica­
tion of the incoming democratic leadership, Eliot expresses a 
mixed hope. Though the future will be controlled by men of Will's 
mettle, that is, not by the extravagant dreams of the explorer but 
by the practical manipulative genius of the politician, this genius
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> will be provident enough to create a world with a place for the 
faltering idealism of a Dorothea, a Lydgate, and even a Casaubon.
If Middlemarch is a nineteenth-century epic of evolutionary 
movement, how does Eliot's art communicate the impression of 
development? In what ways does the novel's rhetorical style desig­
nate this particular historical period as an era of transition? Up to 
this point, this essay has padded the skeleton of Darwinian theory 
with the rich fictional pulp of Middlemarch. Henceforward, the 
scope of this inquiry will converge on the specific narrative strategy 
used by Eliot to make this skeleton move.
One of the most familiar literary techniques to convey the 
fluidity of motion is the widespread use of the progressive tense as 
well as the employment of gerunds and active participles ending in 
a restless suffix, the grammatical "live wire," -ING. Robert 
Southey, for instance,uses over one hundred and fifty . .rushing 
and flushing and brushing and gushing/ And flapping and rapping and 
clapping and slapping" present participles to describe the flow of 
water in his poem, "The Cateract of Lodore. " Several critics of 
Middlemarch, notably Hilda Hulme and Mark Schorer, have dis­
cussed Eliot's reliance on verbs of progressive movement in the 
novel in order to render the flow of time. Even a casual glance at 
the text of the novel easily brings to light scores of samples of 
Eliot's preference for this form of syntax, as the following 
selections show:
She was no longer struggling against the perception of facts, 
but adjusting herself to their clearest perception; and now when 
she looked steadily at her husband's failure, . . .she seemed
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to be looking along the one track where duty became tenderness.
(Ch. 37)
Ben, bouncing across the grass. . . , and seeing the kitten 
dragging the knitting by a lengthening line of wool, ....
(Ch. 57)
"Do you not see that it is no use now to be crawling a little 
way after men of the last century. . . and correcting their 
mistakes? -- living in a lumber-room and furbishing up 
broken-legged theories about Chus and Mizraim?"
(Ch. 22)
Mr. Brooke, persisting as quietly as if he were only discussing 
the nature of last yearvs weather, and nodding at the end with 
his usual amenity, was an exasperating form of obstinacy.
(Ch. 49)
Lydgate was almost forgetting that he must carry on the con­
versation, in thinking how lovely this creature was, her gar­
ment seeming to be made out of the faintest blue sky, . . . 
with this infantine blondness showing so much ready self- 
possessed grace.
(Ch. 16)
Eliot's persistent employment of the -ING suffix supplies the 
narrative with a steady stream of continuing action congruous with 
the state of metamorphosis in an era of transition. Equally 
significant, however, is her emphatic insistence that the pace of 
activity in Middlemarch is "slow" and "gradual, " two qualifiers 
which almost invariably crop up when Eliot talks about movement. 
Theories of change in the nineteenth century favored a non- 
catastrophic view of emerging development not only in biology and 
geology but also in theories of social progress. The year 1830, 
which forms part of the temporal backdrop of Middlemarch saw 
the publication of a scientific classic, which espoused a develop­
mental view of time, namely, Charles Lyell's Principles of Geology. 
Lyell's book argued that changes in the earth's surface were chiefly 
the result of ponderously slow processes rather than convulsive
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upheavals which drastically revolutionized nature's status quo, as 
had hitherto been the tenor of opinion. Belief in geological catastro- 
phism in contrast to Lyell's gradualism was like watching the 
cuckoo bird instead of the hands of the clock, to borrow a metaphor 
from Loren Eiseley's The Firmament of Time (p. 24). Lyell's 
point of view was the mainstay of Darwin's conception of time, a 
conception incorporated in The Origin of Species (Ch. VI): ". . . 
for natural selection acts only by taking advantage of slight succes­
sive variations; she can ns\er take a great and sudden leap, but 
must advance by short and sure, though slow steps. "
Darwin revitalized the old canon, Natura non facit saltum, 
with the evidence of biology, yet his panorama of organic evolution 
is based on Lyell's geological picture of ancient planetary history 
engulfed in a seemingly limitless field of time. In emphasizing 
the adagio movement of the developmental process, Darwin points 
to the imperceptible quality of most evolutionary transitions: "We 
see nothing of ttess slow changes in progress, until the hand of 
time has marked the lapse of ages. . . " (Ch. IV). In acknowl­
edging Lyell's influence, Darwin states that he always felt as if his 
books came half out of Lyell's brain. Lyell stretched the horizons 
of time towards limitless reaches into the past and into the future 
and thereby slackened the speed in the march of natural events 
from a brisk trot to a snail's pace. Capsulating Lyell's contribu­
tion, Gertrude Himmelfarb puts it thus:
The strategy of the Principles had been to create a new concep­
tion of time that would reinforce the new conception of nature.
The catastrophists, for whom violence was a "mysterious and 
extraordinary agency, " had envisaged nature as being "parsi-
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} monious of time and prodigal of violence" -- prodigal of violence 
because it was parsimonious of time. Lyell had to reverse the 
formula: Nature was parsimonious of violence and prodigal of 
time --parsimonious of violence because it was prodigal of time.
(Darwin and the Darwinian 
Revolution, p. VI)
However radical his notions were with regard to traditional­
ly literal interpretations of Biblical time, Lyell, nevertheless, 
helped inject a heavily conservative note into speculations by 
"enlightened" French Philosophes about the the rate of social prog­
ress. In other words, the nineteenth-century idea of development 
decelerated the eighteenth-century idea of progress with cartloads 
of empirical data. To Eliot, historical change is real but barely 
noticeable. Progress is a tired old traveler plodding his patient^ 
weary way through the centuries. Dazzling utopian schemes and 
airy metaphysics fail to quicken his spirit or spark his straggling 
steps. If he has come far and has achieved much, he is acutely 
aware of the costs of the effort. If man is moving towards a 
millennium, this prospect is millions of years away, a prospect 
hardly worth calling "progress" in the life of a man-who lives
Yet to Eliot, the lot of that short life is 
to preserve and transmit the best that change has wrought. Her 
philosophy of historical change embodies a keen consciousness of 
man as a drop of time uniting past and future, of man as both 
testator and legatee. In a poem,"Oh, May I Join the Choir Invisible" 
she eulogizes the cumulative endowment of countless unsung lives, 
whose bit-by-bit improvements have forced the wheels of progress 
to inch along:
three-score-and -ten.
-157-
. . . the choir invisible 
Of those immortal dead who live again 
In minds made better by their presence. . .
In Middlemarch, Eliot expresses this thought in the last sentence of
the novel in a concluding remark about Dorothea's diffusive influence
on the well-being of others, . . for the growing good of the world
is partly dependent on unhistoric acts. . . [and is] half owing to the
number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited
tombs" (Finale).
Eliot labels her attitude toward the slow pace of the develop­
mental process as "meliorism, " a diluted faith in progress watered 
down by infinite oceans of time. In her book review (1856) of a 
pioneering cultural history by Riehl, The Natural History of German 
Life, Eliot approves of Riehl's conservative assessment of the theory 
of progress:
He is as far as possible from the folly of supposing that the sun 
will go backward on the dial, because we put the hands of our 
clock backward; he only contends against the opposite folly of 
decreeing that it shall be mid-day, while in fact the sun is 
only touching the mountain-tops, and all along the valley men 
are stumbling in the twilight.
(Thomas Pinney, ed. Essays of 
George Eliot, p. 299)
Of all her novels, her melioristic outlook is best reflected 
stylistically in Middlemarch, where the reader meets with few sudden 
changes, no startling events, and no impending disasters. She 
handles change like Mr. Tulliver in The Mill on the Floss: "He was 
not a man to make an abrupt transition. This was a puzzling world, 
as he often said, and if you drive your waggon in a hurry, you may 
light on an awkward corner" (Book I, Ch. Ill). Activity in Middle- 
march is inevitably slow-gaited, as the following examples show:
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I A human being in this aged nation of ours is a very wonderful 
whole, the slow creation of long interchanging influences. . . .
(Ch. 40)
But any one watching keenly the stealthy covergence [sic] of 
human lots, sees a slow preparation of effects from one life 
on another. ...
(Ch. 11)
Municipal town and rural parish gradually made fresh threads 
of connection -- gradually, as the old stocking gave way to the 
savings-bank. ...
(Ch. 11)
The result had oozed forth gradually. . . .
(Ch. 37)
But she was gradually ceasing to expect. . . .
(Ch. 20)
And in the meanwhile the hours were each leaving their little 
deposit and gradually forming the final reason for inaction. . . .
(Ch. 36)
. . . her view of Mr. Casaubon. . . was gradually changing 
with the secret motion of a watch-hand. . . .
(Ch. 20)
But results which depend on human conscience and intelligence 
work slowly, and now at the end of 1829, most medical practice 
was still strutting or shambling along the old paths. . . .
(Ch. 15)
Nothing in the world more subtle than the process of their 
gradual change.'
(Ch. 15)
The pace of transition in Middlemarch is deliberately slow and 
undramatic, because from Eliot's point of view even a large-scale 
historical event such as the passing of the Reform Bill looms into 
prominence only with the verdict of history after the passage of a 
considerable amount of time. That 1832 opened the floodgates of 
democracy was especially appreciated in 1867 on the eve of the 
second great extension of manhood suffrage, when men began to fear 
that the torrents of mass voting power would erode the bedrock of
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national life. Eliot wrote "Address to Workingmen, by Felix Holt" in 
1867 in response to the second Reform Bill. This bill also stirred the 
pens of two other Victorians: Thomas Carlyle's in "Shooting Niagara, 
and After?" (1867) and Matthew Arnold's in "Culture and Anarchy" 
(1869). All three essays are critiques of democracy, critiques 
ranging in degree from scathing denunciation to resigned and reluc­
tant acceptance. All three express a deep concern with the problems 
of coping with the unleashed power of newly enfranchised lower 
classes. Carlyle savagely attacks what he calls the democratic 
"swarmery, " because the Reform Bill of 1867 represents to him a 
frenzied leap into a Niagara, a wild plunge into chaos. Arnold 
regards universal manhood suffrage as a challenge which threatens 
to drag down the intellectual and moral calibre of England's best self. 
Eliot's "Address" neither despairs nor offers any practical solution 
such as Arnold’s proposals for mass education. She advises her 
countrymen not to rock the boat or . . we should be much like 
sailors cutting away the timbers of our own ship to warm our grog 
with" (Thomas Pinney, ed. Essays of George Eliot, p. 419). This 
feeling is echoed in Middlemarch by Caleb Garth, who uses a similar 
homily in cautioning men against impeding the progress of the rail­
road: "The cattle may have a heavy load, but it won't help 'em to 
throw it over into the roadside pit, when it's partly their own fodder" 
(Ch. 56). Eliot's interest in the era of the first Reform Bill stemmed 
from her wish to examine the slow germination of a crucial historical 
development, the sprouting of democracy, yet she is careful to depict 
the growth of political consciousness in that transitional period as aI
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gradual and inconspicuous process shrouded by the prosaic solicitudes 
of daily life. The mechanism of historical change fascinated Eliot's 
mind until the end of her days. As late as 1879, the year before her 
death, she writes in the Impressions of Theophrastus Such:
Is there any country which shows at once as much stability and 
as much susceptibility to change as ours? Our national life 
is like that scenery which I early learned to love, not subject 
to great convulsions, but showing more or less delicate 
. . . effects from minor changes.
(Part II)
In Middlemarch, Eliot's awareness of change is also imparted 
by peppering the narrative with "then and now" contrasts. For 
example, she alludes to the backward practice of medicine "at that 
time, " in "that dark period, " or during that "unsanitary" epoch, as 
compared with later days. Often her references to the 1870's as an 
advancement over the 1830's is ironic, for instance: "At that time 
young ladies in the country. . . read little French literature later 
than Racine, and public prints had not cast their present magnificent 
illumination over the scandals of life" (Ch. 43).
The perpetual instability which accompanies the developmental 
philosophy of becoming in Middlemarch is realized in the presenta­
tion of character both in content and method. The central figures 
suffer from a temperamental disability, a restless soul-hunger 
which eludes the poising forces of composure and self-command. 
Dorothea, Lydgate, Casaubon, and Fred, for example, feel 
straitjacketed by unrelenting environmental forces. They are victims 
of what R.P. Blackmur calls "Bovarysme, " that is, they reach so 
hard for ungraspable goals that the very act of reaching becomes 
itself a passion. Theirs is ". . . the history of that kind of damna-
i
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tion which comes when we are unable to accept the conditions of life 
• • . " (Eleven Essays in the European Novel, p. 49). In the end 
each accepts the limits imposed by reality and finds repose either in 
the solace of love or in the release of death. Character in Middle- 
march^ is a plastic entity, subject to the inexhaustible vicissitudes 
of an inconstant ambience. An individual's nature is not set in a 
pre-existing cast of innate attributes but is an evolving phenomenon 
altered by the ease or crush of circumstances. Self-realization is 
the order of things and self-identity the quest. Descartes's "I think, 
therefore I am" becomes transmuted into "I experience, therefore I 
become. " In such a situation a person rarely enjoys the rewards and 
pains of self-knowledge, since he is by definition only a fraction of 
his developing total self. Eliot in Middlemarch on two occasions 
expresses the view that human nature is flexible and not a fixed 
formula of good and evil. "Character is not cut in marble -- it is 
not something solid and unalterable," Farebrother tells Dorothea 
(Ch. 72). His words repeat Eliot's idea as author-commentator in 
an earlier chapter that . . character too is a process and an 
unfolding" (Ch. 15).
The concept of character as a transitional process recognizes 
the continuum of past, present, and future. To know oneself is to
know thy past. One's history is part of one's self-definition, be it
\
on a personal, or national, or an ethnic plane. Eliot states that 
"... a man's past is not simply a dead history, an outworn prep­
aration of the present:. . . it is a still quivering part of himself. . . 
(Ch. 61). While it is considered avant-garde today to talk about the
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death of the past, to think in Now time, to acknowledge the relevance 
only of the immediate moment, and to look upon history as a chaotic 
jumble of meaningless happenstance, it is interesting to come upon 
lively expressions of old-fashioned nineteenth-century developmen- 
talism in current radical writers. In The Strawberry Statement: 
Notes of a College Revolutionary, James Kunen exclaims: "We're 
the bridge generation. . . . We're the product of all the past and 
we'll determine all the future. . . It's exciting. It's a challenge" 
(Section dated Tuesday, July 23, 1968). And the following paragraph 
by Eldridge Cleaver is as dedicated a belief in historicism as any to 
issue from the last century:
Be convinced, Sable Sister, that the past is no forbidden vista 
upon which we dare not look, out of a phantom fear of being, 
as the wife of Lot, turned into pillars of salt. Rather the past 
is an omniscient mirror: we gaze and see reflected there our­
selves and each other -- what we used to be, what we are today, 
how we got this way, and what we are becoming. To decline 
to look into the Mirror of Then, my heart, is to refuse to 
view the face of Now.
(Soul on Ice, p. 207)
Developmentalism is as alive in Cleaver's attitude as it is in George 
Eliot's. Both conceive of history as an unfailing oracle in decipher­
ing the mysteries of character, both in the individual and in the 
collective.
In contrast to the photographic delineation of the individual in 
her earlier novels, Eliot in Middle march presents a prism of per­
spectives through which a character is assessed. Her early novels 
introduce a central figure through the conventional verbal picture of 
physical attributes, while in Middlemarch she creates- "a vessel of . 
consciousness, " as Henry James would say, a vessel whose external
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pictorial qualities are secondary to its state of mind. Consider, for 
example, Eliot's traditional approach in handling two of the leading 
characters in Adam Bede, namely, Dinah Morris and Adam. The 
outward features of each are meticulously described by the narrator. 
We see Adam "in his tall stalwartness" with "jet-black hair" and 
"dark eyes that shone from under strongly marked, prominent and 
mobile eyebrows" (Ch. 1). Dinah's outward appearance is fastid­
iously limned:
It was a small oval face, of a uniform transparent whiteness with 
an egg-like line of cheek and chin, a full but firm mouth, a deli­
cate nostril, and a low perpendicular brow, surmounted by a 
rising arch of parting between smooth locks of pale reddish hair. 
The hair was drawn straight back behind the ears, and covered, 
except for an inch or two, above the brow, by a net Quaker cap.
The eyebrows, of the same colour as the hair, were perfectly 
horizontal and firmly pencilled; the eyelashes, though no darker, 
were long and abundant; nothing was left blurred or unfinished.
(Ch. 2)
By comparison, the conventional capsule portraits which 
usher in the leading figures in Eliot's early fiction give way in 
Middlemarch to a series of varying perspectives from which to view 
a character. Mr. Casaubon, for instance, is beheld through the 
eyes of his fellow Middlemarchers as much as by the omniscient 
gaze of the narrator. Through Dorothea, we first see a distinguished 
scholar who resembles Locke; and later a shallow pedant in the form 
of an unresponsive husband; through Celia, we see an ugly man with 
two white hairy moles on his face; from James's perspective, we see 
a dried bookworm, "no better than a mummy" (Ch. 6). To this 
spectrum of observations are added those of Will, the Cadwalladers, 
and Mr. Brooke. After having shaped Casaubon'through a kaleido­
scope of increasingly damaging impressions, especially Dorothea's,
t
-164-
Eliot comes to his rescue with an apologia on his behalf:
One morning, some weeks after her arrival at Lowick, Dorothea-- 
but why always Dorothea? Was her point of view the only possible 
one with regard to this marriage? I protest against all our 
interest, all our effort at understanding being given to the young 
skins that look blooming in spite of trouble; for these too will get 
faded, and will know the older and more eating griefs which we 
are helping to neglect. In spite of the blinking eyes and white 
moles objectionable to Celia, and the want of muscular curve which 
was morally painful to Sir James, Mr. Casaubon had an intense 
consciousness within him, and was spiritually a-hungered like 
the rest of us.
(Ch. 29)
A personality in Middlemarch emerges as a series of malle­
able impressions produced by people within the story rather than a 
chiseled appraisal by the objective authority of the author's voice. 
This mobile method of handling character accords well with the 
changeable metabolism of an era of transition. In her presentation of 
the irresolute Mr. Brooke, Eliot draws a conventional portrait of 
static traits which, paradoxically enough, are unalterable in their 
alterability. Mr. Brooke is a caricature embodying the vacillation, 
the irresolution, the unsteadiness of an unstable age, much as 
Fielding's Mr. Allworthy in Tom Jones incarnates the steadfastness, 
the constancy, and the unswerving loyalty to absolute principles 
congenial to a Newtonian world view, that is, a stable and well- 
regulated universal machine subject to the "laws of Nature and of 
Nature's God. " Both Brooke and Allworthy are uncles and guardians 
•of their respective wards, Dorothea and Tom, yet unlike All worthy, 
the nineteenth-century Brooke fails to provide the equipoise of his 
eighteenth-century counterpart. The pillar of moral certainty 
symbolized by Allworthy gives way to the vagrant habits of Mr. 
Brooke's vacillating mind.
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Besides incorporating the idea of development in syntax, in 
the gradual pace of the novel's unspectacular plot, and in the pliant 
presentation of character, Eliot infuses the dialogue with a habit of 
speech whose omnipresence in Middlemarch merits close attention. 
This habit is the ubiquitous modification of expressions of thought on 
the part of the characters in the novel by the phrase: "in my opin­
ion. " The preponderant use of personal "opinion" seems innocuous 
enough in view of its frequency in ordinary conversation. Neverthe­
less, Eliot’s exaggerated dependence on this word in Middlemarch 
is in marked contrast to her use of it in earlier novels. How does 
Eliot couch verbal exchanges in other works as compared to those in 
Middlemarch? Why does she alter her former literary manner in 
delivering the discourse of her characters in Middlemarch? Of what 
significance is the nature of opinion in conveying the notion of 
development in an unsettled era of transition?
In novels such as Adam Bede, Silas Marner, and Romola, 
peopled by personalities who are on the whole free from the anxie­
ties of religious doubt and the bewilderment of dissolving institutions, 
the phrase "in my opinion" rarely occurs. Expressions of feeling 
and belief are stated in definite unequivocal terms, unmollified by 
subjective restrictions limiting the assumed universality of a point 
of view. A mood of moral certainty, for example, permeates Adam 
Bede. The spirit of independent judgment is reinforced by appeals to 
conscience, to absolute standards of right and wrong, to an unques­
tioned general affirmation that the path of duty is clear. Adam's 
song ,in the opening chapter sets the tone:
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I Let all thy converse be sincere,
Thy conscience as the noonday clear;
Conscience is viewed as an1 unimpeachable seat of authority, whose 
guidance one can trust. "Let 'em follow their consciences, that's 
all"(Ch. 1), . . I"ll never be the man t'urge you against your
conscience" (Ch. 52), or "... I shall leave you to your own con­
science. . . " (Ch. 5) represent the typical ethical outlook in Adam 
Bede, an outlook secure in the knowledge that men universally agree 
on what constitutes the moral law within. If moral ambiguity should 
arise, it is quickly dispelled by reassurance founded on a portion of 
the Biblical text. "And when I've opened the Bible for direction, " 
Dinah states with confidence, "I've always lighted on some clear 
word to tell me where my work lay" (Ch. 3). The bulwark of ethical 
truth in Adam Bede feels no more threatened by dissident private 
opinions and idle talk "than the old church-steeple minds the rooks 
cawing about it" (Ch. 5).
The "church-steeple" retains its firm underpinning in Silas 
Marner and Romola. Opinions in these novels carry little weight 
and concern themselves with matters of taste^not matters of con­
science. Dolly Winthrop tells Silas Marner with conviction: "For 
if us as knows so little can see a bit o’ good and rights, we may be 
sure as there's a good and a rights bigger nor what we can know -- I 
feel it i' my own inside as it must be so" (Part Two, Ch. 16). In 
Romola, the air of certainty which pervades the atmosphere grows 
out of a strong sense of definiteness about the dividing line between 
true and false. The dialogue is freely strewn with unhesitating and 
categorical exclamations, such as "it is true that . . " "assured-• >
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> ly, " "to tell you the truth,
"Surely, I have. . . ," "You speak truth. . . , 
. . . ," "it is false,
" "it is a pack of lies, "
I cast no doubt on
I am certain" and ". . .the light I saw was the 
true light. " The world of Romola is filled with positive affirmations 
and negations with little room for the vagaries of doubt.
In Eliot’s Reform novels, Felix Holt, the Radical, The Mill 
on the Floss, and Middle march, the picture changes, as notes of 
incertitude and perplexity creep into the conversation of the characr 
ters. In The Mill on the Floss, this state of confusion is singled out 
by Mr. Tulliver, who felt ". . .hardly at home in this insane world, " 
where "everything winds about so -- the more straightforward you 
are, the more you're puzzled" (Book One, Ch. 3). Yet Mr. Tulliver 
is alone in voicing his disorientation at the unsettling shift of per­
spectives, which eluded traditional prescriptions and permitted a 
confusing liberality of thought and action. In Felix Holt, the Radical, 
the fluctuating barometer of public opinion begins to assert its 
collective power as the supreme arbiter of human conduct with the 
coming of democracy. Despite the raging controversy in the nine­
teenth century about the destructive capacities of mass voting power, 
a fragmentary hope exists in Felix Holt, the Radical that public 
opinion may be elevated by men's adherence to an absolute ethical 
standard:
it ifNo, in truth,
ff tt
ft if
I
"I'll tell you what's the greatest power under heaven, " said Felix, 
"and that is public opinion -- the ruling belief in society about 
what is right and what is wrong, what is honourable and what is 
shameful. That's the steam that is to work the engines. How can 
political freedom make us better, any more than a religion we 
don't believe in, if people laugh and wink when they see men abuse 
and defile it?
(Ch. XXX)
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I Public opinion in Felix Holt, the Radical is a by-product, the 
consequence of individual moral inclinations rather than their deter­
minant. In Middle march, however, the function of opinion assumes 
considerable proportions in its ambivalent double role, cast both as 
the despotic promulgator of "groupthink" and also the literal cham­
pion of independent judgment, no matter how free that judgment may 
be. As a public power, opinion exercises the oppressive restraints 
felt in Middlemarch in the guise of the inhibiting "pseudo-environ­
ment. " This aspect of the nature of opinion was discussed earlier in 
this essay in relation to the system of curbs on individual initiative 
found in the English provincial world one hundred and forty years ago. 
Opinion of this sort put a clamp on men’s minds by stringently 
imposing the dominant ethos over free-lance modes of thought. Mrs. 
Grundy, or what Eliot in The Mill on the Floss calls "the world's 
wife, " prospered in the interests of protective social solidarity.
The collective voice became the standard-bearer of public and 
private virtue: Vox populi, vox Dei. The tyranny of mass opinion 
organized daily through the medium of the press was a familiar 
nineteenth-centry ogre, whose ascendance was given a strong boost 
by extensions of the franchise. John Stuart Mill's On Liberty (1859) 
and Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America (1835-39) warn 
against the dangers to individual liberty imposed by the overweening 
arrogance of unlicensed majority rule. The power of public opinion 
and the Reform Bill were inextricably linked, as the following excerpt 
from the October 1833 issue of the scholarly periodical, British 
Critic, demonstrates:
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. . . one colossal figure rises up before us. Everything ex­
hibits to us the omnipotence of the People and the Press. A 
thousand indications declare to us that we are on the eve, nay, 
that we trace already the first throes in the birth of a great 
social Revolution, of which the Reform Bill has been the womb.
(Quoted from Olive J. Brose,
Church and Parliament, p. 36)
Despite the continuing acknowledgment of the formidable 
weight of public opinion in controlling the shape of historical events, 
another side of opinion has received relatively little attention. This 
lies in the emergence of opinion as a vehicle for the metamorphosis 
of thought. Just as money became a solvent of the social fabric, 
opinion became a solvent of pre-existing ways of thinking. In short, 
opinion is the flexible mechanism which makes possible the psycho­
logical transitions requisite in a state of continuing social change.
In an age of dissolving standards, the process of opinion allows for 
the facile interaction and compromise intolerable to people with 
habits of unassailable belief. When the old certainties began to 
crumble, the definiteness of speech evidenced in Adam Bede, Silas 
Marner, and Romola was replaced by the entry of hedging, concil­
iatory, and undogmatic expressions of language, congenial to a mood 
of skepticism, puzzlement, and doubt. Opinion is an adjustive form 
of communication, which admits and often encourages the presence 
of new and alternative points of view in order to reach a common 
ground, a secular consensus. "Beliefs are not opinions, " writes the 
social psychologist, Curtis Macdougall. "Beliefs are what we ’know' 
to be true; opinions are what we 'think' is true" (Understanding Public 
Opinion, p. 16). The difference between the two lies in the measure 
of certainty with which we utter a conviction.
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Kurt and Gladys Lang in Collective Dynamics enlarge upon
Macdougall's attempt to define the nature of opinion:
In setting standards that are accepted and enforced, public opinion 
takes its place alongside custom and law. The authority inhering 
in custom is legitimized by the past. . . . Custom as such 
provokes no discussion. . . . Law [which is a conscious and 
deliberative modification of certain practices] entails a much more 
rational orientation. . . .Public opinion differs from law and 
custom in that it operates primarily in those situations where 
acquiescence to standards cannot be taken for granted and where 
consent must therefore first be ascertained.
(p. 370)
Another social psychologist, Floyd H. Allport,adds that public 
opinion is "a process with a time dimension, in which the older con­
tent represents the present ever-shifting alignment" (Daniel Katz, ed. 
Public Opinion and Propaganda, p. 57). The study of the nature of 
opinion is a new interdisciplinary field involving history, psychology, 
language, and political science. While few inroads have been made 
in understanding the phenomenon, many analysts correlate its rise 
with the breakdown of fixed ethical norms and the disintegration of 
traditional patterns of political authority.
In Middlemarch, Eliot trusts the nimble-footed agency of 
opinion to convey what Allport calls "the ever-shifting alignment" 
of continuous social transformation. Opinion is the mobile rhetorical 
equivalent in the novel for expressing the solubility of fixed and 
abiding forms of belief, since the plasticity of opinion expedites the 
reluctant adaptation of society to new conditions. In a discussion 
with Lydgate, old Mrs. Farebrother makes a clear distinction be­
tween the seemingly ineradicable set of values which stabilized the 
thinking of her youth and the irresolution which characterizes the 
fluctuating standards of the 1830's. If you are permitted to change
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> your ideas once, she states, . . why not twenty times" (Ch. 17)? 
While permissiveness promoted the tolerance important to greater 
social cohesion, the wide diversity of opinions encouraged the 
relativism and subjectivism destructive to individual emotional 
security. Like Mrs. Farebrother, Mr. Tulliver saw the "puzzling 
world, " which introduced the Reform era in The Mill on the Floss, 
as the result of free wayward choice. Ironically, the positive ex­
pression of assurance contained in the words "you know, " which 
invariably fill the pauses of Mr. Brooke's prattling conversation, is 
a garnish which ill fits the miscellaneous bric-a-brac of his meander­
ing mind. Also, Sir James's habit of saying "Exactly! " when he is 
most confused adds a wry twist to the plethora of rhetorical forms 
in the novel, forms which lubricate the motors of uninterrupted 
social development. As Reform made men politically conscious of 
Great Britain as an integral national whole, the expansion of 
democracy also caused a sense of rootlessness evident in the lost 
bearings of the major characters in Middlemarch. While the group 
ego prospered in the growing importance of public opinion, the 
steadiness of the personal ego was shaken, as inviolate beliefs 
weakened in the widespread exercise of offering moral options and 
accepting alternative modes of thought.
The following chart of expressions is a small sampling of 
Eliot's persistent substitution of "in my opinion" for more affirma-
I believe, " "It is true thatft f«tive turns of speech, such as "I know,
. . ., " and others already mentioned, which contribute to the
clear and certain moral tone of Adam Bede, Silas Marner and Romo la:
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) . . Mr. Ladislaw has been here; and he has mentioned a 
proposal of my uncle's which I should like to know your 
opinion of."
*********
"What is your opinion?" she added, rather timidly, after a 
slight pause.
"Did Mr. Ladislaw come on purpose to ask my opinion?" 
said Mr. Casaubon.
"No, " she answered, immediately, "he did not say that he 
came to ask your opinion. "
(Ch. 37)
Mr. Brooke repeated his subdued , "Ah? -- I thought you had 
more of your own opinion than most girls. I thought you liked 
your own opinion -- liked it, you know. "
"I cannot imagine myself living without some opinions, but I 
should wish to have good reasons for them, and a wise man 
could help me to see which opinions had the best foundation, 
and would help me to live according to them. "
(Ch. 4)
"In my opinion, " said Lydgate, "legal training only makes a 
man more incompetent in questions that require knowledge of 
another kind." *********
"And in my opinion, your're safest with a lawyer. "
(Ch. 16)
His acquaintances thought him enviable to have so charming 
a wife, and nothing happened to shake their opinion. . . .
As the years went on he opposed her less and less, whence 
Rosamond concluded that he had learned the value of her 
opinion. . . .
(Finale)
"But that does not alter my opinion that you ought to try every 
other means. ..."
"And suppose I disregard your opinion as you disregard mine?
(Ch. 64)
"In my opinion, men in his condition are oftener killed by 
treatment than by the disease. "
(Ch. 69)
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. I was not going 
and judge for yourself
to tell him my opinion. Hear everything 
is my motto."
(Ch. 45)
"In my opinion it is better than the hams at Freshitt Hall --. . .
"You will not get any writer to beat him in a hurry --he will
not, in my opinion, be surpassed. "
*********
"A sensible girl though, in my opinion. ..."
(Ch. 32)
If that was not reason, Mrs. Dollop wished to know what was; 
but there was a prevalent feeling in her audience that her 
opinion was a bulwark. ...
*********
And let it not be supposed that opinion at the Tankard in 
Slaughter Lane was unimportant to the medical profession. . . . 
In the course of the year, however, there had been a change 
in the public sentiment, of which the unanimity at Dollop's 
was an index.
(Ch. 45)
And so on through endless examples of "opinion" employed in its 
Janus-faced public and private contexts. While the collective voice 
of public opinion assumed increasing sovereignty over the thought 
processes of men, the voice of private opinion displayed, paradox­
ically enough, vacillation, hesitancy, and doubt.
Despite fears of mass rule through conformity to mass 
inclinations and despite fears of individual instability, the role of 
opinion was welcomed in many quarters as being necessary to break 
through the thick crust of custom impeding the progress of new ideas. 
In the same year that Middlemarch was published, Walter Bagehot's 
Physics and Politics appeared. Bagehot, whose book applies Darwin­
ian notions of natural selection and inheritance to political society, 
saw the emergence of opinion as an antidote to the rigid dictatorship 
of men by the petrifaction of staid ideas. By promoting discussion,
t
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Bagehot believed, opinion advanced the principle of variability and 
freedom:
... a government by discussion, if it can be borne, at once 
breaks down the yoke of fixed custom. . . . the mere putting 
up of a subject to discussion, with the object of being guided 
by that discussion, is a clear admission that the subject is in 
no degree settled by established rule, and that men are free 
to choose in it. It is an admission too that there is no sacred 
authority -- no one transcendent and divinely appointed man 
whom. . . the community is bound to obey.
(p. 166)
Unlike Eliot's guarded optimism about the machinations of opinion, 
Bagehot cheers the dissolution of the old sanctions without question­
ing whether the new guidelines emerging from the free play of 
discussion may in their own way prove as oppressive as the discarded 
Eliot wondered whether the sanguine expectations of Bagehot's 
age of discussion were potent enough to offset the psychological 
afflictions of an age of disorientation. Notwithstanding these qualms, 
Eliot, like Bagehot, heartily endorses opinion in Middle march as the 
verbal counterpart of flexibility and variation in the evolutionary 
process. Opinion itself connotes movement, a fact recognized by 
Milton in his Areopagitica: "Where there is much desire to learn, 
there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many 
opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making " 
[italics mine]. Yet Milton's qualification, "opinions in good men, " 
saw through the limitations of intellectual discussion if unaccom­
panied by a sound moral bent. Pandemonium in Paradise Lost is a 
matchless exhibition of independent thought, and Lucifer is a 
brilliant debater in the exemplary forensics displayed by this 
emancipated parliament.
ones.
I
I
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I In addition to the support of rhetorical devices to transmit the 
social equivalent of Darwin's tangled bank, Eliot concludes her novel 
with a deliberate evasion of suggestions that the Finale of Middle- 
march is final. The future of the characters, much like the prospects 
of evolution, is undefined and incomplete. Mankind, as the last page 
of the novel declares, is still beset by conditions of an imperfect 
social state, and doubtless many new Dorotheas will appear to add to 
the dimly perceptible "growing good of the world. " The Finale is no 
conclusion but merely a lull in the continuing activity of the develop­
mental process. "Every limit, " Eliot says in the first line of the 
Finale, "is a beginning as well as an ending. "
Though popularized by the sciences of biology and geology, 
developmentalism is, nevertheless, a brand of nineteenth-century 
historicism. The theory of evolution, in other words, views history 
as having an inner logic, a rationale, a pattern of its own. History 
is not determined by a transcendent providence but provides its own 
mysterious direction. As Darwin applied evolutionary historicism 
to biology, Eliot applied a similar outlook to the transitional picture 
of Middlemarch society. In the novel, Eliot refers to the novelist 
of manners as an historian and likens the introduction of Dorothea 
into her history to the method of the older Herodotus, "who also, 
in telling what had been, thought it well to take a woman’s lot for his 
starting point; though Io, as a maiden apparently beguiled by 
attractive merchandise, was the reverse of Miss Brooke. . . " (Ch. 
11). While the historical viewpoint of Romola rests on the ordered 
hierarchical tree of life whose permanent roots sink deep into the
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I past, that of Middle march is guided by the indefinite contingencies of 
evolutionary design. The very diffusiveness of Middlemarch illus­
trates the sweeping ramifications and the resistance to definition 
characteristic of the developmental process, since . . the great 
Tangled Bank of Life, " as Stanley Edgar Hyman writes of Darwin's 
controlling metaphor, "is disordered, democratic and . . . essen­
tially a modern vision" (The Tangled Bank, p. 33).
Many modern critics of developmentalism deplore the gross 
inaccuracies which arise in applying organic metaphors to observa­
tions about history and society. For example, Robert A. Nisbet in 
his recent book, Social Change and History (1970), argues that an 
evolutionary approach assumes that change is a natural, necessary, 
immanent, and directional function of time, a process which grows 
in structural complexity like the increasing heterogeneity of evolu­
tionary forms of biological life. In the observation of empirical 
data, Nisbet goes on to say, change is not natural or constant, but
rather that fixity is. Change is not intrinsic to social behavior as 
growth is to a living organism. Supporting Nisbet's point of view, 
the historian, J. H. Hexter, proposes that students of change ban
'developed, " "evolved,"ft fsuch words as "tended, ft ngrew out of,
and the like from their writing. Yet all language arises out of a 
matrix of metaphor, and the substitution of one set of verbal images 
by another is just as likely to be objectionable on grounds of animism,
which is inimical to the objectivity sought by the scientific fraternity.
Nineteenth-century theorists of developmentalism were keenly 
aware of their reliance on a picture of history as a developing organ-
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ism. Yet that century's very preference for the paradigm of evolu­
tion is itself a key to the assumptions of the epoch, assumptions 
which are still part of the mental wardrobe of our own times. In 
The Origin of Species, Darwin defends the use of figures of speech
!
in scientific texts:
In the literal sense of the word, no doubt, natural selection is a 
false term; but who ever objected to chemists speaking of the 
elective affinities of the various elements? --and yet an acid 
cannot strictly be said to elect the base with which it in prefer­
ence combines. It has been said that I speak of natural selection 
as an active power or Deity: but who objects to an author 
speaking of the attraction of gravity as ruling the movements of 
the planets? Every one knows what is meant and is implied by 
such metaphorical expressions; and they are almost necessary 
for brevity. . . . With a little familiarity such superficial 
objections will be forgotten.
(Ch. IV)
Though figurative speech not only embellishes but also molds an idea, 
the choice of one image over another shapes the contours of our 
thought. As Eliot puts it in The Mill on the Floss, you can say that 
the study of the classics and geometry plows and harrows the mind 
for the reception of a subsequent crop. Yet if the brain is an 
intellectual stomach with a gastric weakness for such subjects, plows 
and harrows seem to settle nothing (Book Two, Ch. 1). Eliot's 
choice of evolutionary imagery in Middlemarch is the conscious 
selection of a literary artist who wishes to depict a panorama of 
movement and flux, just as her careful adoption of metaphors of 
permanence and stability in Romola was expressly intended to picture 
society as a tree of life, a tree whose fixed structure did not alter 
through the vicissitudes of the seasons. Why Eliot chose to portray 
two great and differing visions of history is a subject reserved for the 
next chapter of this essay.
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} Middlemarch perhaps appeals to modems more than any of 
Eliot's other works. During the last decade, this novel has staged 
a surprising comeback. While Leslie Stephen voiced the general 
feeling among Victorian critics that the book was a sad and melan­
choly piece of fiction, one early twentieth-century critic; Virginia 
Woolf, found Middlemarch to be one of the few worthwhile novels 
for grown-up people. Many Victorians were depressed by the 
novel's confirmation of chameleonic values in a protean world.
The Quarterly Review of 1873 (CXXXIV) wistfully singles out the 
regretted element of change in Middlemarch, a quality which ear­
marks the novel's content:
Possibly the life of England is changing, perhaps has already 
changed, far more than we realize. The growth of enormous 
cities, the ease of travelling. . . , the largeness and organi­
sation of commercial and industrial energy, the disappeai*ance 
of those local attachments and local peculiarities, which used 
to hold us so strongly because they had bound our fathers and 
grandfathers before us -- these imply, it may be, a more rapid 
transition from one state of national development to another 
than can be made clear to those in whose unconscious presence 
the process has accomplished itself. . . .
(Quoted from Barbara Hardy, ed. Middle- 
march: Critical Approaches to the Novel,
pp. 140-/1
The current appeal of Middlemarch seems to lie in its unhysterical 
tone, as it quietly and unsentimentally presents man in a Darwinian 
universe as a "poor, bare, forkt animal, " to use King Lear's 
words, an animal shorn of comforting illusions yet desperately 
attempting to stand his ground in the struggle for existence, 
the doctrine of evolution has been regarded by some as a fatalistic 
kind of pantheism, it, nonetheless, offers the despairing cynic a 
wisp of hope that the process may have a benign providence of its
While
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Despite the failures and the ludicrous aspirations of the human 
"animal" in this novel, man still emerges as a dignified even a 
tragic figure. After many decades of de-escalating human endow­
ments through the debasing agencies of a commandeering nihilism, 
Middlemarch's muted enthusiasm for the human race is balm for 
the sore modern spirit without alienating the integrity of the 
skeptical modern mind.
To view Middlemarch from the vantage point of The Origin 
of Species is to grasp the work as a whole. In a jocose comment 
made in the novel about drawing analogies and parallels, Eliot 
drops a clue about comparing two orders of beings, the biological 
and the social^ "since there never was a true story, " she says, 
"which could not be told in parables where you might put a monkey 
for a margrave, and vice versa" (Ch. 35). Darwin's Origin provides 
the monkey for the margrave in Middlemarch. If not a parable, 
the novel, nevertheless, is one of the finest exhibitions of the 
lumbering human comedy on the move.
own.
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CHAPTER THREE
)
HISTORY AS PROPHECY: DANIEL DERONDA
Placed side by side, the fictional blueprints of Romola and 
Middle march lay bare a marked dualism in George Eliot's histori­
cal posture. On the one hand, Eliot posits a Classical Greek 
picture of a stationary cosmos governed by predetermined immut­
able laws, a fixed and closed system which allows for trifling 
vicissitudes but for no essential changes in the eternal order of 
things. Such is the world view in Romola. On the other hand,
Eliot in Middlemarch presents history as an evolutionary panorama, 
which bans stasis from the universe and which admits of but one 
permanent principle: that of incessant change. This bifurcation of 
historical outlook is most conspicuous in her last novel, Daniel 
Deronda, written in 1876. Significantly this work contains not one 
but two self-contained artistic wholes, two stories which are linked 
by a tenuous and easily disposable plot filament, two narrative 
structures which if divorced could function independently without 
any appreciable loss in intelligibility. The first is the story of 
the rise and fall of Gwendolen Harleth; the second concerns the 
dawning Zionism in the life of Daniel Deronda. F. R. Leavis in 
The Great Tradition (II, iii) recommends a total excision of the 
Zionist portion and suggests renaming the novel: Gwendolen 
Harleth. Many critics share his view. Yet Eliot's remarkably 
prescient Zionist story, which antedated by a score of years the 
epoch-making manifesto of Jewish nationalism, Theodor Herzl's
Per Judenstaat (1895), remains the bedrock of the novel for
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sentinels of the special elan which created the modern state of 
Israel. For them, needless to say, the Gwendolen story remains 
a secondary and dispensable segment as compared with the apoca­
lyptic reality of the Zionist chapters. For them, needless to say, 
Henry James's declaration in Partial Portraits that all the Jewish 
part of Daniel Deronda ". . . is at bottom cold" sounds like 
parochial prattle. What remains most curious in the commonly 
acknowledged structural fissure at the core of the novel is that 
George Eliot was blind to the schism so obvious to others. She 
could not understand how the unity of the work could so effortlessly 
be reft in two. "I meant everything in the book to be related to 
everything else there, " she wrote in a letter to a friend (Haight, 
ed. The George Eliot Letters, Vol. VI, p. 290). In Eliot's mind 
both the Gwendolen Harleth and the Daniel Deronda plots did not 
represent a dichotomy of incompatible elements but instead con­
stituted a confluence of congenial perspectives, a Castor and 
Pollux ruled by the same Gemini sign, two variants of a single 
vision of history.
This chapter will reveal how the artistic disunity of 
Daniel Deronda rests on Eliot's unsuccessful attempt to bridge two 
contrasting appraisals of historical change, two ideational axes, 
each one in turn inhibiting with its own strong centripetal pull the 
structural fusion of the work. These two antithetical approaches 
to the human scene come into focus by juxtaposing the static world 
of Romola with the moving panorama of Middlemarch, both of 
which have been discussed in previous sections of this study. The 
Classical Greek framework evident, in Romola finds its complement
i
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in the Gwendolen Harleth story, while the progressive developmen- 
talism or historicism peculiar to Middle march finds its counterpart 
in the emerging Zionism of the Daniel Deronda part. The ensuing 
pages will deal with several questions which arise from the bifold 
character of Eliot's last novel. In what ways does the literary 
scaffolding of the novel contribute to this duality? Are these two 
historical standpoints mutually exclusive? If not, to what extent is 
Eliot's straddling of the two justifiable? Why does she encourage 
this synthesis of divergent historical systems, this twinning of 
apparent opposites; why does she find it necessary to press, to 
borrow Thomas Hardy’s phrase, "the convergence of the twain"?
Weighing these issues, however, calls for the firm fastening 
of what may at first appear to be an arbitrary assumption, namely, 
that the Gwendolen branch of the novel is indeed based like Romola 
upon a traditional Greek formula, and that the Zionist branch is 
indeed like Middlemarch a product of nineteenth-century historicism. 
Such an appraisal clamors for proof. Eliot’s ambivalent cast of 
thought, which was brought into bold relief by comparing two of 
her former novels, must now be disinterred in Daniel Deronda. 
Despite a radical change of scenery from the Florence of Savona­
rola's day and from the English Midlands of the pre-Victorian era, 
Eliot’s last novel, which depicts contemporary English manners, 
clearly mirrors the disjointed contours of her abidingly equivocal 
theoretical stance. Tracing those contours remains the present 
task.
i
Eliot’s fascination for what she calls "the unexpected forms 
in which the great Nemesis hides herself" flares up again in the
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Gwendolen Harleth plot of Daniel Peronda. After an exhaustive 
portrayal of the circumscribed system of moral checks and balances 
in Romo la, Eliot's interest in the theme of retribution lay in abey- ' 
ance in favor of the overriding developmental survival ethics of 
Middlemarch. Though nemesis stalks the Middlemarch banker, 
Bulstrode, the poetic justice of his fate hardly dents the prevailingly 
neutral moral tone in the Darwinian groundwork of that novel. Yet 
in the Gwendolen Harleth story, the Furies again come to the fore 
and mercilessly avenge themselves on overweening mortals who 
overstep the mark. The idea of retributive justice rests on the 
notion of a limited and changeless universe in which the physical 
order and the moral order are interlocked, a world in which nature 
and human nature are indissolubly bound. Even a minute breach of 
personal propriety jeopardizes the delicate adjustment of the cosmic 
balance and must in the interest of collective stability be severely 
redressed. Individual claims of extenuating circumstances, however 
justifiable from a microcosmic point of view, become contemptible 
trifles in the total picture and are pitilessly ignored. Because of 
the acute vulnerability of the universal equipoise to aberrations within 
the moral fabric of society, the transgressor must not only pay 
but must pay with interest. Because of the magnitude of the risks 
incurred, the debtor must overcompensate to even out the score. 
Punishment in kind, of like for like, of an eye for an eye, of 
measure for measure -- these are but a sorry compromise in the 
canons of nemesis. True retribution exacts more than mere 
retaliation. Not only must the individual suffer, but he must 
suffer beyond reasonable due without hope of grace, forgiveness,
I
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absolution, amnesty, or reprieve. Redemption plays but little 
or no role in this stern scheme of things, unless it takes the 
bitter form of a humiliating lesson learned well. The individual 
has recourse to no exit but to accept his fate and endure. Such is 
the stuff of tragedy; such is the world of Gwendolen Harleth.
In Romola, Eliot projected an immutable and timeless world 
by using a store of literary devices which accentuated the concept 
of eternal recurrence. The underlying stability and permanence 
of changeless forms were suggested by the yearly return of 
fairs and religious festivals, the weekly rhythms of market day, 
the rhetoric of repetition and "sameness, " and the visualization 
of Florence as an unviolated symbol of stasis amidst the flux. Eliot 
also dotted the narrative with a proliferation of plant images 
including the tree of society in order to implement the picture of 
rootedness and fixity, a picture in which even a momentous histori­
cal change was considered to be of no greater significance in the life 
of that tree than the seasonal fall of a leaf. The vocabulary of the 
marketplace, of exchange and barter, of buying and selling, of 
redeeming and defaulting, also served to transmit the idea of give- 
and-take intrinsic to the operation of retributive justice, since the 
balance of payments constituted the prime objective both within the 
economic and the moral spheres. These compositional elements 
in Romola have been discussed in Chapter One. What literary 
strategy does Eliot employ to convey the similarly limited, 
measured, and fixed universe of Romola in the story of Gwendolen 
Harleth?
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In Gwendolen Harleth's world, the ideal of equilibrium 
inherent in a fixed and measured cosmos meshed together morally 
and physically is embodied in an arresting figure which governs 
the logic of the plot from the very outset: the figure of the roulette 
wheel. The opening chapter recreates a continental gambling 
casino presided over not by the smiling countenance but by the 
dour face of the Goddess of Luck. The roulette wheel symbolizes 
the great wheel of fortune, the rudder of that divinity controlling 
the destinies of men. Steeped in ancient Greek and Roman lore, 
the figure of Fortune or Tyche continued to be as prepossessing a 
subject for the Medieval and Renaissance imaginations as it was for 
the pagan mind. The seemingly capricious whims of "giddy Fortune’s 
furious fickle wheel " (Shakespeare, Henry V IIL vi* 28), were 
often visualized as part of the necessary pre-established pattern of 
iron laws which direct the mysterious way of things. In the 
Antigone, for example, the ups and downs of Tyche are within the 
framework of predetermined workings of the world order:
Fortune raises and Fortune humbles the lucky or unlucky 
from day to day, and no one can prophesy to men concern­
ing those things which are established.
(Sophocles, Antigone, 1158-60)
The conception of the wheel is grounded in an outlook which sees 
the universe as a sensitive system of equalization, a system cease­
lessly guarding against excesses and infractions which threaten 
to overcome the just proportions of cosmic stability. Such an 
outlook favors the mutual adjustments of ups and downs, the com­
promises between gains and lqsses, the art of the golden mean.
If the fates help an individual reach the apex of success, it is only
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fair that he suffer a severe reversal so as to strike an even 
balance. This suggests the bigger they are, the harder they fall; 
the more they gain, the more they stand to lose; the greater their 
joy today, the greater their sorrow tomorrow:
I
Time goes by turns, and chances change by course 
From foul to fair, from better hap to worse.
(Robert Southwell, "Time Goes by 
Turns")
For Gwendolen Harleth, the day at the gambling casino 
marks the denouement of her tragic drama, the beginning of her 
downfall. Throughout her past life, as subsequent flashbacks show, 
she had believed herself to be the undisputed mistress of her fate, 
a point of view shared by her abundant admirers who sought only 
divine comparisons to describe her charmed potency. To them she 
was a gifted and beautiful Diana, a captivating Nereid, and an 
enchanting Calypso. Over-esteemed by others, it is no wonder 
Gwendolen was possessed with herself:
. . . the first thought of those about her had been, what will 
Gwendolen think?--if the footman trod heavily in creaking 
boots or if the laundress's work was unsatisfactory, the 
maid said, "This will never do for Miss Harleth;" if the 
wood smoked in the bedroom fireplace, Mrs. Davilow 
[Gwendolen's mother], whose own weak eyes suffered much 
from this inconvenience, spoke apologetically of it to 
Gwendolen. . . . Always she was the princess in exile, 
who in time of famine was to have her breakfast-roll 
made of the finest-bolted flour . . . and was to have her 
silver fork kept out of the baggage.
(Book I, Ch. IV)
Up until the fatal turning point, all her activity had been centered in
herself, in self-glorification, self-satisfaction, self-assertion.
Her hubris stemmed from not only an unmitigated vanity but also a
promethean compulsion to have things her own way. The opening
chapter of the novel signals Gwendolen's day of reckoning, the day
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when she becomes a heavy loser not only at roulette but also in her 
earthly lot. That Eliot fully intended the parallel is revealed in the 
ominous words at the gaming table: "'Faites votre jeu, mesdames 
et messieurs.' said the automatic voice of destiny from between the 
mustache and imperial of the croupier; and Gwendolen’s arm was 
stretched to deposit her last poor heap of napoleons. 'Le jeu ne va 
plus,' said destiny" (Book I, Ch. I). Not only the croupier but also 
the presence of Daniel Deronda, who appears in the opening chapter 
as an intent spectator, intensifies the general air of fatality sur­
rounding Gwendolen. She winces under his "dreadful" and "mea­
suring gaze, " which she believes acts like "an evil eye. " Like the 
voice of the croupier, Deronda’s provocative stare functions as a 
superhuman judicatory agency of fate: "The darting sense that he 
was examining her as a specimen of a lower order, roused a 
tingling resentment which stretched the moment with conflict"
(Book I, Ch. I). Deronda is an outsider to the gambling milieu.
His entrance into Gwendolen's life is tangential to her personal 
story, yet his appearance serves to augment the ill-boding foretaste 
of doom regarding Gwendolen's future. His disapproval of her 
gambling is a prevision of her descent, a descent during which he 
plays no essential role excepting that of confidant or father- 
confessor for a lost soul. Like the spinning roulette wheel, his 
name, De-ronda, meaning "round" suggests the reversal of 
Gwendolen's luck and adds to the image of circuity supported by 
the endless clinking and rattling of coins—five-franc and ten-franc 
pieces, louis, napoleons, and coppers—which shower the gaming 
tables at the foot of the giant revolving disk.
-188-
Since the Gwendolen Harleth plot begins in medias res at the 
apex of her career, the turning point in the upward swing of her 
good fortune, the narrative present is consumed with events of her 
denouement, the falling action in her tragedy. The successful part 
of her life is relegated to a series of flashbacks, which are inserted 
like enormous parenthetical remarks in the description of her down­
fall. The psychological effect of this literary strategy is to drama­
tize the immediacy of the retributive process. The omens, auguries, 
portents of her decline suggested by die striking opening scene of 
the gambling casino present us widi a controlled focus of her inev­
itable future. Gwendolen's gambling loss in the casino parallels die 
gamble that marrying Grandcourt represents in her life.
That life is a game with established rules is a motif which is 
re-echoed on numerous occasions throughout the novel. Three chap­
ters are devoted to Gwendolen's prowess in an archery contest, a 
traditional ritual with the local aristocracy. At this particular stage 
in her life, she is still a "winner" and reaps a coveted gold star for 
her dexterity. In die bucolic setting of Brackenshaw Park, where 
the archery meeting, the archery picnic, and the archery ball are 
held, Gwendolen still lives in a pagan "Eden" in a pagan state of 
grace. She is a "Calypso among her nymphs" (Book I, Ch. X), a 
"wood-nymph among the beeches" (Book II, Ch. XIV). Also 
reminiscent of a Classical Greek scene is the Archery Hall . . 
with an arcade in front . . . like a white temple against the greenery
Supreme in her self-assui'ance and 
the belief in her lucky "golden" star, Gwendolen, nevertheless, has •
. . " (Book I, Ch. X).
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not yet violated the sanctities. For example, she discreetly refrains
from pushing her luck too far by avoiding the competition for the
golden arrow, the supreme token of sagitary excellence. It is also
at the archery match that Gwendolen solemnly promises to honor
Mrs. Glasher's plea to terminate further relations with Grandcourt.
At this juncture in her life, her moral actions like her bow and
arrows hit the target and thus are immune to the dire effects of
vindictive supernatural agencies dispensing notorious "slings and
arrows of outrageous fortune. "
Besides roulette and archery, other instances of the game
image occur. Eliot, for instance, makes a reference to:
. . . Retzsch's drawing of destiny in the shape of Mephistopheles 
playing at chess with man for his soul, a game in which we may 
imagine the clever adversary making a feint of unintended 
moves so as to set the beguiled mortal on carrying his defen­
sive pieces away from the true point of attack.
(Book V, Ch. XXXVII)
The player's argot frequently punctintes the dialogue as well as 
Eliot's commentary in the novel. Grandcourt, for example, 
traveled ". . . after the manner of a creeping billiard ball ..." 
(Book II, Ch. XV); he ". . . knew how to play his cards ..."
(Book IV, Ch. XXX); Lush, Grandcourt's toady, . . would as 
soon bet on it as on any other likelihood" (Book IV, Ch. XXX);
"Ten to one he will not close for some time .... I would bet on 
your ultimate success" (Book IV, Ch. XXVIII); "I will take odds 
that the marriage will never happen" (Book II, Ch. XIII); "Here 
certainly was a 'mate' in answer to Lush's 'check"' (Book III,
Ch. XXV); 'That's a trump! " (Book IV, Ch. XXVIII). These state­
ments support the total conception of a patterned world with fixed
>
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rules, a world which "pays" a player according to the adroitness 
with which he manipulates within proscribed limits the intangibles 
of the game.
Eliot betrays a puritanical aversion to games of chance and 
would place worshipers of luck in one of the nether circles of her 
idea of Inferno. For her, the lure of gambling marked a signal 
phase in human dissolution and decline. In Middlemarch, for 
example, the billiard room of the Green Dragon heralds the disin­
tegration of Lydgate's moral integrity and the loss of his self- 
possessed strength. Placing his bets, Lydgate had "that excited 
narrow consciousness which reminds one of an animal with fierce 
eyes and retractile claws" (Ch. 66). After losing money, he pro­
phetically announces the beginning of his end: "The game is up"
(Ch. 66). For Eliot, the temper of mind displayed at the gaming 
table is closely associated with the steps leading into all forms of 
temptation. Gambling is the "devil's bait" (Ch. 66), a passion 
which lures the individual into a dizzying vortex of increased risks, 
false hopes, and irresponsible commitments. In a similar vein, 
the opening scene in Daniel Deronda is a tableau of decadent cosmo­
politan Europeans for whom les jeux son faits. As in Middlemarch, 
Eliot ladens this episode with reptilian imagery along with added 
surrealistic brushstrokes of loathsome, lifeless, and stagnant 
varieties of humanity. Gwendolen's striking mien is described by 
fascinated onlookers as the "ensemble du serpent. " She is "cold 
and neutral, " has "long narrow eyes, " is dressed . . all green 
and silver, and winds her neck about a little more than usual . . 
in sum, . . it is a sort of Lamia beauty she has" (Book I, Ch. I).
I
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Her serpentine aspect is a prophetic announcement of her imminent 
downfall and strongly suggests a parallel with the metamorphosis 
of Milton's Lucifer:
... a greater power
Now ruled him, punished in the shape he sinned, 
According to his doom . . .
. . . for now were all transformed 
Alike, to serpents all, as accessories 
To his bold riot . . .
(Paradise Lost, Book X, 515-517, 
519-521)
The gamblers surrounding Gwendolen are fit "accessories" to her 
ophidian trappings. The company of the doomed includes such
repulsive, artificial, and spiritually palsied people, as the
following wisps from the opening pages show:
... a bony, yellow, crab-like hand stretching a bared wrist 
to clutch a heap of coin--a hand easy to sort with the square, 
gaunt face, deep-set eyes, grizzled eyebrows, and ill- 
combed scanty hair which seemed a slight metamorphosis 
of the vulture.
. . . that dry-lipped feminine figure prematurely old, 
withered after short bloom like her artificial flowers, 
holding a shabby reticule ....
... an occasional monotone in French, such as might be 
expected to issue from an ingeniously constructed automaton.
... an emaciated beau or worn-out libertine ....
... an old bewigged woman with eyeglasses pinching her 
nose.
. . . the statuesque Italian remained impassive ....
... his eyes fell on this scene of dull, gas-poisoned 
absorption ....
. . . the blank gaze of a bedizened child ....
". . . that old Adonis in the George the Fourth wig?"
". . . because lam bored to death. "
"He looked bored."
I
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But while every single player differed markedly from every 
other, there was a certain uniform negativeness of expression 
which had the effect of a mask--as if they had all eaten of 
some root that for the time compelled the brains of each to 
the same narrow monotony of action.
Such a supporting cast surrounding Gwendolen leaves little doubt
as to the downward course of Fortune's rudder. To sum up, the
roulette wheel in the Gwendolen Harleth story functions much as 
does the tree of society in Roinola, that is, to transmit the picture
of an undeviating world order faithful to the conception of finite 
limits in cosmic potential, faithful to the idea of fixed moral sanc­
tions, and dedicated to the perpetual convolutions of eternal return.
The steadying of weights and counterweights in the universal 
equipoise is expressed in Romola in the marketplace vocabulary of 
barter: the economic balance of payments. Eliot uses the gambling 
rhetoric of gain and loss to communicate the mutual adjustment of 
successes and failures, of rewards and punishments in the non­
progressive historical design of the Gwendolen Harleth plot. Like 
the language of the marketplace in Romola, the language of the 
gambling casino in Daniel Deronda provides the idiom which makes 
viable the concept of nemesis central to both stories. In Daniel 
Deronda, the narrative is peppered with such statements as these:
"I think it would be better for men not to gamble. It is a 
besotting kind of taste, likely to turn into a disease. And, 
besides, there is something revolting to me in raking a heap 
of money together, and internally chuckling over it, when 
others are feeling the loss of it . . . There are enough 
inevitable turns of fortune which force us to see that our 
gain is another's loss ....
(Book IV, Ch. XXIX)
. . . she felt herself standing at the game of life with many 
eyes upon her, daring everything to win much--or if to lose, 
still with gclat and a sense of importance.
------  (Book IV, Ch. XXIX)
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"It is because of the gain, that I feel the loss. "
(Book II, Ch. XIV)
"It seemed a gain to balance our loss. "
(Book III, XXIV)
"Confess you hate them when they stand in your way--when 
their gain is your loss. "
(Book V, Ch. XXXV)
"I have thrust out others--I have made my gain out of their 
loss . . . ."
(Book V, Ch. XXXVI)
"I would rather run my chance there and lose, than be sure 
of winning anywhere else. "
(Book V, Ch. XXXVII)
"I wanted to make my gain out of another's loss-- you remem­
ber?--it was like roulette .... It was as if I had prayed 
that another should lose and I should win. "
(Book VII, Ch. LVI)
It was all a part of that new gambling in which the losing was 
not simply a minus, but a terrible plus that had never entered 
into her reckoning.
(Book VI, Ch. XLVII)
Sentiments such as these couched in a verbal matrix of losses and 
gains are freely strewn throughout the novel and serve to underpin 
the idea of retribution, which presupposes a world view of fixed 
and compensating balances rather than an infinite vista progres­
sively stockpiled with the goods of life.
The Gwendolen Harleth story resembles Romola not only in 
the implications of controlling metaphors such as the tree of life, 
the roulette wheel, and the specialized idiom of debits and credits 
woven into the texture of both novels, but also in the belief that 
"character is destiny. " The individual "by reiterated choice of 
good or evil, " to use a phrase from Romola, shapes his future by 
attempting to tailor circumstances through the resolute imposition 
of his powerful will. Both Tito of Romola and Gwendolen possess a
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superabundant cocksureness coupled with an intrepid daring as 
plucky as it is wild. At the expense of others, both seek to do 
exactly as they like with the least distress to themselves. 
"Gwendolen's nature was not remorseless, but she liked to make 
her penances easy ..." (Book I, Ch. Ill), and Tito's mind ". . . 
was destitute of that dread . . . that awe of the Divine Nemesis 
.... the initial recognition of a moral law restraining desire 
[which] checks the hard bold scrutiny of imperfect thought into 
obligations which can never be proved to ha\e any sanctity in the 
absence of feeling" (Romola, Book One, Ch. XI). Like Tito, 
Gwendolen prior to her fatal step was enveloped by a consuming 
conviction that she controlled the reins in her life, just as she con­
trolled the reins of the horses she was so passionately fond of 
riding. Characteristic of her conversation are defiant outbursts, 
such as "I am determined to be happy ..." (Book I, Ch. Ill);
"But I don’t resign myself ..." (Book III, Ch. XXI); ". . . every­
thing is to be as I like" (Book III, Ch. XXVII); "I will not submit to 
it" (Book III, Ch. XXI). She would ". . . conquer circumstance by 
her exceptional cleverness" (Book I, Ch. IV) and would crush 
sorrow, ". . . defy it, or run away from it . . . " (Book I, Ch. II). 
Both Tito and Gwendolen believe they can commandeer their fate 
without suffering ill consequences. Theirs is a presumption which 
constitutes that peculiar brand of pride called hubris, that excess 
of ego which prevents the cautious holding back and curbs the inner 
summons to
Be wise;
Soar not too high to fall; but stoop to rise.
(Philip Massinger. Duke of Milan)
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The typical tragic hero is something of a gambler, head­
strong and rash, ready to take reckless chances in the confident 
belief that he can best the worst crisis. He believes in himself,
in the reality of freedom of choice, and in the consequent assump­
tion of total responsibility for his acts. Eliot emphasizes the 
importance of free will and accountability in the Gwendolen 
Harleth story by naming three of the novel's eight chapters as
Gwendolen Gets her Choice, " andfollows: "Maidens Choosing,
"Fruit and Seed, " the last being reminiscent of a chapter heading 
in Romola called "Fruit is Seed. " While Gwendolen's environment 
permits the unbridled exercise of her willfulness, environment 
nevertheless performs a secondary function in steering her 
decisions. Eliot stresses this priority in the epigraph to Book III, 
Ch. XXVII: "Desire has trimmed the sails, and Circumstance/ 
Brings but the breeze to fill them. " Gwendolen's passion to master 
is predominantly a native rather than an acquired trait. Her down­
fall is spurred by the domineering bent of her character, but her 
grandeur as a heroine derives from her acute perceptivity. Unlike 
other great women in nineteenth-century fiction such as Madame 
Bovary, for example, or Tess of the D'Urbervilles, or Diana of 
the Crossways, or even the petulant spoiled Rosamond Vincy of 
Middlemarch, Gwendolen has a scrupulous conscience and 
shoulders the consequences of her actions without blaming others. 
After her comedown, she displays what Thomas Hardy calls a 
capacity "to take a full look at the worst" and accepts that condition 
with patient acquiescence. She understands that she must suffer, 
that her wheel has come full circle, never to ascend again, that she
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must pay her tribute to the avenging Furies, that she must even 
out the score. Like the portrait of Tito, Eliot's handling of 
Gwendolen follows a fixed pattern involving the initial inner flaw of 
character (hamartia), the exercise of overconfidence (hubris), and 
the inevitable retribution (nemesis), from which there is no escape. 
As in Romola, character in the Gwendolen I-Iarleth plot edges out 
circumstance in the direction of one's personal lot. The reverse is 
true in Middlemarch. The concept of a pliant human nature molded 
entirely by outside stresses, a human nature which is handicapped 
or sustained by the "spirit of the times" is alien to the portrayal 
of Gwendolen. Eliot's comment about Dorothea on the last page of 
Middlemarch, that ". . . there is no creature whose inward being 
is so strong that it is not greatly determined by what lies outside 
it, " tilts the scales in favor of environmental determinism. In the 
case of Gwendolen, Eliot reverts to the classical formula, which 
makes due allowance for the puissance of individual will.
The precipitating cause of Gwendolen's moral tailspin is 
her rebellion against the stark presence of poverty. Shortly after 
leaving the gambling casino, she learns from a letter that her 
family has lost the comfortable income,which permitted a life of 
leisured ease. To avoid having to sink in the social scale and to 
submit to the indignities of an impoverished life, Gwendolen enters 
into a loveless marriage with a wealthy aristocrat, Henleigh 
Mallinger Grandcourt. She marries him with the guilty knowledge 
that she is impairing the legitimization of Grandcourt's four heirs, 
fruit of a long liaison with a Mrs. Lydia Glasher. Gwendolen's 
initial disgust with her husband's reprehensible past turns into
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a virulent loathing for him, when the extravagant illusion that she 
could master him is shattered. Eliot charts the repugnance of 
Grandcourt's character with the familiar imagery of the first 
chapter, imagery conveying stagnation, frigidity, and disgust. He 
is "flaccid, " "languid, " "bored, " "a handsome lizard" (Book II,
Ch. XIII) with an expression "as neutral as an alligator" (Book II,
Ch. XV). Behind his passive exterior, however, lies a tyrannical, 
even a sadistic will: ". . . like that of a crab or a boa constrictor 
which goes on pinching or crushing without alarm at thunder"
(Book V, Ch. XXXV). His delight in making horses and dogs quail 
extends to the subjection of his proud wife: "He meant to be master 
of a woman who would have liked to master him ..." (Book IV,
Ch. XXVIII). Too weak for Grandcourt's ruthlessness, Gwendolen 
becomes submissive, her spirit broken; ". . . she answered to the 
rein" (Book V, Ch. XXXV). Her repressed fury finds no outlet 
until Grandcourt drowns in a boating accident in the Mediterranean 
off Genoa, a misfortune which perhaps could have been avoided had 
Gwendolen thrown him a rope in time. Legally innocent, Gwendolen, 
nevertheless, suffers remorse as a murderess and accepts her 
self-inflicted humiliation without hope for a revitalization of her 
life. "It can never be altered. That was what happened. That 
was what I did . . . It can never be altered, " she exclaims (Book 
VII, Ch. LVI). Her capacity to feel the stings of guilt, her refusal 
to excuse herself, and the stoic acceptance of her lot make her fit 
material for a tragic heroine. Eliot's detailed rendering of 
Gwendolen’s intricate psychological make-up,from the incipient 
impetuosity, the immoral choice, and the jarring confrontation
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with the harsh aftermath of that choice, to the gnawing guilt, the 
intense repression, the defensive backlash, and the final acceptance
of a blunted life, make the portrait of Gwendolen Harleth one of 
Eliot's finest. The connotations of Gwendolen's cognomen, Harleth, 
point to a looseness of the harlot, though not to sexual license, how­
ever, but to the license of a creature "not subject to control, " such 
as the harlot Goddess of Fame. Within the scheme of the Classical 
Greek outlook of a restrictive and regulated universe, any such 
"looseness" is inevitably suppressed; nevertheless that insurgent 
human spirit, that protest against all forms of thralldom is man's 
titanic spark. Gwendolen's assertion of independence, no matter 
how petty, illusory, and risky is still a treasured token of man's, 
or in this case, woman’s fierce defense of the right to be free.
One of the prevalent narrative techniques used by Eliot to 
underline Gwendolen's moral accountability is to highlight the 
inner stresses and strains, the internal debates, the weighing of 
advantages and drawbacks prior to making a commitment. To act 
freely, a character must be surrounded by options, by reasonable 
and readily available alternatives from which he makes an uncoerced 
autonomous choice. Gwendolen’s warring pressures derive from 
her good and evil impulses rather than from a resistance towards 
victimization by the environment in the shape of a loss of fortune, 
for example, or the servitude of a woman's lot. Eliot makes it 
clear that Gwendolen's earlier noble resolve not to marry the im­
moral Grandcourt took . . the alternate dip of counterbalancing 
thoughts begotten of counterbalancing desires. . ." (Book III, Ch. 
XXVII). Despite her reservations, she wants to wed Grandcourt;
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she is not pushed into marriage, but does so with the air of
. . 'God's will be done' of one who is eagerly watching chances" 
(Book III, Ch. XXVII).
In order to convey the reality of Gwendolen's freedom of 
choice, Eliot saturates the narrative with a common syntactical de­
vice: the question mark. The profusion of interrogative sentences 
functions in several ways; first, to portray the inward wrangling of 
Gwendolen's better and worse self before committing herself to a 
definite decision; second, to emphasize the burden of responsibility 
inherent in her determinations; third, to create an air of free partic­
ipation in which the reader is invited to exercise his own judgment in 
assessing the implications of a given situation. This last function, 
for example, strikes one at the very outset of the novel. Not one or 
two but five bald interrogative sentences startle us with their brisk 
summons to respond:
Was she beautiful or not beautiful? and what was the secret of 
form or expression which gave the dynamic quality to her 
glance? Was the good or the evil genius dominant in those 
beams? Probably the evil; else why was the effect that of 
unrest rather than of undisturbed charm? Why was the wish 
to look again felt as coercion and not as a longing in which 
the whole being consents?
(Book I, Ch. I)
The first function of the multitude of questions interspersed 
throughout Daniel Deronda lies in picturing the contest of inner 
voices battling within Gwendolen for supremacy. Such self­
questioning presupposes a spectrum ranging from noble to base aims 
originating deep within the wellsprings of human nature, not in the 
world outside. Such self-questioning presupposes a conscience
struggling to preside over strong wayward passions, a conscience
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earnestly trying to cope with the lacerations of self-recrimination 
and self-exculpation. Before each critical decision, Gwendolen's 
social conversation as well as her private thoughts are riddled with 
endless pros and cons which unveil her guilt, her fears, and her 
repressions. Examples such as the following, chosen at random, 
load the text: "How could she believe in sorrow;" (Book I, Ch. II)? 
"What could she do;" (Book I, Ch. II)? "How much more might such 
trifles tell . . . (Book III, Ch. XXI)? "What was the good of living 
in the midst of hardships, ugliness, and humiliation;" (Book III,
Ch. XXI)? "When was she to have any happiness, if it did not come 
while she was young;" (Book III, Ch. XXVI)? "Yet--was it triumph 
she felt most or terror;" (Book III, Ch. XXVI)? "Was she to decline 
Grandcourt's visit--close the shutters--not even look out on what 
would happen?--though with the assurance that she should remain 
just where she was;" (Book III, Ch. XXVI)? "Where was the good 
of choice coming again? What did she wish? Anything different" 
(Book III, Ch. XXVI)? Gwendolen's soliloquizing has a piquant air of 
self-possession and transmits the powerful impression that though 
circumstances may balk at her ambitions, her will nevertheless 
is free. Eliot's use of a throng of questions to mirror the intensity 
of moral struggle antecedent to a decisive commitment is pointedly 
illustrated by Dostoyevsky's classic study of guilt in Crime and 
Punishment (1866):
He suddenly paused in his reflections and stood still.
'It shall not be? But what are you going to do to prevent it?
You'll forbid it? And what right have you? What can you 
promise them on your side to give you such a right? Your 
whole life, your whole future, you will devote to them. . . ?
Yes, we have heard all that before, and that's all words, but 
now? Now something must be done, now, do you understand
>
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that? And what are you doing now? . . . who would arrange 
their lives for them? In another ten years? . . . and my 
sister? Imagine for a moment what may have become of your 
sister in ten years? What may happen to her during those 
ten years? Can you fancy?
(Part I, Ch. IV)
The second function of the interrogative statement in the 
Gwendolen Harleth plot acts as a challenge, a goad which wrests a 
definitive reply. In this manner, Eliot’s method subtly focuses on 
the root of human responsibility. Responding to the countless ques­
tions posed by others, Gwendolen is constantly viewed in the 
causative role of making independent decisions which in turn lead 
to tangible consequences. Her resolutions affirm her liability; in 
her answers she becomes answerable. Innumerable examples of 
this kind of interrogative technique are interlaced within the 
narrative in so natural and unobtrusive a way as almost to escape 
attention. To capture the flavor of this compositional element, 
quotations must be lengthy, so that only two will be included here. 
The first bears upon Gwendolen's decision to renew Grandcourt's 
courtship despite her initial determination to sever relations with 
him, and the second concerns Gwendolen's decision to marry 
Grandcourt despite her vow to Mrs. Glasher:
i
Gwendolen felt a contradictory desire to be hastened: hurry 
would save her from deliberate choice. . . .
"But if you don't feel able to decide?" said Mrs. Davilow, 
sympathisingly.
"I must decide, " said Gwendolen, walking to the writing 
table and seating herself. . . . Why-should she not let him 
come? It bound her to nothing. He had been to Leubronn 
after her: of course he meant a direct unmistakable renewal 
of the suit which before had been only implied. What then? 
She could reject him. Why was she to deny herself the 
freedom of doing this--which she would like to do?
(Book III, Ch. XXVI)
• **’
. J
«•/
./ . •'/. /J -*
\ J "
-202-
"Perhaps there is some deeper interest? Some attraction-- 
some engagement--which it would have been only fair to 
make me aware of? Is there any man who stands between 
us?"
Inwardly the answer framed itself, "No; but there is a woman. " 
Yet how could she utter this? ... A fish honestly invited to 
come and be eaten has a clear course in declining, but how 
if it finds itself swimming against a net? And apart from the 
network, would she have dared at once to say anything 
decisive? ...
"Am I to understand that some one else is preferred?"
. . . She raised her eyes again and said with something of 
her former clearness and defiance, "No"--wishing him to 
understand, "What then?". ...
Almost to her own astonishment, Gwendolen felt a sudden 
alarm at the image of Grandcourt finally riding away. What 
would be left her then?
* * *
"Do you command me to go?" No familiar spirit could have 
suggested to him more effective words.
"No, " said Gwendolen. She could not let him go: that negative 
was a clutch. She seemed to herself to be, after all, only 
drifting towards the tremendous decision:--but drifting 
depends on something besides the currents, when the sails 
have been set beforehand.
"You accept my devotion?" said Grandcourt. . . . how could 
she contradict herself? What had she detained him for?
He had shut out any explanation.
"Yes" came as gravely from Gwendolen's lips as if she had 
been answering to her name in a court of justice.
(Book III, Ch. XXVII)
Implicit in Eliot's technique of incessant questioning in the Gwendolen 
Harleth plot is the solid entrenchment of individual responsibility 
for one’s deeds. The fatalistic determinism which hovers over the 
Classical world picture, be it Gwendolen's, Tito's, or Antigone's, 
is mitigated by a fine sliver of human freedom, a sliver which 
raises a mortal from a comic or pathetic personage to the ennobling 
stature of a tragic figure. Whether Fortune’s roulette wheel 
pitilessly spins its inevitable revolutions according to whimsical 
chance or inexorable law, that "chance" or that "law" by some 
mysterious agency is affected by even an insignificant puff of air,
i
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such as the puff which uttered Gwendolen's catastrophic "yes. "
Throughout Daniel Deronda, Eliot deliberately plays on the 
word "fortune" to exhibit the infinite shades of meaning contained 
in that ambivalent idea. Sometimes she equates this concept with 
destiny or fatalism, at other times with chance or luck. Sometimes 
fortune appears fickle, at other times cunning and deliberate. Often 
fortune is disguised as adversity, while misfortune, paradoxically, 
may bring happiness. In Daniel Deronda, the goddess of the 
revolving wheel showers favors by bestowing gifts of talent,personal 
allure, social status, and riches, or scourges her victims by 
reducing them to the bondage of poverty, the humiliation of social 
inferiority, or, as in the case of Gwendolen, by subjecting her to 
the servitude of a tyrannical husband. Yet Eliot again carefully 
emphasizes how human character can make the most of the assets 
and shortcomings which fortune imposes by avoiding the prosti­
tution of personal integrity to what is all too glibly assumed to be 
"a fortune, " namely material wealth. Attracted by the life of 
leisured ease offered by Grandcourt's vast holdings, Gwendolen 
". . . had sold herself . . . had sold her truthfulness and sense 
of justice. . ."(Book VII, Ch. LIV). By contrast, Catherine 
Arrowpoint, an heiress and acquaintance of Gwendolen's, gives up 
"a fortune" to marry the musician, Klesmer, a genius inferior 
in social station but a man whose human endowments far outweigh 
any loss of lucre. Eliot's endless interplay of the contrary con­
notations of "fortune" appears in a conversation between Klesmer 
and Catherine's indignant parents:
"If Catherine disobeys us we shall disinherit her. You will
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not marry her fortune. It is right you should know that. "
"Madam, her fortune has been the only thing I have had to 
regret about her. But I must ask her if she will not think 
the sacrifice greater than lam worthy of. "
"It is no sacrifice to me, " said Catherine, "except that lam 
sorry to hurt my father and mother. I have always felt my 
fortune to be a wretched fatality of my life. "
(Book III, Ch. XXII)
Successful cormorants, fortune hunters, "gold diggers, " "free­
loaders, " and other varieties of the itching palm invariably lose in 
the Gwendolen Harleth world, in which unmerited gain is fittingly 
counterbalanced by an equitable loss. Even the supremely talented 
individual must earn his kudos the hard way. Klesmer, for example, 
discusses with Gwendolen the arduous road of the authentic artist.
He tells her bluntly that she lacks the mettle to undergo the neces­
sary trials to develop her dramatic gifts to the point of excellence:
"I am not decrying the life of the trueartist. I am exalting it.
I say, it is out of the reach of any but choice organizations-- 
natures framed to love perfection and to labour for it; ready, 
like all true lovers, to endure, to wait, to say, I am not yet 
worthy, but she--Art, my mistress--is worthy, and I will 
live to merit her. An honourable life? Yes. But the honour 
comes from the inward vocation and the hard-won achieve­
ment: there is no honour in donning the life as a livery. "
(Book III, Ch. XXIII)
Thus the fortunate few whom fate rewards with unusual gifts 
necessarily incur a compensating obligation to work unceasingly 
towards the perfection of their talents. To do less is a travesty 
of a benefaction. In presenting Klesmer's point of view, Eliot 
supplies a leitmotif to the general theme of the Gwendolen Harleth 
story of Daniel Deronda, the theme of affirming human responsi­
bility in grappling with the constant giving and taking, the meeds 
and penalties, the awards and damages demanded by a regulated 
and disciplined universal order determined to keep its ballast.
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Leaving the cyclical historical pattern of Gwendolen 
Harleth's story and entering the Zionist part of Daniel Deronda is 
to experience the same shift of historical perspectives met with by 
reading Middle march after Romola. From the roulette wheel 
vision of history moving round and round acknowledging change 
only for the purposes of achieving homeostasis within a fixed order, 
we move to a linear conception of time, in which the pull of the past 
no longer drags down hope for the future. The Zionist portion of 
Daniel Deronda views history as a progressive fulfillment of a 
vaguely understood but desirable future goal. From a dire sense 
of inescapable brewing ruin in the Gwendolen Harleth plot, we move 
to an atmosphere of sanguine expectations, an open-ended vista of 
obscure yet confident prospects, millennial dreams and unchartered 
regions of reassurance. Les jeux son fa its theme, which from the 
very first page frames the Gwendolen Harleth section of the work 
through the imagery of the gambling casino, stands in sharp 
contrast to the closing picture in the last chapter of the novel.
Here we see two Jewish pioneers, Daniel Deronda and his wife, 
Mirah, preparing for departure to the East in order to help estab­
lish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. A third pioneer, the mystic 
Mordecai, who was to join themedies before the voyage. His death, 
however, is looked upon as a successful portent of Daniel's 
mission. The failing Mordecai assures Daniel that death is
. . both parting and reunion--which takes me from your bodily 
eyes and gives me full presence in your soul" (Book VIII, Ch. LXX). 
By ending the novel with an inspiriting tribute to the mystic, Eliot 
reinforces the notion that Mordecai's demise in no way effaces the
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buoyant optimism regarding the fate of David's voyage to the Holy
Land or the eventual success of his calling:
Nothing is here for tears, nothing to wail 
Or knock the breast; no weakness, no contempt, 
Dispraise, or blame; nothing but well and fair. . . .
Ideally, Eliot's twin plots in Daniel Deronda were doubt­
lessly intended to be structural counterparts of one another, the 
Gwendolen Harleth story performing as a "paradise lost" and the 
Jewish story performing as a "paradise regained. " To put it 
another way, the second plot could serve as the smiling side of 
the wheel of fortune, in which a benign nemesis rewards a long- 
suffering people for their perseverance and trust. In either case, 
the two halves of the novel do not fit together, because the strin­
gent ahistorical world picture of the first is at odds with the 
amoral historicism of the second. The Gwendolen Harleth plot is 
rooted in a cosmos driven by traditional ethical principles, whereas 
the predominant impulse of the Zionist portion derives from the 
modern ethos of ethnic self-realization, which is political, secular, 
and collective in nature. At first glance, this assertion seems 
contradictory because of the dense religious aura which surrounds 
the second portion of the novel. Judaism imparts a spiritual 
grandeur to the activities of characters such as Daniel, Mordecai, 
and Mirah; nevertheless their "providential" mission stems from 
a nationalistic rather than an ethical core. While Mordecai feeds 
his visions of a united Israel from the pages of the Old Testament, 
his justifications for unity reflect stirrings of nineteenth-century 
historicism, which views the history of a group as a developmental 
process evolving towards concrete self-definition. The following
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words of the ardent Zionist, Mordecai, for example, sound less 
like those of a religious prophet than of a Fichte, a Guizot, or a 
Mazzini exhorting fellow citizens to recognize and honor their 
cultural bonds:
I believe in a growth, a passage, and a new unfolding of life 
whereof the seed is more perfect, more charged with the 
elements that are pregnant with diviner form. The life of 
a people grows, it is knit together and yet expanded, in 
joy and sorrow, in thought and action; it absorbs the thought 
of other nations into its own forms, and gives back the 
thought as new wealth to the world; it is a power and an 
organ in the great body of the nations. But there may come 
a check, an arrest . . . - -the soul of a people, whereby they 
know themselves to be one, may seem to be dying for want 
of common action. But who shall say, "The fountain of their 
life is dried up, they shall for ever cease to be a nation"? 
Not he who feels the life of his people stirring within his 
own.
(Book VI, Ch. XLII)
The impetus for Mordecai's sublime exhortations to unite 
the Jews politically is a nationalistic fervor which ran rampant in 
the nineteenth century. While Mordecai's arguments in support of 
a Jewish state possess the staggering presence of Biblical testi­
mony and the massive spiritual strength of an incredibly enduring 
Jewish cultural tradition, it must be emphasized that his sentiments 
are more patriotic than religious. Compare, for example, Morde- 
cai’s impassioned pleas to unite Israel with Mazzini's to unite Italy:
Mazzini
!
Mordecai
The degraded and scorned of our 
race will learn to think of their 
sacred land, not as a place for 
saintly beggary to await death in 
loathsome idleness, but as a re­
public where the Jewish spirit 
manifests itself in a new order.
Without a Country, you have 
no name, no identity, no 
voice, no rights, no ad­
mission as brothers into 
the fellowship of nations.
You remain the bastards of 
Humanity, Soldiers without 
a flag, Jews in a world of 
Gentiles; you will find nei­
ther trust nor protection.
(The Duties of Man) .
(Book VI, Ch. XLII)
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Let the torch of visible 
community be lit!
(Book VI, Ch. XLII)
I say that the effect of our Show me if you can, a single 
separateness will not be com- important sign of European 
pleted and have its highest life, that does not proceed 
transformation unless our race from the social principle, which 
take on again the character of does not depend upon the people,
a nationality. That is the ful- the king of the future .... 
fillment of the religious trust [It is] the common, social faith, 
that moulded them into a peo- which gains victories; the faith 
pie .... which awakens the multitudes,
(Book VI, Ch. XLII) that faith in their destiny, in
their mission. . . .
("Faith and the Future")
The infusion of religious ardor into nationalistic sympathies 
is characteristic of both men. In the novel, Mordecai even eulo­
gizes the work of Mazzini as Italy's political Messiah in the Risorgi- 
mento. Nevertheless, for the very reason that Mordecai has an 
authentic living religion to champion his aspirations for Jewish 
unity, his motives may easily be confused with purposes which are 
religious and ethical in nature rather than goals which, like 
Mazzini's, are secular, practical, and organizational. Both men, 
despite their lofty aims, are attempting to consummate a pragmatic 
ideal, namely, that in union there is strength. The underdog, be 
he Jew, Italian, or a proletarian worker, was implored by his 
nineteenth-century leaders to band together with his victimized 
confreres; he had nothing to lose but his chains. Eliot knew 
Mazzini very well and urged him to contribute an article to The 
Westminster Review on "Freedom v. Despotism. " She fully shared 
in the English Italomania of die 1860's, which Mazzini had fostered, 
and upon his death wrote on March 17, 1872}to Mrs. Peter Taylor
Nationalities are sacred. . . 
("To the Italians")
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that the impact of his presence would always remain, and that in 
her opinion:
The greatest gift the hero leaves his race,
Is to have been a hero.
Her democratic sympathy for subjugated peoples is one of 
the most liberal elements in Eliot’s generally conservative tempera­
ment. Lord Acton went so far as to declare that Eliot's tolerance 
for Mazzini was a criminal matter (Harry Rudman. Italian Nation­
alism and English Letters, pp. 102, 164, 171). In Daniel Deronda, 
Eliot makes several topical allusions to current happenings which 
illuminate the desire of afflicted peoples to be liberated from 
oppressors in order to pilot their own destinies. For example, the 
plight of the Jamaican Negro is touched upon: "Grandcourt held that 
the Jamaican Nsgro was a beastly sort of Baptist Caliban; Deronda 
said he had always felt a little with Caliban, who naturally had his 
own point of view and could sing a good song. . . " (Book IV, Ch. 
XXIX). Daniel, like Eliot, has "... a passion for people who are 
pelted. . . " (Book VIII, Ch. LIX). Eliot in the novel also describes 
Negro emancipation in the American Civil War as a "mighty drama" 
in which ideas ". . . with fresh vigour [were] making armies of 
themselves. . . a time when the soul of man was waking to new 
pulses which had for centuries been beating in him unheard. . . " 
(Book II, Ch. XI). On two occasions, Eliot quotes Leopardi's "Ode 
to Italy, " a glorious paean to Italian patriotism:
Beatissimi voi,
Cne onriste if petto alle nemiche lance
Per amor di costei die al sol vi diede
(Book V, Ch. XXXIX)
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Leopardi's words are sung by Mirah in a much admired aria by 
Joseph Leo: "O Patria Mia. " By including references to persecuted 
peoples united by cultural, racial, and other ties of a non-religious 
nature, Eliot acknowledges that Zionism is primarily grounded in 
the concept of nationality rather than religion. Yet so taken is she 
by the powerful cohesive thrust of groups who share a common his­
tory, a common culture, or a common racial inheritance, that like 
Mordecai and Mazzini, she elevates the very yearning for collectivity 
to a religious passion. In short, while Eliot does not equate Zionism 
and Judaism, she views Zionism as the finest expression of Judaism. 
Her peculiar loyalty to the developing historical awareness of all 
kinds of groups, be they clans, castes, tribes, or national states, 
is a typical characteristic of her age. To Eliot, the notion of a 
shared inheritance of a "race, " the shared evolution of a people, 
is the focal point of the Zionist story in Daniel Deronda; and the 
intrinsic merits of Judaism as a standard-bearer of ethical and 
religious ideals remains tangential to the decided historical impress 
of the ideal of emerging nationality.
If the Zionist story unlike the Gwendolen Harlet plot is 
governed by a frame of reference that is historical rather than 
ethical in nature, why does such a disjunction of outlooks neces­
sarily impair the artistic unity of the novel? Why is the Classical 
Greek world picture of Romola and the roulette wheel which rules 
the fortunes of Gwendolen Harleth necessarily at odds with an 
understanding of the past as an evolving historical process, such 
as is evidenced in Middlcmarch and the Jewish part of Daniel 
Deronda? In what ways does the biological imprint of Middlemarch
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resemble the stamp of nationalism apparent in Mordecai's Zionism? 
How is history related to historicism? These are pressing questions 
at this point, questions whose answers may help disentangle some 
of the idiosyncrasies not only of Eliot's thought but also those of the 
nineteenth-century mind.
Unity of structure is the hallmark of good aesthetic form. 
Henry James tells us in "The Art of Fiction" that "a novel is a living 
thing, all one and continuous, like every other organism, and in 
proportion as it lives will it be found . . . that in each of the parts 
there is something of each of the other parts. " His words seem to 
echo Aristotle's on dramatic plot: . . so too the plot of a play,
being the representation of an action, must present it as a unified 
whole; and its various incidents must be arranged that if any one of 
them is differently placed or taken away, the effect of wholeness will 
be seriously disrupted" (On die Art of Poetry, Ch. VIII).
The foremost cause of the artistic fracture within Daniel 
Deronda lies in the creation of character. The driving forces 
which influence Gwendolen's sphere, the interaction of freedom of 
choice, human responsibility, the balancing wheel of fortune, and 
die strict score card kept by the avenging Furies, bear little or no 
relevance in assessing a figure whose importance is at least equal 
to Gwendolen's in the compositional make-up of the novel: the 
figure of Daniel. Daniel's character remains peculiarly enigmatic, 
because he does not function according to the assumptions which 
control the modus operandi of human behavior in die Gwendolen 
section. To interpret the conduct in the first story with that of 
the second is like judging a game of tennis with the rules of golf.
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Both Gwendolen and Daniel are two irreducible fractions without any 
common denominator. Unlike Gwendolen's, Daniel's actions are not 
controlled by his own impulses or even by his own decisions. He 
does not move on his own but is buffeted by the winds of mysterious 
historical forces like a man of straw. The great ancestral "collec­
tive unconscious" of his undisclosed Jewish heritage forges its way 
unchecked into his receptive psyche. Unbeknownst to him, Daniel 
was born a Jew, but was reared as the Gentile stepson of an English 
aristocrat, Sir Hugo Mallinger. By rescuing a distraught young 
Jewess, Mirah, from drowning in the Thames, Daniel becomes 
involved in a circle of London lower-class Jewry in order to find 
Mirah’s long lost brother. His pursuit ends with the discovery that 
a dying tubercular visionary, Mordecai, who had befriended Daniel, 
is the object of Mirah's search. Inspired by the Zionist passion 
of the mystic, Daniel devotes hours to the study of Hebrew and 
Jewish theology. Mordecai is certaiin that Daniel is a Jew who has 
been sent as a spiritual recruit to carry out plans for establishing 
a Jewish homeland in Palestine. "You will be my life: it will be 
planted afresh; it will grow, " Mordecai tells Daniel. "You shall 
take the inheritance; it has been gathering for ages" (Book V, Ch. 
XL). Unconvinced by Daniel's gentle protestations to the contrary, 
Mordecai doggedly sticks to his intuitions, which at the end of the 
novel turn out to be completely justified. Daniel learns that his 
parents descended from a long line of distinguished Spanish Jews 
who settled in Italy to escape the Inquisition. His mother, a great 
singer, had abandoned him as a child in order to pursue her 
artistic career, whereupon Sir Hugo adopted him and kept Daniel's
i
-213-
origin a secret. Embracing his newly found birthright, Daniel 
automatically assumes the obligations of Mordecai's Zionist mission 
on the strength of racial inheritance alone. The power of his past 
heritage exacts total concessions from his acquiescent nature, and 
the pull of his happy home life with devoted Sir Hugo, the pull of 
his upbringing as an English gentleman exert no pressures on his 
resolve. History has spoken using Daniel as a marionette. As if 
he had little choice in the matter, he tells Gwendolen of his sudden 
awakening to the call of duty:
"I am going to the East to become better acquainted with the 
condition of my race. . . . The idea that I am possessed 
with is that of restoring a political existence to my people, 
making them a nation again, giving them a national centre, 
such as the English have, though they too are scattered over 
the face of the globe. That is a task which presents itself to 
me as a duty: lam resolved to begin it, however feebly 
. . . At the least, I may awaken a movement in other minds, 
such as has been awakened in my own. "
(Book VIII, Ch. LXIX)
Deronda’s mechanical conversion is less an adherence to 
religious convictions than fealty to the idea of race and nationality. 
His action parallels a similar situation in Eliot’s poem, The 
Spanish Gypsy, in which Fedalma, "a faithful soul, " gives up 
marriage to a nobleman when she learns she is a gypsy. She joins 
her father to help regenerate her tribe and goes to "... a prom­
ised land beyond the sea . . . [to] make a nation" (Book I, p. 135). 
Hereditary bonds of race strengthened by a developing historical 
consciousness are rendered in evolutionary terms. She feels the 
power of community in ". . . the mystic stirring of a common 
life" (Book I, p. 124), and the linear movement of that collective 
history". . . feeding an embryo future, offspring strange/Of the
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fond Present ..." (Book I, p. 25). Like Fedalma, Daniel feels 
". . . the electric chain of ancestry ..." (Book VIII, Ch. LX) 
when he discovers his Hebrew origins, and like Fedalma goes off
to a promised land to found a nation. Viewing Daniel's motives 
through the reasoning of the Spanish gypsy girl isolates the predom­
inant impulses of his energies, namely, a romantic fascination 
with the past history of his people coupled with a patriotic compul­
sion to unite them. Just as Gwendolen's decisions are centered 
squarely within her will, Daniel's are determined entirely by 
forces outside himself. Frequently pictured on horseback control­
ling the reins, Gwendolen is given full measure of credit for the 
control and direction of her steed. On the other hand, in Daniel's 
world, one sits like a child on a wooden horse in a merry-go-round 
and waits patiently for the unknown sources of energy to stir things 
into action. In Hegelian terms, Daniel is a "world-historical" 
individual, the implement of history's grand design, like a will­
less Napoleon,whom Hegel described as "the world spirit on horse­
back. "
Characters in the Zionist section feel coerced into doing 
things and usually submit without a murmur. Mirah is submissive 
to the point of dullness: "It is not her nature to run into planning 
and devising: only to submit" (Book III, Ch. XX). The consumptive 
Mordecai, despite his prophetic self-confidence, knows himself to 
be driven by "remote stirrings" of the "growing soul" of a growing 
world. What reaches man ". . . stays with him, rules him: he 
must accept it, not knowing its pathway" (Book V, Ch. XL). Daniel 
in turn accepts Mordecai's transfer of spiritual vocation with the
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"That blent transmission must go on without any choice of 
ours ..." (Book VIII, Ch. LXIII). Like Fedalrria, Daniel sees 
inherited tradition as the clue to meaning in life, the ancestral life 
which lies within us ". . . as a dim longing for unknown objects and 
sensations, and the spellbound habit of their inherited frames ..." 
(Book VIII, Ch. LXIII). The force of tradition is most tellingly 
accentuated in the splendid minor figure of Daniel's mother, who 
had in her youth vehemently renounced Judaism. Nevertheless, 
she feels inwardly compelled to meet with the son whom she had 
abandoned in order to tell him of his origins. '1 obey something 
tyrannic ... I have been forced to obey my dead father. I have 
been forced to tell you that you are a Jew, and deliver to you what 
he commanded me to deliver" (Book VII, Ch. LI). That compelling 
power, she says, is the expression of "something stronger" than 
her own defiant will. "But that stronger Something" Daniel replies, 
"has determined that I shall be all the more the grandson whom 
also you willed to annihilate" (Book VII, Ch. LIII).
The vagueness of that "Something" lies like a pall over the 
entire Zionist portion of Daniel Deronda. Shrouded in religious 
mysticism, that "Something" is historical determinism, or "histori- 
cism, " a belief that the individual is at the mercy of the Zeitgeist, a 
progressively advancing collective consciousness moving towards an 
abstruse collective destiny. The Zeitgeist is a romantic principle. 
This principle assumes that a nation is an organic unity, a race with 
a unique cultural identity moving towards greater self-determination. 
A nation like an individual is natus or born. History, be it of a class, 
a territorial region, or a culture becomes a secular providence
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words:
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working itself out through the medium of earthly affairs. Like 
the theory of biological evolution, cultural or racial historicism 
emphasizes the notion of continuous, not cyclical progressive move­
ment, the developing self-realization, and the unconscious emerging 
apperception of a people. In Mordecai's words, '1 believe in a 
growth, a passage, and a new unfolding of life whereof the seed is 
more perfect ... the life of a people grows ..." (Book VI, Ch.
XLII). This sentiment is not Judaism, but pure nineteenth-century 
historicism in a Jewish setting. The concept of a "chosen people" 
is used by Mordecai as a convenient camouflage of an ethical ideal 
by an historical one. While the Jews were the first to believe in a 
messianic commitment, that is, a prophecy of deliverance through 
historical time, the faith in transcendent universal divinity re­
mained paramount to more mundane hopes of perpetuating a nation. 
Eliot obviously intended to fortify Biblical echoes of the messianic 
idea by using the names of Daniel and Mordecai as the principal 
Zionists in her novel. In The Bible, messianic expectations appear 
in the last chapter of The Book of Daniel, and nationalistic virtues 
are extolled by praising Mordecai's deeds in The Book of Esther. 
Nevertheless, nationality in die Old Testament never displaces die 
presence of God, while in historicism, the nation becomes a divine 
end in itself.
If the principle of nationality and the Zeitgeist are endowed 
with religious attributes, then history becomes holy and the col­
lective destiny of a people becomes sacrosanct. Like Bildad, the 
secular tempter in Archibald MacLeish’s J. B., historicism proclaims 
that God is history. History becomes a protagonist, an immanent
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spiritual entity replacing both the idea of a transcendent deity and 
the idea of a universe based on moral sanctions enforced by the 
agency of nemesis. According to an historicist point of view, stand­
ards of good and evil are interpreted in the light of securing the full­
est blossoming of history's inner bent, whether that bent be the slow 
maturation of a dialectical movement such as a Hegel and Marx might 
suggest, or a step-by-step advance in an enormous program with 
dimly understood beginnings moving towards obscure ends, such as 
a Comte and a Buckle would assume. The study of the past contained 
the prognosis of the history's successive stages of self-exterioriza­
tion. In the nineteenth century, man's redemption, as John T. Marcus 
puts it in Heaven, Hell and History, lay in participating in the his­
torical ideal. History thsn had a theological burden as a new instru­
ment of salvation by immortalizing the individual through his contri­
bution to the infinite progress and to the eternal presence of man­
kind (p. 71). It became the function of the historian to decipher the 
hidden clues of history's master plan. The past was an oracle, the 
lodestar of the future, and the historian a prophet. In biology, his- 
toricism inspired The Origin of Species, in philosophy The Phenomen­
ology of Spirit, in poetry Faust, in politics the unification of Italy and 
Germany, and in the works of George Eliot, historicism produced 
the milieu of Middlemarch and the Zionist part of Daniel Deronda.
Both Daniel in Daniel Deronda and Dorothea in Middlemarch are 
prey to the permutations of the time-spirit. "Who that cares much 
to know the history of man, " Eliot writes in the Prelude to Middle- 
march, would learn ". . . how the mysterious mixture behaves under 
the varying experiments of Time. ..." Dorothea's ardent nature
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blunders gauchely in a medium foreign to her potentially heroic tem­
perament, a . . young and noble impulse struggling amidst the 
conditions of an imperfect social state, in which great feelings will 
often take the aspect of error, and great faith the aspect of illusion" 
(Finale). Like Dorothea, Daniel flounders but luckily is rescued by 
a Zionist ideal, which provides the spiritual stimulation absent in 
Dorothea's life. Neither, however, has any choice in the matter. 
Both wander aimlessly3vaguely hoping for something to happen. 
Luckily for Daniel, the call of nationality via a newly discovered 
inheritance provides him with a mission, but the less fortunate 
Dorothea, "a Saint Theresa, foundress of nothing" (Prelude), merely 
keeps on drifting. In a historicist world, ore either fits in with the 
changing times or one settles for a life bereft of profound meaning. 
Since evolutionary movement is central to this vision, the relativity 
of all human concepts, barring the necessity of history’s ineluctable 
thrust forward, is an inescapable condition of knowledge and 
belief. Virtue and a sense of duty are arrived at by a kind of 
sensitivity training to the incessant shower of obscure new cues 
which bombard the individual consciousness through the agency 
of continuing change. Good and bad are no longer absolute ethical 
norms but degrees of personal adjustment. Good is defined by 
the ability to "tune in, " and bad by "tuning out. "
In such a system, evil is not centered in human volition but 
is the result of an incompatibility between the group will versus the 
individual temperament. The traditional values of responsibility, 
fault, error, and sin have little relevance for historicism. Loyalty 
to felt stirrings of the historic sense is the one redeeming virtue.
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If Fedalma in The Spanish Gypsy had not returned to her gypsy 
people, she would have thwarted a collective social faith to satisfy 
selfish individualistic inclinations. That her tribe may have been a 
band of thieving cutthroats ill-deserving of her fidelity would in a 
historicist world be entirely beside the point. If Daniel had traced 
his lineage to one of less elevated moral stature than Judaism, his 
conversion would be still considered proper and right. Would he have 
joined the Tartars, if such were his ancestral race? Or the Austral­
ian aborigines? The Terra del Fuegans? In The Mill on the Floss, 
Eliot comments, "If the past is not to bind us, where can duty lie" 
(Book VI, Ch. 14)? This confinement of duty to the honoring of local 
community and immediate family ties in the earlier novel is expanded 
in Daniel Deronda and The Spanish Gypsy into a glorification of "duty" 
towards all ancestral and racial bonds, whatever they may be. Daniel 
is compelled to obey historical powers beyond the verdict of his own 
judgment. If Gwendolen lived in an evolutionary cosmos lacking the 
strict canons which bound her conscience, she need not have suf­
fered any remorse for her "crime. " How could she help it if unfor­
tunate conditions pushed her into marrying Grandcourt? How could 
she foresee the changes which forced her to break a vow to Mrs. 
Glasher? Why should she feel guilt about her murderous intentions 
towards her husband? After all, she didn't make him drown. She 
was just a victim of circumstances:
Guilt is a sociological accident;
Wrong class--wrong century--
You pay for your luck with your licks, that's all.
(Archibald Macboish, J. B.,
Scene Nine)
Placed in a historicist setting, the Gwendolen Harleth story would
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lack the ethical imperatives which raise her portion of the novel to 
the level of tragedy. On the other hand, in a tragic setting the 
Daniel story would dissolve for want of a constraining individual con­
science genuinely responsive to conflicts between pressures of id 
and super-ego, between a person's will and an unyielding environ­
ment, or between a moral and a tribal bond, 
values exists at the core of Daniel Deronda, one for Gwendolen and 
another for Daniel. This double standard inhibits the integral vision 
fundamental to the novel's unity, since the reader see-saws from 
one frame of convictions to another like a fascinated spectator seated 
on a park bench situated midway between two prepossessing soapbox 
orators on a fine Sunday morning.
The amorality of Daniel's motives is screened by Eliot's 
presentation of Judaism as a powerful moral stimulus in the shaping 
of the Western mind, "... a national faith, which had penetrated 
the thinking of half the world, and moulded the splendid forms of 
that world's religion. . . " (Book IV, Ch. XXXII). Mordecai is con­
vinced that "... a whole Christian is three-fourths a Jew. . ."
(Book VII, Ch. LII), and he declares, "Where else is there a nation 
of whom it may as truly be said that their religion and law and moral 
life mingled as the stream of blood in the heart and made one 
growth. . . " (Book VI, Ch. XLII)? His words paraphrase Eliot's 
feelings. In a letter to Harriet Beecher Stowe (29 October1876),
Eliot wrote:
But towards the Hebrews we western people who have been reared 
in Christianity have a peculiar debt and, whether we acknowl­
edge it or not, a peculiar thoroughness of fellowship in re­
ligious and moral sentiment. Can anything be more disgusting
A double standard of
I
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than to hear people called "educated" making small jokes 
about eating ham, and showing themselves empty of any real 
knowledge as to the relation of their own social and religious 
life to the history of the people they think themselves witty in 
insulting? They hardly know that Christ was a Jew. And I 
find men educated at Rugby supposing that Christ spoke Greek. 
To my feeling, this deadness to the history which has prepared 
half our world for us. . . lies very close to the worst kind of 
irreligion.
(Haight, ed. The George Eliot 
Letters, Vol. VI, pp. 301-2)
Prior to becoming a novelist, Eliot shared the provincial 
narrowness of Englishmen towards the Semite. She vehemently 
disliked Disraeli's exalted portrait of the Jew, Sidonia, in Coningsby, 
and she stated flatly in a letter to John Sibree (11 February 1848) that 
"Everything specifically Jewish is of a low grade" (Haight, ed.,
The George Eliot Letters , Vol. I, p. 247). In the same letter, 
she also says that Disraeli's theory of racial inheritance ". . . has 
not a leg to stand on. " Her early intolerance was gradually erased 
by closer acquaintance with a widening circle of impressive Jews, 
people like Sidonia, Mordecai, and Daniel. Before Eliot wrote 
Daniel Deronda, the old stereotype of the Shylock-Fagin-Barabas 
tradition was still strongly entrenched in the popular imagination of 
the nineteenth-century gentile. The Jew portrayed in literature as 
Christ-killer, miser, fawning hypocrite, usurer, and greedy
parvenu, continued to activate deep-seated hatreds, although a few 
sympathetic portraits, besides those of Disraeli, began to fracture 
ancient prejudices. There exist Lessing's Nathan the Wise (1799), 
Maria Edgeworth's Harrington (1811), Scott's Ivanhoe (1819), Byron's 
Hebrew Melodies (1814-16), Shelley's The Wandering Jew (1810), and 
Browning’s "Rabbi Ben Ezra!' (1855). Eliot’s novel displays a socio-
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■ logical spectrum of Jewish types, which include the musical genius, 
Klesmer; the mystic, Mordecai; the English gentleman, Daniel; 
the actress, Mirah; the second-hand bookseller, Miller; the saddler, 
Buchan; the watchmaker, Pash; the optical instrument maker, Gideon; 
the shoemaker, Croop; the wood-inlayer, Goodwin; the laboratory 
assistant, Marrables; the copying clerk, Lilly; the pawnbroker, 
Cohen; the thief, Lapidoth; and the "wanderer, " Kalonymos. Last 
but not least, the novel contains the superb characterization of 
Daniel's derelict mother, whose classic comment curiously antic­
ipates a modern Jewish archetype. "I was not, " she tells Daniel, "a 
Jewish mother to you" (Book VII, Ch. LIII).
A second reason for Eliot's sympathetic rendering of Judaism 
has already been touched upon, that is, her democratic support of 
all oppressed peoples seeking a centralized core, a state or a terri­
tory from which to shape their own destinies. From her standpoint, 
nationalism was a sacred impulse which bound communities together 
and fostered their best interests. Little could she foresee the . 
militant forms of rabid patriotism which bred the racial hatreds of 
a later day, hatreds which sought the extermination of "inferior" 
races, such as Jews and Gypsies, and ironically impelled the 
shocked conscience of the world to create the modern state of 
Israel. Despite the fact that Eliot could not envision the kinds of 
destruction caused by separatist beliefs in the "blood-consciousness" 
of a group, the theory of racial determinism which she championed 
led to the sundering and splintering of the grand eighteenth-century 
cosmopolitan ideal of universal fraternite. Like many thinkers in
l
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her time, Eliot embraced the ideal of "racial" solidarity because 
of the biological saturation of historicism with Darwin’s The Origin 
of Species. Collective entities were looked upon as distinct species 
united not only by cultural bonds but also by ties of blood and com­
mon ancestry, with each species struggling, evolving, and pro­
gressing towards self-realization. In Daniel Deronda, Judaism as 
a religion and a cultural heritage too often becomes obscured by 
Eliot's repetitive insistence on Hebrew ties of race, blood, and 
parentage. The following statements are typical of this kind of 
emphasis throughout the Zionist part of the novel:
■
"The divine principle of our race is action, choice, resolved 
memory. "
(Book VI, Ch. XLII)
In fact, pure English blood ... did not declare itself pre­
dominantly in the party [of Jews] at present assembled.
(Book VI, Ch. XLII)l
"What is the citizenship of him who . . . has no hearty 
kindred . . . with his own race?"
(Book VI, Ch. XLII)
". . . our separateness will not be completed . . . unless our 
race take on again the character of a nationality. "
(Book VI, Ch. XLII)
". . . the Hebrew blood which has maintained its vigour in 
all climates. ..."
(Book VI, Ch. XLII)
"Then our race shall have an organic center. ..."
(Book VI, Ch. XLII)
"The degraded and scorned of our race. ..."
(Book VI, Ch. XLII)
. to identify myself . . . with
(Book VII, Ch. LIII)
It seemed as if her words called out a latent obstinacy of race
"But I consider it my duty . . 
my hereditary people. . . . "
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in him.S
(Book VII, Ch. LI)
"I am going to the East to become better acquainted with the 
condition of my race. ..."
(Book VIII, Ch. LXIX)
. . I was a Jew and felt the heart of my race beating within me."
(BookV, Ch. XL)
"You are perhaps of our race?"
(Book IV, Ch. XXXIII)
Eliot's emphasis on hereditary unity based on the nebulous 
concept of race, her equation of "race" and "people" in Daniel 
Deronda and The Spanish Gypsy, leads to a fatalistic determinism 
of birth and blood, which relegates religious persuasion, ethical 
belief, and individual conscience to subordinate positions in the 
spiritual framework of nationality. Eliot neatly avoids the problem 
of evil raised by the racial myth by engaging her historicist char­
acters in "good" collective causes. Though Dorothea in Middlemarch 
misses her vocation by being born at the wrong time, Daniel's 
birth coincides with the sublime mission of helping to rescue his 
people from the subjugation of a millenium and a half, and Fedalma 
of The Spanish Gypsy becomes involved in a patriotic venture on
behalf of her distressed gypsy tribe. Each mission, however, rings 
false. Unlike Verdi's Aida (1871), whom Fedalma resembles, the 
gypsy girl was not raised with her people and never developed the 
true communal bonds of family and caste, bonds which spring out of 
love and long association. So Daniel. It is curious that Eliot's 
historicism, which stresses the consequence of shared collective 
past ties, should slight the importance of a shared upbringing in 
shaping that very historical consciousness. Instead of crediting
-225-
nurture for the construction of our loyalties, Eliot credits the 
collective voice of ancestors communicating mysteriously through 
hereditary channels of kinship and blood.
To the historicist mind, the Jews as a group had the added 
appeal of being a living relic of antiquity, a "chosen people" who 
had in Darwinian terms successfully endured an arduous struggle for 
existence since Biblical times, "If there are ranks in suffering, " 
Eliot quotes Zunz in Daniel Deronda, "Israel takes precedence of 
all the nations-- if the duration of sorrows and the patience with 
which they are borne ennoble, the Jews are among the aristocracy 
of every land. . . "(Book VI, Ch. XLII). What Zunz calls "aristoc­
racy" is the extraordinary adaptability and pliancy of the Jewish 
will-to-live. To Jewish commentators of the late nineteenth century, 
this collective capacity to survive fitted in well with Darwinian ideas 
of natural selection. Because of their unusual history, the Jews as 
a nation appeared not only divinely chosen but naturally select. In 
an essay by Simon Dubnow, "The Doctrine of Jewish Nationalism" 
(1897), Zionism is expressed in Darwinian metaphors:
What force, then, was it that kept alive this dispersed nation, 
without state and without territory, all these centuries?. . . 
Over a period of many generations, unique characteristics, 
emotions, and historical tendencies, the effects of the 
sufferings and pains of the past, were brought out by the law 
of heredity. . .The weapons used by the nation in its struggle 
for survival were adapted to more difficult conditions. In 
this struggle there were critical and dangerous moments. . . 
when weaker parts of the nation were cut off and assimilated 
with other peoples. In the end, however, the healthy kernel 
of the nation survived and drew its strength from a 
determined national will.
(Michael Selzer, ed. Zionism Recon­
sidered: The Rejection ot Jewish 
Normalcy, pp. l-iCFI)
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■ Eliot’s growing admiration for Judaism was amplified by her 
Darwinism and her avid historicist belief in the power of resurgent 
nationalism especially in a people inspired by a Divine Covenant. 
These reasons moved her to examine the messianic strain of Jewish 
thinking in Daniel Deronda. While Eliot infuses the Zionist part with 
impassioned displays of what Walter Houghton describes in The 
Victorian Frame of Mind as the nineteenth-century "cult of noble 
emotions, " that is, a sublime enthusiasm for exalted vague longings 
exciting aspiration, hope, and love, Eliot nevertheless recognized 
the dynamics of those noble emotions in shaping the future state of 
Israel. A street in Tel Aviv is named after her in deference to her 
substantial support of the Jewish cause in the prophetic Daniel De­
ronda . How curious that a provincial English girl who grew up to 
write novels about early nineteenth-century English life should end 
her creative career with a proclamation of Jewish nationalism.' How 
strange that among the foremost nineteenth-century partisans of 
the Jewish national awakening, such as Moses Hess, Leon Pinsker, 
Sir Moses Montefiore, and Theodor Herzl, there stands a Zionist 
Gentile: the author of Silas Marner and Adam Bede!
To objectify the sublime feelings, the solemn yearnings, and 
the nascent sympathies kindled by an unfulfilled ideal, Eliot laces the 
Zionist section with the language of aspiration. An overdose of such 
language in a novel often leads to an affected artificiality, sentimen­
tality, and nebulousness. The speech of the characters becomes 
stilted , as ordinary conversation strains to be impressive and 
lofty in keeping with the grandeur of the ideal goal. Such is the
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case in the Jewish part of Daniel Deronda. The atmosphere of the 
Sabbath pervades the sermonizing discourses of Daniel; Mordecai's 
utterances are unrelieved mystical outpourings, and Mirah gushes 
forth geysers of high-minded munificent expressions like a school­
girl reciting her daily catechism. The language of aspiration, if 
uncontrolled in a novel, imparts a loose and indefinite flavor of 
generality to the text, a flavor which tends to destroy the palpable 
down-to-earth sense of reality for which the novel as a genre is 
justly celebrated. Such writing is typical in a romantic disposition, 
which too often offers obscurity as a substitute for the ineffable and 
muddies waters to make them appear deep. In an essay, "Roman­
ticism and Classicism" (1913), T. E. Hulme describes his irritation 
with romantic verbal extravagance, which had for a hundred years 
or more debauched us into believing that vagueness and hankerings 
after the infinite were unimpeachable signs of great writing:
I
You might say if you wished that the whole of the romantic 
attitude seems to crystallize in verse round metaphors of 
flight. Hugo is always flying, flying over abysses, flying 
up into the eternal gases. The word infinite in every other 
line.
In the classical attitude you never seem to swing 
right along to the infinite nothing. . . You never go blindly 
into an atmosphere more than the truth, an atmosphere 
too rarefied for man to breathe for long.
(Stallman, ed. Critiques and Essays 
in Criticism, p. 6)
Unfortunately, the Zionist part of Daniel Deronda suffers 
from precisely this sort of romantic over indulgence. Doubtless 
the mystic, the fanatical idealist, and the dedicated patriot are less 
apt to express themselves with the humor, the easy tolerance, and 
the petty trivia which fills the chatter of a less committed mortal.
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Nevertheless, a steady diet of sanctimonious statements, such as
the following, robs the Zionist narrative of the rich human tone
which pervades the Gwendolen Harleth story:
"Death and life are one before the Eternal. I know our fathers 
slew their children and then slew themselves to keep their 
souls pure. I meant it so. But now I am commanded to live. "
(Book II, Ch. XVII)
She lifted her eyes to his and said with reverential fervour, "The 
God of our fathers bless you and deliver you from all evil. ..."
(Book II, Ch. XVIII)
"A curse is on your generation, child. They will open the 
mountains and drag forth the golden wings and coin them into 
money. ..."
(Book V, Ch. XXXVIII)
"For the sin of the father my soul must go into exile, 
the sin of the father the work was broken, and the day of 
fulfillment delayed. She who bore me was desolate, disgraced, 
destitute."
(Book VI, Ch. XLIII)
"But there came new messengers from the Eternal. I had to 
bow under the yoke that presses on the great multitudes born 
of woman: family troubles called me. . . . "
(Book V, Ch. XL)
". . . for as our life becomes more spiritual by capacity of 
thought, and joy therein, possession tends to become more ^ 
universal, being independent of gross material contact. . . .
(Book VIII, Ch. LXI)
For
". ... yet it does not exclude the willing marriage which melts 
soul into soul, and makes thought fuller as the clear waters 
are made fuller, where the fulness is inseparable and the 
clearness is inseparable."
(Book VIII, Ch. LX III)
Such "conversation" approaches the heightened reaches of 
prayer, invocation, and incantation and thus remains foreign to the 
commonplace idiom of everyday speech, Jewish or otherwise. The 
elevated and generalized language of the Zionist section of Daniel
Deronda jars strikingly with the tangibility of metaphor, the graphic
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quality of thought and action, characteristic of the Gwendolen Ilarleth 
plot, examples of which have already been cited from the gambling 
scene of die opening chapter of the novel. This contrast in the use 
of language contributes substantially to the separation of mood be­
tween the two sections of Daniel Deronda and inhibits any attempt 
at reconciliation between die two stories. To use T. E. Hulme's 
dichotomy in his forementioned essay, the idiom in the Gwendolen 
Harleth part is classic, while that of the Zionist part is romantic.
By "classical, " Hulme means that a writer rarely gets carried away 
by vagaries inspired by idealism: "In the classic it is always the 
light of ordinary day, never die light that never was on land or sea.
It is always perfectly human and never exaggerated: man is always 
man andneier a god" (Stallman, ed., op. cit., p. 10). Just as the 
classical conception of man as a fixed and limited creature controls 
the vivid graphic rhetoric of the first portion of the novel, so the 
romantic dream of the limitless potential of the human being moving 
steadily towards a progressively brighter future controls the 
amorphous rhetoric of aspiration of the second portion. Each 
hemisphere of the novel has its own vernacular, so to speak, and 
neither speaks a common tongue.
Eliot never explicitly states just how she understood the two 
plots of Daniel Deronda to be connected to one another, except to 
assert unequivocally in a letter already quoted that they were. Though 
a critical examination of the novel argues against the success of her 
artistic intention to unite both stories, it is important to investigate 
what she had in mind. To reach the marrow of her conceptual out-
I
I
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look requires the winnowing out of preconceptions which make her 
position appear justified.
From Eliot's standpoint, one could argue that both stories 
are cemented together by an all-encompassing environmental fatal­
ism to which Daniel and Gwendolen with varying degrees of coopera­
tion or resistance are forced to submit. In a few afterthoughts on 
The Spanish Gypsy, Eliot stated that fatalism is the essence of 
tragedy, which she defines as the adjustment of our lot to the 
unrelenting necessity of forces beyond our control. Tragedy, she 
quotes, is "The dire strife/ Of poor Humanity’s afflicted will/ 
Struggling in vain with ruthless destiny." She explains that fate in 
The Spanish Gypsy is symbolized by ". . . hereditary conditions in 
the largest sense, and of the fact that what we call duty is entirely 
made up of such conditions. . . " (J. W. Cross. George Eliot's Life, 
Vol. Ill, pp. 32-3). In The Spanish Gypsy as in Daniel Deronda the 
inexorable pressure of biological inheritance brought into promi­
nence by Darwinism serves as a substitute for the fates and furies of 
Greek drama. Thus the findings of modern science supplied for 
Eliot the stringent laws of necessity characteristic of the inescapable 
moira of the ancient pagans. Eliot avoids having to distinguish 
between the two kinds of determinism by covering both sections of 
the novel with a conveniently comprehensive umbrella: the term 
"destiny. " This word had a peculiar vogue in the last century, when
manifest destiny, " or thephrases such as "a man of destiny, 
title to Verdi's opera, "La Forza del Destino, " were commonplace. 
Both parts of Daniel Deronda are riddled with references to destiny, 
which at times refers to a foreordained state, a predetermined
tt ti
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course of events. At other times the word is befogged in a romantic 
haze of blurred allusions about an indeterminate future. Often 
destiny is associated with God’s will or Providence, and sometimes 
the power of destiny appears to be dominated and driven by capri­
cious agencies of luck or chance. The following selections from 
Daniel Deronda illustrate the inordinate diversity of connotations
s
inherent in the term:
. . . the automatic voice of destiny . . .
(Book 1, Ch. 1)
”Le jeu ne va plus" said destiny.
(Book I, Ch. I)
. . . her destiny must be one of luxurious ease. . . .
(Book I, Ch. II)
. . . who can wonder if Gwendolen felt ready to manage her own 
destiny?
(Book I, Ch. IV)
. . . Mr. Grandcourt who had come ... to make a chief epoch 
in her destiny. . . .
(Book II, Ch. XIII)
. . . a losing destiny did not press upon her as a fear. . . .
(Book IV, Ch. XXXI)
. . . destiny in the shape of Mephistopheles playing at chess 
with man for his soul. . . .
(Book V, Ch. XXXVII)
The thoughts of his heart seemed too precious ... not to have 
a further destiny.
(Book V, Ch. XXXVIII)
". . . as if I were awaiting the destiny that could interpret 
the oracle. "
(Book V, Ch. XL)
"I have had experience . . (. in the story of a spiritual destiny 
embraced willingly. ..."
(Book V, Ch. XL)
. . . but he was not caring for destinies still moving in the dim 
streets of our earthly life. . . .
(Book VI, Ch. XLIII)
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... a mind consciously, energetically moving with the larger 
march of human destinies. ...
(Book VI, Ch. XLIII)
. . . Deronda's life could be determined by the historical des­
tiny of the Jews. . . .
(Book VI, Ch. XLIV)
Gazing with a sad surprise 
At surging visions of her destiny--
(Motto, Book VII, Ch. LI)
. . . moving like creatures who were fulfilling a supernatural 
destiny. . . .
(Book VII, Ch. LIV)
• . . she no more thought of . . . [them] as likely to make a 
difference in her destiny. . . .
(Book VIII, Ch. LXV)
He felt more than a presentiment ... at this turn of destiny.
(Book VIII, Ch. LXIX)
. . . the great movements of the world, the larger destinies 
of mankind . . . enter like an earthquake into their own 
lives. ...
(Book VIII, Ch. LXIX)
The use of "destiny" to replace Greek "fate" obscures the 
notion of progressive expectation implicit in the former word.
Belief in destiny is often associated with an optimistic turn of mind, 
while fate brings with it overtones of pessimism and despair.
Though both words are used as synonyms, a subtle distinction 
remains between them. Destiny often points to the genius of the 
open future, while fate alludes to the hopeless strangleholds by 
unseen powers smothering the hopes of men. In short, destiny 
befits the determinism of an historicist world drunk with the future, 
while fate accords better with the Classical Greek vision. For 
example, to substitute fate for destiny in Schiller's famous line from 
Wallenstein's Death would undermine the buoyant surge of confidence
felt by the hero. To say that "I am a man of fate" sounds dismal
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when compared to the sanguine anticipation of "I am a man of des­
tiny. "
i
Both words imply an irrevocable course for man, a course 
governed by stringent cosmic laws, either cyclical or progressive.
In this respect, Eliot is warranted in using the terms interchangeably. 
A world controlled by scientific laws of biological determinism or by 
pre-established historical patterns resembles the relentless pre­
scriptions of a Classical Greek order of things. In Science and the 
Modern World, Whitehead sees a close similarity between scientific 
determinism and Greek drama:
The pilgrim fathers of the scientific imagination as it exists 
today are the great tragedians of ancient Athens, Aeschylus, 
Sophocles, Euripedes. Their vision of fate, remorseless and 
indifferent, urging a tragic incident to its inevitable issue, is 
the vision possessed by science . . . The laws of physics are 
the decrees of fate.
(Ch. 1)
Whitehead’s attitude could validate Eliot's assumption that the bio­
logical destiny regulating Daniel's life is of the same nature as 
Gwendolen’s battle with nemesis. From the viewpoint of individual 
behavior, however, the difference is critical. A scientific world is 
not an ethical universe, yet a Greek world is. Scientific laws are 
impervious to the moral actions of men, while the very stability of 
the Greek cosmos depends on keeping human passions in balance. 
Sin, hubris, hamartia vitally disturb the harmony of the spheres and 
necessitate the defensive vigilance of the Furies. Morality is an 
intrinsic part of the physical order in the Greek picture; morality in 
the modern scientific sphere is irrelevant. Thus Gwendolen's mis­
carriage of virtue demands an acknowledgment of guilt and respon­
sibility and the consequent burden of retributive payment. On the 
other hand, Daniel’s actions are impelled by a hereditary determin-
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ism imposed by biological laws beyond the reach of his conscience, 
his accountability, or his freedom of choice. The rift between the 
two plots remains, because the spiritual forces germane to the 
Gwendolen Harleth story are alien to those which propel the Zionist 
part.
In conclusion, the study of Romola, Middlemarch, and 
Daniel Deronda has brought to light the dual strain in Eliot’s attitude 
towards history. In labeling herself a "conservative-reformer, " she 
was aware of this conflict in her temperament. As a "conservative, " 
Eliot treasured the traditional tableau of a fixed and ordered uni­
verse, in which the writing of history was merely a preservation of 
vicissitudes bearing little vital connection to the underlying structure 
and functioning of the total system. The historical novelist filled an 
important craving to satisfy what Henry James called "the hunger 
for history, " that is, an intense curiosity to know not only ". . . 
the immediate crudity of what 'happens! but the much finer complex­
ity" in which ". . . hats and dental work. . . form part of the un­
created history of the race. . . " (Novel, A Forum on Fiction, Spring 
1970, p. 260). The traditional concept of the role of history in the 
novel appears in the minutely detailed static canvas of Romola. As 
a "reformer, " however, Eliot began to view history as an evolution­
ary process, so much so that Darwinism and historicism indelibly 
mark the last two novels, Middlemarch and the Zionism of Daniel 
Deronda. Like Darwinism, Zionism was spurred by the doctrine 
of development, one in the biological, the other in the political 
sphere. Eliot, like many in her age, turned to the idea of 
nationality as spiritual succor in counteracting the religious
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bankruptcy of The Origin of Species. History as historicism was 
imbued with mystical attributes, and history became prophecy. 
Despite modern disesteem for nineteenth-century historicist predic­
tions, the establishment of the state of Israel in the twentieth century 
prompts even the most jaded skeptic to acknowledge Eliot's 
astonishing prescience.
The "conservative-reformer" split in Eliot's outlook mirror­
ed a similar duplexity in the Victorian psyche, that is, the coupling 
of the critical spirit and the will to believe, a psyche which was, to 
use Carlyle's words, "at once destitute of faith and terrified at 
skepticism. " This state of mind resulted in a tension, such as 
Walter Houghton described in The Victorian Frame of Mind, a 
"tension between the emancipated head and the traditional heart"
(pp. 106-7). In honoring the advanced intellectual thought of her 
day, Eliot carefully sifted and salvaged the wealth of the past. A 
foolish consistency, Emerson's hobgoblin, was secondary to Eliot's 
urgent impulse to rescue the precious cast-offs of the scientific 
avant-garde. If all truth were prey to the permutations of the 
time-spirit, this fact also applied to the latest paradigms of 
science. Holding The Origin of Species in one hand, Eliot kept a 
strong grip on Oedipus Rex in the other. The two worlds were 
not fused by her, but neither was refused.
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